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Abstract
Byzantine reliable broadcast is a powerful primitive that allows a set of processes to agree on a
message from a designated sender, even if some processes (including the sender) are Byzantine.
Existing broadcast protocols for this setting scale poorly, as they typically build on quorum
systems with strong intersection guarantees, which results in linear per-process communication and
computation complexity.
We generalize the Byzantine reliable broadcast abstraction to the probabilistic setting, allowing
each of its properties to be violated with a fixed, arbitrarily small probability. We leverage these
relaxed guarantees in a protocol where we replace quorums with stochastic samples. Compared to
quorums, samples are significantly smaller in size, leading to a more scalable design. We obtain
the first Byzantine reliable broadcast protocol with logarithmic per-process communication and
computation complexity.
We conduct a complete and thorough analysis of our protocol, deriving bounds on the probability
of each of its properties being compromised. During our analysis, we introduce a novel general
technique we call adversary decorators. Adversary decorators allow us to make claims about the
optimal strategy of the Byzantine adversary without having to make any additional assumptions.
We also introduce Threshold Contagion, a model of message propagation through a system with
Byzantine processes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first formal analysis of a probabilistic
broadcast protocol in the Byzantine fault model. We show numerically that practically negligible
failure probabilities can be achieved with realistic security parameters.
∗This is an extended version of a conference article, to appear in the proceedings of the 33rd International Symposium on
Distributed Computing (DISC 2019), October 14–18, 2019, Budapest, Hungary, https://10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2019.22.
This extended version includes a detailed probability analysis of our algorithms (Appendices A to E). Typically, probabilistic
broadcast algorithms are comparatively simple, but proving their correctness can be surprisingly hard. In our case, this is
exacerbated by the presence of a Byzantine adversary with an a priori unknown distribution. We believe, however, that





















Broadcast is a popular abstraction in the distributed systems toolbox, allowing a process to transmit
messages to a set of processes. The literature defines many flavors of broadcast, with different safety
and liveness guarantees [14, 25, 33, 40, 46]. In this paper we focus on Byzantine reliable broadcast, as
defined by Bracha [12]. This abstraction is a central building block in practical Byzantine fault-tolerant
(BFT) systems [15, 19, 32]. We tackle the problem of its scalability, namely reducing the complexity
of Byzantine reliable broadcast, and seeking good performance despite a large number of participating
processes.
In Byzantine reliable broadcast, a designated sender broadcasts a single message. Intuitively, the
broadcast abstraction ensures that no two correct processes deliver different messages (consistency),
either all correct processes deliver a message or none does (totality), and that, if the sender is correct,
all correct processes eventually deliver the broadcast message (validity). This must hold despite a
certain fraction of Byzantine processes, potentially including the sender. We denote by N the number
of processes in the system, and f the fraction of processes that are Byzantine. Existing algorithms for
Byzantine reliable broadcast scale poorly as they typically have O(N) per-process communication
complexity [13, 40, 43, 51]. The root cause for poor scalability of these algorithms is their use of
quorums [41, 54], i.e., sets of processes that are large enough to always intersect in at least one correct
process. The size of a quorum grows linearly with the size of the system [14].
To overcome the scalability limitation of quorum-based broadcast, Malkhi et al. [44] generalize
quorums to the probabilistic setting. In this setting, two random quorums intersect with a fixed,
arbitrarily high probability, allowing the size of each quorum to be reduced to O(
√
N). We are not
aware of any Byzantine reliable broadcast algorithm building on probabilistic quorums; nevertheless,
such an algorithm could have a per-process communication complexity reduced from O(N) to O(
√
N).
The activet protocol [40] uses a form of samples for an optimistic path, but relies on synchrony and
has a linear worst-case complexity (that is arguably very likely to occur with only moderate amounts
of faulty processes).
Samples. In this paper, we present a probabilistic gossip-based Byzantine reliable broadcast
algorithm having O(logN) per-process communication and computation complexity, at the expense
of O(logN/loglogN) latency. Essentially, we propose samples as a replacement for quorums. Like a
probabilistic quorum, a sample is a randomly selected set of processes. Unlike quorums, samples do
not need to intersect. Samples can be significantly smaller than quorums, as each sample must be
large enough only to be representative of the system with high probability.
A process can use its sample to gather information about the global state of the system. An
old Italian saying provides an intuitive understanding of this shift of paradigm: “To know if the sea
is salty, one needs not drink all of it!” Intuitively, we leverage the law of large numbers, trading
performance for a fixed, arbitrarily small probability of non-representativeness. 1
Throughout this paper, we extensively use samples to estimate the number of processes satisfying
a set of yes-or-no predicates, e.g., the number of processes that are ready to deliver a message m.
Consider the case where a correct process pi queries K randomly selected processes (a sample) for
a predicate P . Assume a fraction p of correct processes from the whole system satisfy predicate P .
Let x be the fraction of positive responses (out of K) that pi collects. By the Chernoff bound, the
probability of |x−p|≥f+ is smaller or equal to exp(−λ()K), where λ quickly increases with . For
sufficient K, the probability of x differing from p by more than f+ can be made exponentially small.
1To get an intuition of the difference between quorums and samples, consider the emulation of a shared memory in
message passing [3]. One writes in a quorum and reads from a quorum to fetch the last value written. Our algorithms
are rather in the vein of ”write all, read any”. Here we would ”write” using a gossip primitive and ”sample” the system
to seek the last value.
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Our algorithms use a sampling oracle that returns the identity of a process from the system picked
with uniform probability. In a permissioned system (i.e., one where the set of participating processes is
known) sampling reduces to picking with uniform probability an element from the set of processes. In
a permissionless system subject to Byzantine failures and slow churn, a (nearly) uniform sampling
mechanism is still achievable using gossip [10].
Scalable Byzantine Reliable Broadcast. Our probabilistic algorithm, Contagion, allows each
property of Byzantine reliable broadcast to be violated with an arbitrarily small probability . We
show that  scales sub-quadratically with N , and decays exponentially in the size of the samples. As a
result, for a fixed value of , the per-node communication complexity of Contagion is logarithmic.
We build Contagion incrementally, relying on two sub-protocols, as we describe next.
First, Murmur is a probabilistic broadcast algorithm that uses simple message dissemination to
establish validity and totality. In this algorithm, each correct process relays the sender’s message to a
randomly picked gossip sample of other processes. For the sample size Ω(logN), the resulting gossip
network is a connected graph with O(logN/loglogN) diameter, with high probability [21, 17]. In case
of a Byzantine sender, however, Murmur does not guarantee consistency.
Second, Sieve is a probabilistic consistent broadcast algorithm that guarantees consistency, i.e.,
no two correct processes deliver different messages. To do so, each correct process uses a randomly
selected echo sample. Intuitively, if enough processes from any echo sample confirm a message m, then
with high probability no correct processes in the system delivers a different message m′. Sieve, however,
does not ensure totality. If a Byzantine sender broadcasts multiple conflicting messages, a correct
process might be unable to gather sufficient confirmations for either of them from its echo sample, and
consequently would not deliver any message, even if some correct process delivers a message.
Finally, Contagion is a probabilistic Byzantine reliable broadcast algorithm that guarantees
validity, consistency, and totality. The sender uses Sieve to disseminate a consistent message to a subset
of the correct processes. In order to achieve totality, Contagion mimics the spreading of a contagious
disease in a population. A process samples the system and if it observes enough other ”infected”
processes in its sample, it becomes infected itself. If a critical fraction of processes is initially infected
by having received a message from the underlying Sieve layer, the message spreads to all correct
processes with high probability. If a process observes enough other infected processes, it delivers. As
in the original deterministic implementation by Bracha [12], the crucial point here is that ”enough” for
becoming infected is less than ”enough” for delivering. This way, with high probability, either all
correct processes deliver a message or none does—Contagion satisfies totality. The other two important
properties (validity and consistency) are inherited from the underlying (Contagion and Sieve) layers.
Probability Analysis and Applications. A major technical contribution of this work is a complete,
formal analysis of the properties of our three algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
such analysis applied to a probabilistic broadcast algorithm in the Byzantine fault model, and this
turned out to be challenging. Intuitively, providing a bound on the probability of a property being
violated reduces to studying a joint distribution between the inherent randomness of the system and
the behavior of the Byzantine adversary. Since the behavior of the adversary is arbitrary, the marginal
distribution of the Byzantine’s behavior is unknown.
We develop two novel strategies to bound the probability of a property being violated, which we
use in the analysis of Sieve and Contagion respectively.
(1) When evaluating the consistency of Sieve, we show that a bound holds for every possibly
optimal adversarial strategy. Essentially, we identify a subset of adversarial strategies that we prove to
include the optimal one, i.e., the one that has the highest probability of compromising the consistency of
Sieve. We then prove that every possibly optimal adversarial strategy has a probability of compromising
the consistency of Sieve smaller than some .
(2) When evaluating the totality of Contagion, we show that the adversarial strategy does not affect
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the outcome of the execution. Here, we show that any adversarial strategy reduces to a well-defined
sequence of choices. We then prove that, due to the limited knowledge of the Byzantine adversary,
every choice is equivalent to a random one.
Our analysis shows that, for a practical choice of parameters, the probability of violating the
properties of our algorithm can be brought down to 10−16 for systems with thousands of processes.
In the rest of this paper, we state our system model and assumptions (Section 2), and then present
our Murmur, Sieve, and Contagion algorithms (Sections 3 to 5). While describing our algorithms,
we give high-level ideas about their analyses and refer the interested reader to the corresponding
appendices containing all details including pseudocode and formal proofs. We discuss related work in
Section 7.
2 Model and Assumptions
We assume an asynchronous message-passing system where the set Π of N= |Π| processes partaking in
an algorithm is fixed. Any two processes can communicate via a reliable authenticated point-to-point
link.
We assume that each correct process has access to a local, unbiased, independent source of
randomness. We assume that every correct process has direct access to an oracle Ω that, provided with
an integer n≤N , yields the identities of n distinct processes, chosen uniformly at random from Π.
Implementing Ω is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is straightforward in practice. In a system
where the set of participating processes is known, sampling reduces to picking with uniform probability
an element from the set of processes. In a system without a global membership view that may even
be subject to slow churn, a (nearly) uniform sampling mechanism is available in literature due to
Bortnikov et al. [10].
At most a fraction f of the processes are Byzantine, i.e., subject to arbitrary failures [38]. Byzantine
processes may collude and coordinate their actions. Unless stated otherwise, we denote by ΠC⊆Π the
set of correct processes and by C= |ΠC |=(1−f)N the number of correct processes. We assume a
static Byzantine adversary controlling the faulty processes, i.e., the set of processes controlled by the
adversary is fixed at the beginning and does not change throughout the execution of the protocols.
We make standard cryptographic assumptions regarding the power of the adversary, namely that
it cannot subvert cryptographic primitives, e.g., forge a signature. We also assume that Byzantine
processes are not aware of (1) the output of the local source of randomness of any correct process; and
(2) which correct processes are communicating with each other. The latter assumption is important to
prevent the adversary from poisoning the view of the system of a targeted correct process without having
to bias the local randomness source of any correct process. Even against ISP-grade adversaries, we can
implement this assumption in practice by means such as onion routing [18] or private messaging [52].
3 Probabilistic Broadcast with Murmur
In this section, we introduce the probabilistic broadcast abstraction and its implementation, Murmur.
Briefly, probabilistic broadcast ensures validity and totality. We use this abstraction in Sieve (Section 4)
to initially distribute the message from a sender to all correct processes.
The probabilistic broadcast interface assumes a specific sender process σ. An instance pb of
probabilistic broadcast exports two events. First, process σ can request through 〈pb.Broadcast |m〉
to broadcast a message m. Second, the indication event 〈pb.Deliver |m〉 is an upcall for delivering
message m broadcast by σ. For any ∈ [0,1], we say that probabilistic broadcast is -secure if:
1. No duplication: No correct process delivers more than one message.
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2. Integrity: If a correct process delivers a message m, and σ is correct, then m was previously
broadcast by σ.
3. -Validity: If σ is correct, and σ broadcasts a message m, then σ eventually delivers m with
probability at least (1−).
4. -Totality: If a correct process delivers a message, then every correct process eventually delivers
a message with probability at least (1−).
3.1 Gossip-based Algorithm
Murmur (presented in detail in Appendix A, Algorithm 1) distributes a single message across the
system by means of gossip: upon reception, a correct process relays the message to a set of randomly
selected neighbors. The algorithm depends on one parameter: expected gossip sample size G.
Upon initialization, every correct process uses the sampling oracle Ω to select (on average) G other
processes to gossip with. Gossip links are reciprocated, making the gossip graph undirected.
To broadcast a message m, the designated sender σ signs m and sends it to all its neighbors. Upon
receiving a correctly signed message m from σ for the first time, each correct process delivers m and
forwards m to every process in its neighborhood.
3.2 Analysis Using Erdo¨s-Re´nyi Graphs
The detailed analysis, provided in Appendix A, Sections A.3 and A.4, formally proves the correctness
of Murmur by deriving a bound on  as a function of the algorithm and system parameters. Here we
give a very high-level sketch of our probabilistic analysis of Murmur.
No duplication, integrity and -validity. (Appendix A.3) Murmur satisfies these properties:
1. No duplication: A correct process maintains a delivered variable that it checks and updates
when delivering a message, preventing it from delivering more than one message.
2. Integrity: Before broadcasting a message, the sender signs that message with its private key.
Before delivering a message m, a correct process verifies m’s signature. This prevents any correct
process from delivering a message that was not previously broadcast by the sender.
3. -Validity: Upon broadcasting a message, the sender also immediately delivers it. Since this
happens deterministically, Murmur satisfies 0-validity, independently from the parameter G.
-Totality. (Appendix A.4) Murmur satisfies -totality with  upper-bounded by a function that
decays exponentially with G, and polynomially increases with f . We prove that the network of
connections established among the correct processes is an undirected Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph [21]. Totality
is satisfied if such graph is connected.
Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graphs are well known in literature [1] to display a connectivity phase transition:
when the expected number of connections each node has exceeds the logarithm of the number of nodes,
the probability of the graph being connected steeply increases from 0 to 1 (in the limit of infinitely
large systems, this increase becomes a step function). We use this result to compute the probability of
the sub-graph of correct processes being connected and, consequently, of Murmur satisfying totality
(Theorem 4).
4 Probabilistic Consistent Broadcast with Sieve
In this section, we first introduce the probabilistic consistent broadcast abstraction, which allows (a
subset of) the correct processes to agree on a single message from a (potentially Byzantine) designated
sender. We then discuss Sieve, an implementation of this abstraction. We use probabilistic consistent
broadcast in the implementation of Contagion (see Section 5) as a way to consistently disseminate
messages. Sieve itself builds on top of probabilistic broadcast (see Section 3).
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Probabilistic consistent broadcast does not guarantee totality, but it does guarantee consistency:
despite a Byzantine sender, no two correct processes deliver different messages. If the sender is
Byzantine, however, it may happen with a non-negligible probability that only a proper subset of the
correct processes deliver the message.
For any ∈ [0,1], we say that probabilistic consistent broadcast is -secure if it satisfies the properties
of No duplication and Integrity as defined above, and:
• -Total validity: If σ is correct, and σ broadcasts a message m, every correct process eventually
delivers m with probability at least (1−).
• -Consistency: Every correct process that delivers a message delivers the same message with
probability at least (1−).
4.1 Sample-Based Algorithm
Sieve (presented in detail in Appendix B, Algorithm 3) uses Echo messages to consistently distribute a
single message to (a subset of) the correct processes: before delivering a message, a correct process
samples the system to estimate how many other processes received the same message. The algorithm
depends on two parameters: the echo sample size E and the delivery threshold Eˆ.
Upon initialization, every correct process uses the sampling oracle Ω to select an echo sample E of
size E, and sends an EchoSubscribe message to every process in E . Upon broadcasting, the sender
uses the underlying probabilistic broadcast (e.g., Murmur) to initially distribute a message to every
correct process. This step does not ensure consistency, so processes may see conflicting messages if the
sender σ is Byzantine. Upon receiving a message m from probabilistic broadcast, a correct process pi
sends an (Echo,m) message to every process that sent an EchoSubscribe message to pi. (Note that,
due to the no duplication property of probabilistic broadcast, this can happen only once per process.)
Upon collecting Eˆ (Echo,m) messages from its echo sample E , pi delivers m. Notably, if pi delivers
m, then with high probability every other correct process either also delivers m, or does not deliver
anything at all, but never delivers m′ 6=m.
4.2 Analysis Using Adversary Decorators
Here we present a high-level outline of the analysis of Sieve; for a full formal treatment, see Appendix B,
where we prove the correctness of Sieve by deriving a bound on .
No duplication and integrity. (Appendix B.3) Sieve deterministically satisfies these properties
the same way as Murmur does.
-Total Validity. (Appendix B.4) Since we assume a correct sender σ (by the premise of total
validity), a bound on the probability  of violating total validity can easily be derived from the
probability of the underlying probabilistic broadcast failing and from the probability of some process’
random echo sample having more than E−Eˆ Byzantine processes.
-Consistency. (Appendices B.5-B.10) While the intuition why Sieve satisfies consistency is
rather simple, proving it formally is the most technically involved part of this paper. We now provide
the intuition and present the techniques we use to prove it, while deferring the full body of the formal
proof to the appendix.
In order for Sieve to violate consistency, two correct processes must deliver two different messages
(which can only happen if the sender σ is malicious). This, in turn, means that two correct processes
pi and pi′ must observe two different messages m and m′ sufficiently represented in their respective
echo samples. I.e., pi receives (Echo,m) at least Eˆ times and pi′ receives (Echo,m′) at least Eˆ times.
Note that a correct process only sends (Echo,m) for a single message m received from the underlying
probabilistic broadcast layer. The intuition of Sieve is the same as in quorum-based algorithms. With
quorums, if enough correct processes issue (Echo,m) to make at least one correct process deliver
m, the remaining processes (regardless of the behavior of the Byzantine ones) are not sufficient to
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make any other correct process deliver m′. For Sieve, this holds with high probability as long as Eˆ is
sufficiently high and the fraction f of Byzantine processes is limited.
To prove these intuitions, we first describe Simplified Sieve (Appendix B.6), a strawman variant of
Sieve that is easier to analyze. We prove that Simplified Sieve guarantees consistency with strictly lower
probability than Sieve does (Appendix B.8, Lemma 12). Thus, an upper bound on the probability of
Simplified Sieve failing is also an upper bound on the probability of Sieve failing.
Next, we analyze Simplified Sieve using a novel technique that involves modeling the adversary as
an algorithm that interacts with the system through a well-defined interface (Appendix B.7). We start
from the set of all possible adversarial algorithms and gradually reduce this set, while proving that
the reduced set still includes an optimal adversary (Appendix B.9). (An adversary is optimal if it
maximizes the probability  of violating consistency.) Intuitively, we prove that certain actions of
the adversary always lead to strictly lowering , and thus need not be considered. For example, an
adversary can only decrease its chance of compromising consistency when omitting Echo messages.
To this end, we introduce the concept of decorators. A decorator is an algorithm that lies between
an adversary and a system. It emulates a system and exposes the corresponding interface to the
decorated adversary. At the same time, the decorator also exposes the interface of an adversary to
interact with a system. The purpose of a decorator is to alter the interaction between the adversary
and the system. For any decorated adversary, we prove that the decorator does not decrease the
probability  of the adversary compromising the system. Thus, a decorator effectively transforms an
adversary into a stronger one. Each decorator maps a set of adversaries into one of its proper subsets
that is easier to analyze (Appendix D).
Through a series of decorators, we obtain a tractable set of adversaries that provably contains an
optimal one. Then we derive the bound on  under these adversaries (Theorem 9).
5 Probabilistic Byzantine Reliable Broadcast with Contagion
Our main algorithm, Contagion, implements the probabilistic Byzantine reliable broadcast abstraction.
This abstraction is strictly stronger than probabilistic consistent broadcast, as it additionally guarantees
-totality. Despite a Byzantine sender, either none or every correct process delivers the broadcast
message.
For any ∈ [0,1], we say that probabilistic Byzantine reliable broadcast is -secure if it satisfies the
properties of No duplication, Integrity, -Validity, -Consistency and -Totality, as already
defined in previous sections.
5.1 Feedback-Based Algorithm
Our algorithm implementing probabilistic Byzantine reliable broadcast is called Contagion and we
present it in detail in Appendix C (Algorithm 7). It uses a feedback mechanism to securely distribute
a single message to every correct process. The main challenge of Contagion is to ensure totality; we
prove that the other properties are easily inherited from the underlying layer with high probability.
The basic idea of Contagion roughly corresponds to the last stage of Bracha’s broadcast algorithm
[12]. During the execution of Contagion for message m, processes first become ready for m. A correct
process pi can become ready for m in two ways:
1. pi receives m from the underlying consistent broadcast layer.
2. pi observes a certain fraction of other processes being ready for m.
A correct process delivers m only after it observes enough other processes being ready for m.
Unlike Bracha, we use samples (as opposed to quorums) to assess whether enough nodes are
ready for m (and consequently our results are all probabilistic in nature). Upon initialization, every
correct process selects a ready sample R of size R and a delivery sample D of size D. Our algorithm
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depends on four parameters: the ready and delivery sample sizes R and D, and the ready and delivery
thresholds Rˆ and Dˆ.
The delivery sample D is the sample used to assess whether m can be delivered. A correct process
pi delivers m if at least Dˆ out of the D processes in pi’s delivery sample are ready for m.
The purpose of the ready sample R is to create a feedback loop, a crucial part of the Contagion
algorithm. When a correct process pi observes at least Rˆ out of the R other processes in pi’s ready
sample to be ready for m, pi itself becomes ready for m. A direct consequence of such a feedback loop
is the existence of a critical fraction of processes that, when ready for m, cause all the other correct
processes become ready for m with high probability.
We require that Rˆ/R<Dˆ/D, i.e., the fraction of ready processes pi needs to observe in order to
become ready itself is smaller than the fraction of ready processed required for pi to deliver m. Totality
is then implied by the following intuitive argument. If a correct process pi delivers m, it must have
observed a fraction of at least Dˆ/D other processes being ready for m. As this fraction is higher than
the critical fraction required for all correct processes to become ready for m, all correct processes will
eventually become ready for m. Consequently, all correct processes will eventually deliver m. On
the other hand, if too few processes are initially ready for m, such that the critical fraction is not
reached, with high probability no correct process will observe the (even higher) fraction Dˆ/D of ready
processes in its sample. Consequently, no correct process delivers m.
To broadcast a message m, the sender σ initially uses probabilistic consistent broadcast (Section 4)
to disseminate m consistently to (a subset of) the correct processes. All correct processes that receive
m through probabilistic consistent broadcast become ready for m. If their number is sufficiently high,
according to the mechanism described above, all correct processes deliver m with high probability.
If only a few correct processes deliver receive m from probabilistic consistent broadcast, with high
probability no correct process delivers m.
5.2 Threshold Contagion Game
Before presenting the analysis of Contagion, we overview the Threshold Contagion game, an important
tool in our analysis. In this game, we simulate the spreading of a contagious disease (without a cure)
among members of a population, the same way the “readiness” for a message spreads among correct
processes that execute our Contagion algorithm.
Threshold Contagion is played on the nodes of a directed multigraph, where each node represents
a member of a population (whose state is either infected or healthy), and each edge represents a
can-infect relation. An edge (a,b) means that a can infect b. We also call a the predecessor of b. In our
Contagion algorithm, this corresponds to a being in the ready sample of b. Analogously to Contagion,
a node becomes infected when enough of its predecessors are infected.
Threshold Contagion is played by one player in one or more rounds. At the beginning of each round,
the player infects a subset of the healthy nodes. In the rest of the round, the infection (analogous to
the readiness for a message) propagates as follows. A healthy node that reaches a certain threshold
(Rˆ) of infected predecessors becomes infected as well (potentially contributing to the infection of more
nodes). The round finishes when no healthy node has Rˆ or more infected predecessors, or when all
nodes are infected.
In the analogy with our Contagion algorithm, infection by a player at the start of each round
corresponds to a process receiving a message from the underlying probabilistic consistent broadcast
layer. Infection through other nodes is analogous to observing Rˆ ready processes in the ready sample.
We analyze the Threshold Contagion game, and compute the probability distribution underlying
the number of nodes that are infected at the end of a each round, depending on the number of healthy
nodes infected by the player. Applying this analysis to the Contagion algorithm (the adversary being
the player), we obtain the probability distribution of the number of processes ready for a message,
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which, in turn, allows us to compute a bound on the probability of violating the properties of Contagion.
We provide all details on the Threshold Contagion game itself in Appendix E.
5.3 Analysis Using Threshold Contagion
Here we present an outline of the analysis of Contagion; for a full formal treatment, see Appendix C.
No duplication and integrity. (Appendix C.3) Contagion deterministically satisfies these
properties the same way as our previous algorithms do.
-Validity. (Appendix C.4) Assuming a correct sender σ (by the premise of validity), we derive a
bound on the probability  of violating validity from the probability of the underlying probabilistic
consistent broadcast failing and from the probability of σ’s random delivery sample containig more
than D−Dˆ Byzantine processes.
-Consistency. (Appendix C.9) When computing the upper bound on the probability  of
compromising consistency, we assume that if the consistency of the underlying probabilistic consistent
broadcast is compromised, then the consistency of probabilistic Byzantine reliable broadcast is
compromised as well. The rest of the analysis assumes that probabilistic Byzantine reliable broadcast
is consistent.
In such case, every correct process receives at most one message m∗ from the underlying probabilistic
consistent broadcast. Simply by acting correctly, Byzantine processes can cause any correct process to
eventually deliver m∗. Consistency is compromised if the adversary can also cause at least one correct
process to deliver a message m 6=m∗, given that no correct process becomes ready for m by receiving
it through the underlying probabilistic consistent broadcast.
We start by noting that, since a correct process pi can be ready for an arbitrary number of messages,
the set of processes that are eventually ready for m is not affected by which processes are eventually
ready for a message m∗. If enough processes in pi’s delivery sample are eventually ready both for m
and m∗, then pi can deliver either m or m∗. In this case, the adversary (who controls the network
scheduling, see Section 2) decides which message pi delivers.
The probability of m being delivered by any correct process is maximized when every Byzantine
process behaves as if it was ready for m (Appendix C.9, Lemma 28). Note that a Byzantine process
being ready for m behaves identically to a correct process that receives m through probabilistic
consistent broadcast. We model the adversarial system using a single-round game of Threshold
Contagion where both correct and Byzantine processes are represented as nodes in the multigraph and
all nodes representing Byzantine processes are initially infected (Appendix C.7, Lemma 26).
Given the distribution of the number of correct processes that are ready for m at the end Threshold
Contagion, we compute the probability that at least one correct process will deliver m 6=m∗. This
probability, combined with the probability that the consistency of probabilistic consistent broadcast is
violated, yields the probability  of violating the consistency of Contagion.
-Totality. Again, to compute an upper bound on the probability of our algorithm compromising
totality, we assume that compromising the consistency of probabilistic consistent broadcast also
compromises the totality of probabilistic Byzantine reliable broadcast. Assuming that probabilistic
consistent broadcast satisfies consistency, at most one message m∗ is received by any correct process
through the underlying probabilistic consistent broadcast. We loosen the bound on the probability
of compromising totality (and simplify analysis) by considering totality to be compromised if any
message m 6=m∗ is delivered by any correct process. This allows us to focus on message m∗. We
further loosen the bound by assuming that the Byzantine adversary can arbitrarily cause any correct
process to become ready for m∗. Whenever this happens, zero or more additional correct processes
will also become ready for m∗ as a result of the feedback loop described in Section 5.1. To compromise
totality, there must exists at least one correct process that delivers m∗ and at least one correct process
does not.
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We prove (Appendix C.10.3, Lemma 31) that the optimal adversarial strategy to compromise
totality is to repeat the following. (1) Make a correct node ready for m∗. (2) Wait until the “readiness”
propagates to zero or more correct nodes. (3) Have specific Byzantine processes behave as correct
processes ready for m∗, if this leads to some (but not all) correct processes delivering m∗. Totality
is satisfied if, after every step of the adversary, either the feedback loop makes all correct processes
deliver m∗ (relying only on correct processes’ ready samples), or no correct process delivers m∗ (even
with the “support” of Byzantine processes) (Theorem 14). Otherwise, totality is violated.
We study this behavior with a multi-round game of Threshold Contagion, where only correct
processes are represented as nodes in the multigraph and, at the beginning of each round, the player
(i.e., the adversary) infects one uninfected node. From the probability distribution of the number of
infected nodes after each round, we derive the probability of compromising totality by message m∗.
This probability equals to the probability that there is at least one round after which the number of
infected nodes allows some but not all the processes to deliver m∗.
6 Security and Complexity Evaluation
Figure 1: Left – -security of Contagion, as a function of the average
sample size S=〈G,E,R,D〉. We use a system size of 1024 processes and
fractions of tolerated Byzantine processes f=0.1 and f=0.15. Right –
Square root of the normalized -security of Contagion, as a function of
the system size N , for various fractions of Byzantine processes (f) and
average sample sizes (S). We normalize the values in each series by the
first element of that series. All lines appearing to grow sub-linearly with a
square-rooted y-axis demonstrates that the normalized  security grows
sub-quadratically.
In Sections 3 to 5, we in-
troduced three algorithms,
Murmur, Sieve and Con-
tagion, and outlined their
analysis (deferring the for-
mal details to the appen-
dices).
The modular design of
our algorithm allows us to
study its components in-
dependently. We employ
numerical techniques to
maximize the -security of
Contagion, under the con-
straint that the sum of all
the sample sizes of a pro-
cess is constant (G+E+
R + D = const). Since
a process communicates
with all the processes in
its samples, this corre-
sponds to a fixed commu-
nication complexity.
For a given system size N and fraction of Byzantine processes f , we relate this per-process
communication complexity to the -security of Contagion. As Figure 1 (left) shows, the probability 
of compromising the security of Contagion decays exponentially in the average sample size S.
We also study how the -security of Contagion changes as a function of the system size N , for
a fixed set of parameters (G,E,R,D). Figure 1 (right) shows that the -security is bounded by a
quadratic function in N . Thus, for a fixed security , the average sample size (and consequently, the
communication complexity of our algorithm) grows logarithmically with the system size N .
Given that a process pi only exchanges a constant number of messages with each member of pi’s
samples, and the sample size is logarithmic in system size, each node needs to exchange O(logN)
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messages. Thus, for N nodes in the system, the overall message complexity is O(N logN). The latency
in terms of message delays between broadcasting and delivery of a message is O(logN/loglogN).
Specifically, the latency converges to O(logN/loglogN) message delays for gossip-based dissemination
with Murmur (we prove this in Appendix A.4, Theorem 5), and 2 message delays in total for Echo
(Sieve) and Ready (Contagion) messages.
7 Related Work
At its base, our broadcast algorithm relies on gossip. There is a great body of literature studying
various aspects of gossip, proposing flavors of gossip protocols for different environments and analyzing
their complexities [2, 6, 8, 7, 4, 20, 23, 30, 50, 28, 26, 27, 53, 55, 29, 34]. However, to the best of our
knowledge, we propose the first highly scalable gossip-based reliable broadcast protocol resilient to
Byzantine faults with a thorough probabilistic analysis.
The communication pattern in the implementation of both our Sieve and Contagion algorithms can
be traced back to the Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement (ABA) primitive of Bracha and Toueg [13]
and the subsequent line of work [12, 15, 40, 48]. Indeed, our echo-based mechanism in Sieve resembles
algorithms from classic quorum-based systems for Byzantine consistent broadcast [51, 47]. The
ready-based mechanism in Contagion is inspired by a two-phase protocol appearing in several practical
(quorum-based) systems [15, 19, 42]. Compared to classic work on this topic, the key feature of
Contagion and Sieve is that they replace the building block of quorum systems with stochastic samples,
thus enabling better scalability for the price of abandoning deterministic guarantees.
There is significant prior work on using epidemic algorithms to implement scalable reliable
broadcast [9, 22, 35, 39]. Under benign failures or constant churn, these algorithms ensure, with high
probability, that every broadcast message reaches all or none, and that all messages from correct
senders are delivered. Our goal is to additionally provide consistency for broadcast messages, and
tolerate Byzantine environments [13, 43, 51]. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply
the epidemic sample-based methodology in this context. Our main algorithm Contagion scales well to
dynamic systems of thousands of nodes, some of which may be Byzantine. This makes it a suitable
choice for permissionless settings that are gaining popularity with the advent of blockchains [45].
Distributed clustering techniques seek to group the processes of a system into clusters, sometimes
called shards or quorums, of size O(logN) [5, 31, 36, 37, 49]. This line of work has various goals
(e.g., leader election, “almost everywhere” agreement, building an overlay network) and they also
aim for scalable solutions. The overarching principle in clustering techniques is similar to our use of
samples: build each cluster in a provably random manner so that the adversary cannot dominate any
single cluster. Samples in our solution are private and individual on a per-process basis, in contrast to
clusters which are typically public and global for the whole system.
The idea of communication locality appears in the context of secure multi-party computation
(MPC) protocols [11, 16, 24]. This property captures the intuition that, in order to obtain scalable
distributed protocols and permit a large number of participants, it is desirable to limit the number of
participants each process must communicate with. All of our three algorithms have this communication
locality property, since each process coordinates only with logarithmically-sized samples. In contrast
to secure MPC protocols, our algorithms have different goals, system model, or assumptions (e.g., we
do not assume a client-server model [24], nor do we seek to address privacy issues). Our algorithms
can be used as building blocks towards helping tackle scalability in MPC protocols, and we consider
this an interesting avenue for future work.
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A Murmur
In this appendix, we present in greater detail the probabilistic broadcast abstraction and discuss
its properties. We then present Murmur, an algorithm that implements probabilistic broadcast, and
evaluate its security and complexity as a function of its parameters.
The probabilistic broadcast abstraction serves the purpose of reliably broadcasting a single message
from a designated correct sender to all correct processes (validity, totality).
We use probabilistic broadcast in the implementation of Sieve (see Section 4) to initially distribute
the message from the designated sender to all correct processes.
A.1 Definition
The probabilistic broadcast interface (instance pb, sender σ) exports the following events:
• Request: 〈pb.Broadcast |m〉: Broadcasts a message m to all processes. This is only used by σ.
• Indication 〈pb.Deliver |m〉: Delivers a message m broadcast by process σ.
For any ∈ [0,1], we say that probabilistic broadcast is -secure if:
1. No duplication: No correct process delivers more than one message.
2. Integrity: If a correct process delivers a message m, and σ is correct, then m was previously
broadcast by σ.
3. -Validity: If σ is correct, and σ broadcasts a message m, then σ eventually delivers m with
probability at least (1−).
4. -Totality: If a correct process delivers a message, then every correct process eventually delivers
a message with probability at least (1−).
A.2 Algorithm
Murmur (Algorithm 1) distributes a single message across the system by means of gossip: upon
reception, a correct process relays the message to a set of randomly selected neighbors. The algorithm
depends on one integer parameter, G (expected gossip sample size), whose value we discuss in
Appendix A.4.
Initialization Upon initialization, (line 11) every correct process randomly samples a value G¯ from
a Poisson distribution with expected value G, and uses the sampling oracle Ω to select G¯ distinct
processes that it will use to initialize its gossip sample G.
Link reciprocation Once its gossip sample is initialized, a correct process sends a GossipSubscribe
message to all the processes in G (line 13). Upon receiving a GossipSubscribe message from a
process pi (line 17), a correct process adds pi to its own gossip sample (line 22), and sends back the
gossiped message if it has already received it (line 20).
Gossip When broadcasting the message (line 34), a correct designated sender σ signs the message
and sends it to every process in its gossip sample G (line 28). Upon receiving a correctly signed
message from σ (line 37) for the first time (this is enforced by updating the value of delivered, line 25),




2: ProbabilisticBroadcast, instance pb
3:
4: Uses:
5: AuthenticatedPointToPointLinks, instance al
6:
7: Parameters:
8: G: expected gossip sample size
9:
10: upon event 〈pb.Init〉 do
11: G=Ω(Poisson[G]);
12: for all pi∈G do




17: upon event 〈al.Deliver |pi,[GossipSubscribe]〉 do
18: if delivered 6=⊥ then
19: (message,signature)=delivered;




24: procedure dispatch(message,signature) is
25: if delivered=⊥ then
26: delivered←(message,signature);
27: for all pi∈G do
28: trigger 〈al.Send |pi,[Gossip,message,signature]〉;
29: end for
30: trigger 〈pb.Deliver |message〉
31: end if
32:
33: upon event 〈pb.Broadcast |message〉 do . only process σ
34: dispatch(message,sign(message));
35:
36: upon event 〈al.Deliver |pi,[Gossip,message,signature]〉 do





A.3 No duplication, integrity and validity
We start by verifying that Murmur satistifes no duplication, integrity and 0-validity, independently
of G.
Theorem 1. Murmur satisfies no duplication.
Proof. Procedure dispatch explicitly checks (line 25) if the variable delivered is equal to ⊥ before
delivering any message. Before a message is delivered (line 30), delivered is updated to a value
different from ⊥ (line 26). Therefore a correct process only delivers one message.
Theorem 2. Murmur satistifes integrity.
Proof. Upon receiving a Gossip message, a correct process checks its signature against the public key
of the designated sender σ (line 37). Moreover, if σ is correct, it only signs message when broadcasting
(line 34). Since we assume that cryptographic signatures cannot be forged, this implies that the
message was previously broadcast by σ.
Theorem 3. Murmur satisfies 0-validity.
Proof. Upon broadcasting a message m, a correct sender calls the procedure dispatch(m,sign(m))
(line 34). Since delivered is initialized to ⊥, this immediately results in the delivery of m (line 30).
Since the validity property is satisfied deterministically, Murmur satisfies -validity for =0.
A.4 Totality
We now compute, given the parameter G, the -totality of Murmur. To this end, we first prove some
preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let ρ and pi be two correct processes, let ρ be in pi’s gossip sample. Then pi is eventually
in ρ’s gossip sample.
Proof. A gossip sample is updated only upon initialization (line 11) or when a GossipSubscribe
message is received (line 22).
If pi selected ρ upon initialization, then it also sent it a GossipSubscribe message (line 13).
Since Byzantine network scheduling can only finitely delay the messages between correct processes, ρ
eventually receives pi’s message (line 17) and adds pi to its gossip sample.
If pi received a GossipSubscribe message from ρ, then (line 13) ρ selected pi upon initialization,
which means that pi is already in ρ’s gossip sample.
Definition 1 (Correct gossip network). Let pi, ρ be two correct processes, let pi↔ ρ denote the
condition ρ is eventually in pi’s gossip sample. Lemma 1 proves that
(pi↔ρ)⇔(ρ↔pi)








Lemma 2. If the correct gossip network is connected, then Murmur satisfies totality.
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Proof. We start by noting that a correct process eventually delivers a message (line 30) if and only if
it eventually sets delivered to a value different from ⊥ (line 26).
Let pi be a correct process for which eventually delivered 6=⊥. Upon setting delivered← (m 6=⊥), pi
sends m to all the processes in its gossip sample (line 28). Moreover, upon receiving a GossipSubscribe
message after setting delivered←m, pi replies with m (line 20).
Therefore, every correct process that is eventually in pi’s gossip sample eventually satisfies
delivered 6=⊥. If G is connected, then a path exists in G between pi and every other correct process,
and they all eventually satisfy delivered 6=⊥, i.e., they deliver a message.
From Lemma 2 it follows that Murmur satisfies -totality if the probability of G being disconnected
is at most .
Notation 1 (Binomial distribution). We use Bin[N,p] to denote the binomial distribution with
N trials and p probability of success.
Notation 2 (Poisson distribution). We use Poisson[λ] to denote the Poisson distribution with
expected value λ.
Notation 3 (Probability). Let E, F be events. We use P[E] to denote the probability of E. We use
P[E |F ] to denote the probability of E, conditioned on the occurrence of F .
Let X, Y , Z be random variables. For example, we use the following expressions interchangeably:
P[X¯]←→P[X=X¯]
Note how X is a random variable, while X¯ is an element in the codomain of X. Stand-ins can be
combined. For example, we use the following expressions interchangeably:
P[X¯,Y¯ ] ←→ P[X=X¯,Y = Y¯ ]
P[X¯ | Y¯ ] ←→ P[X=X¯ |Y = Y¯ ]
P[X¯,Y¯ | Z¯] ←→ P[X=X¯,Y = Y¯ |Z= Z¯]
Stand-ins are only used to express exact values. Whenever non-trivial expressions are needed, we
use their explicit form. Explicit notation and stand-ins can be combined. For example, we use the
following expressions interchangeably:
P[X¯ |Y <K] ←→ P[X=X¯ |Y <K]
P[X¯ |X<K] ←→ P[X=X¯ |X<K]






Proof. It is a known result that, for large samples and small probabilities, a binomial distribution



























As we discussed in Appendix A.2, a gossip sample G is initialized upon initialization (line 11) by
first sampling a value G¯ from a Poisson[G] distribution, then selecting G¯ distinct processes from Π
with uniform probability.
Let pi∈ΠC ,ρ∈Π, let Ginpi be pi’s initial gossip sample, let q=G/N . By the law of total probability,
and using Equation (2), we have for large N





































































Let ρ1,...,ρR be distinct processes, with R≤N . Similar calculations yield
P[ρ1∈Ginpi ,...,ρR∈Ginpi ]=qR (3)
Equation (3) proves that every process ρ∈Π has an independent probability q of being in Ginpi .
Since for any two pi,ξ∈ΠC we have
(pi↔ξ)⇔(pi∈Ginξ ∨ξ∈Ginpi )







Therefore, following Equations (3) and (4), G=G(C,p) is an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph with H nodes
and p probability of connection between any two nodes.
Lemma 3 allows us to bound the -totality of Murmur, given G.












Proof. It follows immediately from Lemma 3 and a known result [1] on the connectivity of Erdo˝s–Re´nyi
graphs.
We prove an additional result on the latency of Murmur.
Theorem 5. The latency of Murmur is asymptotically sub-logarithmic. More formally, the diameter









































which proves the lemma. For a fixed security , we showed in Theorem 4 that G must scale




In this appendix, we present in greater detail the probabilistic consistent broadcast abstraction
and discuss its properties. We then present Sieve, an algorithm that implements probabilistic consistent
broadcast, and evaluate its security and complexity as a function of its parameters.
The probabilistic consistent broadcast abstraction allows a subset of the correct processes to
agree on a single message from a potentially Byzantine designated sender. Probabilistic consistent
broadcast is a distinct from probabilistic broadcast. Probabilistic broadcast guarantees (totality)
that if any correct process delivers a message, every correct process delivers a message. Probabilistic
consistent broadcast, instead, guarantees (consistency) that, even if the sender is Byzantine, no two
correct processes deliver different messages. However, if the sender is Byzantine, it may happen with
a non-negligible probability that only an intermediate fraction of the correct processes deliver the
message.
We use probabilistic consistent broadcast in the implementation of Contagion (see Section 5) as a
way to consistently broadcast messages.
B.1 Definition
The probabilistic consistent broadcast interface (instance pcb, sender σ) exposes the following
two events:
• Request: 〈pcb.Broadcast |m〉: Broadcasts a message m to all processes. This is only used by
σ.
• Indication: 〈pcb.Deliver |m〉: Delivers a message m broadcast by process σ.
For any ∈ [0,1], we say that probabilistic consistent broadcast is -secure if:
1. No duplication: No correct process delivers more than one message.
2. Integrity: If a correct process delivers a message m, and σ is correct, then m was previously
broadcast by σ.
3. -Total validity: If σ is correct, and σ broadcasts a message m, every correct process eventually
delivers m with probability at least (1−).
4. -Consistency: Every correct process that delivers a message delivers the same message with
probability at least (1−).
B.2 Algorithm
Algorithm 2 implements a sample procedure that we use both in the implementation of Sieve and
Contagion. Procedure sample(message,size) uses Ω to pick size processes with replacement, and
sends them message.
Algorithm 3 implements Sieve. Sieve consistently distributes a single message across the system as
follows:
• Initially, probabilistic broadcast distributes potentially conflicting copies of the message to every
correct process.
• Upon receiving a message m from probabilistic broadcast, a correct process issues an Echo
message for m.
• Upon receiving enough Echo messages for the message m it Echoed, a correct process delivers m.
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Algorithm 2 Procedure sample
1: procedure sample(message,size) is
2: ψ=∅;
3: for size times do
4: ψ←ψ∪Ω(1);
5: end for
6: for all pi∈ψ do




A correct process collects Echo messages from a randomly selected echo sample of size E, and
delivers the message it Echoed upon receiving Eˆ Echoes for it. We discuss the values of the two
parameters of Sieve in Section 4.2.
Sampling Upon initialization (line 12), a correct process randomly selects an echo sample E of
size E. Samples are selected with replacement by repeatedly calling Ω (Algorithm 2, line 4). A correct
process sends an EchoSubscribe message to all the processes in its echo sample (Algorithm 2, line 7).
Publish-subscribe Unlike in the deterministic version of Authenticated Echo Broadcast, where
a correct process broadcasts its Echo messages to the whole system, here each process only listens for
messages coming from its echo sample (line 37).
A correct process maintains an echo subscription set E˜ . Upon receiving an EchoSubscribe
message from a process pi, a correct process adds pi to E˜ (line 23). If a correct process receives an
EchoSubscribe message after publishing its Echo message, it also sends back the previously published
message (line 21).
A correct process only sends its Echo messages (line 32) to its echo subscription set.
Echo The designated sender σ initially broadcasts its message using probabilistic broadcast (line 26).
Upon pb.Delivery of a message m (correctly signed by σ) (line 28), a correct process sends an Echo
message for m to all the nodes in its echo subscription set (line 32).
Delivery A correct process pi that Echoed a message m delivers m (line 43) upon collecting at least
Eˆ Echo messages for m (line 41) from the processes in its echo sample.
B.3 No duplication and integrity
We start by verifying that Sieve satisfies both no duplication and integrity.
Theorem 6. Sieve satisfies no duplication.
Proof. A message is delivered (line 43) only if the variable delivered is equal to False (line 41).
Before any message is delivered, delivered is set to True. Therefore no more than one message is ever
delivered.




2: ProbabilisticConsistentBroadcast, instance pcb
3:
4: Uses:
5: AuthenticatedPointToPointLinks, instance al
6: ProbabilisticBroadcast, instance pb
7:
8: Parameters:
9: E: echo sample size
10: Eˆ: delivery threshold
11:
12: upon event 〈pcb.Init〉 do





18: upon event 〈al.Deliver |pi,[EchoSubscribe]〉 do
19: if echo 6=⊥ then
20: (message,signature)=echo;




25: upon event 〈pcb.Broadcast |message〉 do . only process σ
26: trigger 〈pb.Broadcast | [Send,message,sign(message)]〉;
27:
28: upon event 〈pb.Deliver | [Send,message,signature]〉 do
29: if verify(σ,message,signature) then
30: echo←(message,signature);
31: for all ρ∈E˜ do




36: upon event 〈al.Deliver |pi,[Echo,message,signature]〉 do




41: upon |{ρ∈E |replies[ρ]=echo}|≥ Eˆ anddelivered=False do
42: delivered←True;
43: trigger 〈pcb.Deliver |message〉;
44:
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Proof. Upon receiving an Echo message, a correct process checks its signature against the public of
the designated sender σ (line 37), and the (message,signature) pair is added to the replies variable
only if this check succeeds. Moreover, a message is delivered only if it is represented at least Eˆ>0
times in replies (line 41).
If σ is correct, it only signs message when broadcasting (line 26). Since we assume that
cryptographic signatures cannot be forged, this implies that the message was previously broadcast by
σ.
B.4 Total validity
We now compute, given E and Eˆ, the -total validity of Sieve. To this end, we prove some preliminary
lemmas.
Lemma 4. In an execution of Sieve, if pb does not satisfy totality, then pcb does not satisfy total
validity.
Proof. A correct process delivers a message (line 43) only if the echo variable is different from ⊥.
Moreover, the echo variable is set to a value different from ⊥ (line 30) only upon pb.Delivery of a
message (line 28).
Let m be the message broadcast by the correct sender σ. If pb does not satisfy totality, then at
least one correct process never sets echo to m. Therefore, at least one correct process does not deliver
the m, and the total validity of pcb is comrpomised.
Lemma 5. In an execution of Sieve, if pb satisfies totality and no correct process has more than
E−Eˆ Byzantine processes in its echo sample, then pcb satisfies total validity.
Proof. Let m be the message broadcast by the correct sender σ. Since pb satisfies totality (it always
satisfies validity), every correct process eventually issues an Echo(m) message (i.e., an Echo message
for m) (line 32).
Let pi be a correct process that has no more than E−Eˆ Byzantine processes in its echo sample.
Obviously, pi has at least Eˆ correct processes in its echo sample. Therefore, pi eventually receives at
least Eˆ Echo(m) messages (line 36), and delivers m (line 41).
Lemmas 4 and 5 allow us to bound the -total validity of Sieve, given E and Eˆ.














if the underlying abstraction of probabilistic broadcast satisfies pbt -totality.
Proof. Following from Lemmas 4 and 5, the total validity of pcb can be compromised only if the
totality of pb is compromised as well, or if at least one correct process has more than E−Eˆ Byzantine
processes in its echo sample.
Since procedure sample independently picks E processes with replacement, each element of a
correct process’ echo sample has an independent probability f of being Byzantine, i.e., the number of
Byzantine processes in a correct echo sample is binomially distributed.
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Therefore, a correct process has a probability o of having more than E−Eˆ Byzantine processes
in its echo sample. Since every correct process picks its echo sample independently, the probability
of at least one correct process having more than E− Eˆ Byzantine processes in its echo sample is
1−(1−o)C .
B.5 Preliminary lemmas
In order to compute an upper bound for the probability of the consistency of Sieve being compromised,
we will make use of some preliminary lemmas. The statements of these lemmas are independent from
the context of Sieve. For the sake of readability, we therefore gather them in this section, and use
them throughout the rest of this appendix.
Lemma 6. Let A,B∈N, let x,y∈N such that x+y≤B. Let X, Y be random variables defined by

























Given the value of X¯, Y is also binomially distributed with probability y/(B−x) and E−X¯ trials.
We can therefore express Y as the sum of E Bernoulli variables Y1,...,YE :
Y = Y1+...+YE
P[Yi=1 |X¯i] = {0 iffX¯i=1y
B−x otherwise
We indeed note how, out of Y1,...,YE :
• Only E−X¯ variables have a non-null probability of being equal to 1.
• Those variables that have a non-null probability of being equal to 1 have a probability y/(B−x)
of being equal to 1.
We therefore have
X+Y =(X1+Y1)+...+(XA+YA)
and from the law of total probability we have
































which proves the lemma.




is an increasing function of i.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction by showing that, for any i<B,
P[Xi≥B−i]≤P[Xi+1≥B−(i+1)]























































































which proves the lemma.
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Notation 4 (Ranges). Let a,b∈N, with b≥a. We use a..b to denote the range of integers {a,...,b}.



































































































Proof. It follows immediately from applying Lemma 8 l times.
Lemma 9. Let f :−1..C→R, let g,h :−1..C→ [0,1], with:
• f decreasing.
• g,h increasing.









































and by noting that:
• Since f is decreasing, f(x)−f(x+1)≥0.
• By hypothesis, g(x)−h(x)≤0.
• By hypothesis, g(C)−h(C)=1−1=0.
• By hypothesis, g(−1)−h(−1)=0−0=0.
Consequently, all the terms of the sum in (?2) are negative, and the two terms out of the sum are
null. Therefore, (?2)≤0.
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let X1,...,XT be independent random variables defined by
P[X¯i]=Bin[N,pi](X¯i)
We have




















































We now study the domain where (?b) is convex:
∂2
∂2p










































which proves the lemma.
B.6 Simplified Sieve
In this section, we introduce Simplified Sieve, a modified version of Sieve.
Simplified Sieve is a strawman both from a performance and a safety point of view. Indeed, on the
one hand Simplified Sieve has O(N2) per-process communication complexity, which makes it unfit for
any real-world, scalable deployment. On the other, we prove that it is strictly easier for any Byzantine
adversary to compromise the consistency of Simplified Sieve than that of Sieve.
Unlike Sieve, however, Simplified Sieve allows for an analytic probabilistic analysis. A critical goal
of this appendix is to compute a bound c on the probability of compromising the consistency of
Simplified Sieve. Since the consistency of Simplified Sieve is weaker than that of Sieve, c is also a
bound on the probability of compromising the consistency of Sieve.
B.6.1 Consistency-only broadcast
Simplified Sieve implements consistency-only broadcast, a minimal version of the probabilistic consistent
broadcast abstraction, designed to only provide -consistency. In particular, we drop the no duplication
property, i.e., we allow a correct process to deliver more than one message.
The consistency-only broadcast interface (instance cob, sender σ) exposes the following two
events:
• Request: 〈cob.Broadcast |m〉: Broadcasts a message m to all processes. This is only used by σ.
• Indication 〈cob.Deliver |m〉: Delivers a message m broadcast by process σ.
For any ∈ [0,1], we say that consistency-only broadcast is -secure if:
1. -Consistency: With probability at least (1−), no more than one message is delivered by at
least one correct process.
We note how the above definition of -consistency is equivalent to the one we provided in
Appendix B.1, but adapted for a context where no duplication is not guaranteed. In consistency-only
broadcast, consistency is compromised even if a single process delivers two or more different messages.
33
B.6.2 Byzantine oracle
In order to implement Simplified Sieve, we make an additional assumption about the system:
• (Byzantine oracle) Every correct process has direct access to an oracle Ψ that, provided with
a process pi, returns True if pi is Byzantine, and False if pi is correct.
This assumption is obviously unsatisfiable in any realistic distributed system. Indeed, a system
subject to Byzantine failures where every correct process can tell correct processes from Byzantine
failures is hardly a Byzantine system. It is therefore critical to underline that Assumption B.6.2 is
not a requirement for the implementation of Sieve. Indeed, no correct process invokes Ψ throughout
any execution of Algorithm 3. Assumption B.6.2 is purely a theoretical artifice to aid in our proof of
correctness.
B.6.3 Algorithm
Before introducing the design principles behind Simplified Sieve, we prove a simple preliminary result.
Lemma 11. No execution of probabilistic broadcast results in more than C different messages being
delivered.
Proof. Following from Theorem 1, probabilistic broadcast satisfies no duplication, i.e., no correct
process delivers more than one message. As we discussed in Section 2, the system is composed of C
correct processes.
Since the set of messages that are pb.Delivered by at least one correct process has no more than C
elements, and noting that a correct process pcb.Delivers a message m only if it pb.Delivered m, it is
not restrictive to introduce the following definition.
Definition 2 (Message). A message is an element of the set
M=1..C
Algorithm 5 implements Simplified Sieve. Simplified Sieve bears multiple differences to Sieve:
• A correct process can deliver more than one message. No correct process, however, delivers the
same message more than once.
• In order to cob.Deliver a message, a correct process does not need to pb.Deliver any message.
• A correct process maintains C echo samples E [1..C]. The Echo messages collected from the
processes in the i-th echo sample E [i] determine whether or not message i∈M is delivered.
• Echo messages have two fields: sample and message. Intuitively, an Echo(s,m) message (i.e.,
an Echo message with fields s and m) represents the following statement: “within the context of
message s, consider my Echo to be for message m”.
Upon pb.Delivering a message m, a correct process sends C Echo messages to each other process,
one Echo(s,m) message for every s∈M. In other words, the correct behavior is to echo m
across all contexts s∈M. A Byzantine process, however, can in principle send to the same
process a set of Echo messages echoing different messages in different contexts (e.g, Echo(s,m)
and Echo(s′,m′ 6=m)).
• When a correct process pi collects at least Eˆ Echo(m,m) messages from the processes in E [m], pi
delivers m.
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Algorithm 4 Procedure mimic






7: procedure mimic(reference) is
8: ψ=∅;
9: for all ρ∈reference do








Mimic Algorithm 4 presents two utility procedures for manipulating samples with respect to their
Byzantine component:
• (correct, line 1) Procedure correct returns a correct process, picked with uniform probability. It
does so by invoking Ω to select a process ρ with uniform probability (line 3), then using Ψ to
repick if ρ is Byzantine (line 4).
• (mimic, line 7) Provided with a sample reference, procedure mimic returns a sample ψ that
shares with reference all Byzantine processes. It does so by looping over each process ρ in
reference. If ρ is Byzantine (line 11), ρ is added to ψ. If ρ is correct (line 13), procedure
correct() is used to add a random correct process to ψ.
Samples Upon initialization (line 12), a correct process initializes C echo samples E [1..C] that share
the same set of Byzantine processes. It does so by using procedure sample(...) to randomly pick E [1]
(line 17), then using mimic(E [1]) to pick samples 2 to C (line 20).
We underline how E [1] is selected using the sample procedure we defined in Algorithm 2. As a
result, upon initialization, a correct process sends an EchoSubscribe message to each process in E [1].
However, a correct process does not handle the al.Delivery of an EchoSubscribe message. This is
done on purpose. The only goal of those EchoSubscribe messages is to let the Byzantine adversary
know which Byzantine processes are in E [1] (and, consequently, in every other sample).
Broadcast Upon cob.Broadcasting a message message (line 23), the correct designated sender uses
pb.Broadcast to distribute message.
Echo When a correct process pb.Delivers a message message (line 26), it sends to each process ρ
an Echo(sample,message) message, for every sample in M (line 29). In other words, the correct
behavior of a correct process that pb.Delivered message is to echo message across all samples.
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Algorithm 5 Simplified Sieve
1: Implements:
2: ConsistencyOnlyBroadcast, instance cob
3:
4: Uses:
5: AuthenticatedPointToPointLinks, instance al
6: ProbabilisticBroadcast, instance pb
7:
8: Parameters:
9: E: echo sample size
10: Eˆ: delivery threshold
11:
12: upon event 〈cob.Init〉 do
13: delivered={False}C ; reveal={False}C revealed={False}C ;





19: for j∈2..C do
20: E [j]←mimic(E [1]);
21: end for
22:
23: upon event 〈cob.Broadcast |message〉 do . only process σ
24: trigger 〈pb.Broadcast | [Send,message]〉;
25:
26: upon event 〈pb.Deliver | [Send,message]〉 do
27: for all ρ∈Π do
28: for all sample∈M do




33: upon event 〈al.Deliver |ρ,[Echo,sample,message]〉 do





We note how Simplified Sieve does not make use of echo subscription sets. A correct process
sends its Echo messages to every process in the system. The goal of Simplified Sieve, indeed, is not
performance, but probabilistic tractability.
Delivery A correct process maintains a table replies to keep track of the Echo messages received
by each node in its echo samples. Upon receiving an Echo(sample, message) message from a process
ρ for the first time (line 33), if ρ is in E [sample], a correct process sets replies[sample][ρ] to message
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42: trigger 〈cob.Deliver |message〉;
43:
44: upon exists message such that reveal[message]=Trueandrevealed[message]=False do
45: revealed[message]←True;
46: sample={ρ∈E [message] |replies[message][ρ] 6=⊥};
47: for all pi∈Π do
48: trigger 〈al.Send |pi,[Reveal,message,sample]〉;
49: end for
50:
51: upon event 〈al.Deliver |ρ,[Reveal,message,sample]〉 do





Upon receiving at least Eˆ Echo(message, message) messages from the processes in E [message]
(line 39) (this is checked using the replies table), a correct process cob.Delivers message (line 42).
Reveal A correct process maintains a reveal array to keep track of which echo samples it should
reveal. When, for some message, reveal[message] = True (line 44), a correct process sends to
every process a Reveal message, containing the set of processes in E [message] that issued an
Echo(message, message′) message for some message′ ∈M (line 48). In other words, whenever
reveal[message]=True, a correct process reveals the set of processes in its echo sample for message
that issued a an Echo message for that sample.
If, after revealing its sample for message, a correct process receives additional Echo messages from
the processes in E [message], the reveal procedure is performed again. This is enforced by setting a
revealed flag back to False (line 36) every time a new Echo message is received.
A correct process sets reveal[message] to True under two circumstances: when it cob.Delivers
message (line 41) and when it receives a Reveal message for message from a correct process (line 53).
As a result, whenever any correct process delivers message, every correct process reveals its sample
for message, regardless of whether or not it delivered message.
Like EchoSubscribe, the Reveal message serves the only purpose to provide information to the
Byzantine adversary.
B.7 Adversarial execution
In this section, we define the model underlying an adversarial execution of Sieve and Simplified Sieve,
and identify the set of Byzantine adversaries for each algorithm. Here, a Byzantine adversary is an
agent that acts upon a system with the goal to compromise its consistency. Throughout the rest of
this appendix, we use the term pcb adversary to denote a Byzantine adversary for Sieve, and the
term cob adversary (or just adversary) to denote a Byzantine adversary for Simplified Sieve.
The main goal of this section is to formalize the information available both to the pcb and the
cob adversary, and the set of actions that they can perform on the system throughout an adversarial
37
execution of either algorithm.
Throughout the rest of this appendix, we bound the probability of compromising the consistency of
Sieve by assuming that, if the totality of pb is compromised, then the consistency of pcb is compromised
as well. In what follows, therefore, we assume that pb satisfies totality.
B.7.1 Model (Sieve)
Let pi be any correct process. We make the following assumptions about an adversarial execution of
Sieve:
• As we established in Section 2, the pcb adversary does not know which correct processes are in
pi’ echo sample. The pcb adversary knows, however, which Byzantine processes are in pi’s echo
sample.
• At any time, the pcb adversary knows if pi delivered a message. If pi delivered a message, then
the pcb adversary knows which message did pi deliver.
• The pcb adversary can cause pi to pb.Deliver any message. As we established with Theorem 1, pi
will, however, pb.Deliver only one message throughout an execution of Sieve.
Throughout an adversarial execution of Sieve, an adversary performs a sequence of minimal
operations on the system. Each operation consists of either of the following:
• Selecting a correct process that did not pb.Deliver any message, and causing it to pb.Deliver a
message.
• Selecting a Byzantine process and causing it to send an Echo message to a correct process.
As a result of each operation, zero or more correct processes deliver a message. The pcb adversary is
successful if, at the end of the adversarial execution, at least two different messages are delivered by at
least one correct process.
B.7.2 Model (Simplified Sieve)
Let pi be any correct process. We make the following assumptions about an adversarial execution of
Simplified Sieve:
• As we established in Section 2, the cob adversary does not know which correct processes are in
pi’s echo samples. The cob adversary knows, however, which Byzantine processes are in pi’s echo
samples.
• At any time, the cob adversary knows if pi delivered a message. If pi delivered a message, then
the cob adversary knows which message did pi deliver. Moreover, if pi delivered a message m,
then at any time the cob adversary also knows the processes in pi’s echo sample for m that sent
an Echo(m, m′) message to pi, for some message m′.
• The cob adversary can cause pi to pb.Deliver any message. As we established with Theorem 1, pi
will, however, pb.Deliver only one message throughout an execution of Simplified Sieve.
Throughout an adversarial execution of Simplified Sieve, an adversary performs a sequence of
minimal operations on the system. Each operation consists of either of the following:
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• Selecting a correct process that did not pb.Deliver any message, and causing it to pb.Deliver a
message.
• Selecting a Byzantine process and causing it to send an Echo message to a correct process.
As a result of each operation, zero or more correct processes deliver a message. The cob adversary is
successful if, at the end of the adversarial execution, at least two different messages are delivered by at
least one correct process.
B.7.3 Network scheduling
In this section, we discuss the behavior of the adversary in relation to network scheduling. As we
discussed in Section 2, the system is asynchronous, i.e., every message is eventually delivered but can
be delayed by an arbitrary, finite amount of time.
Gossip messages As we stated in Appendix B.7, throughout this appendix we assume that the
pb instance used by Sieve and Simplified Sieve satisfies totality. While this means that the adversary
cannot prevent any correct process from eventually pb.Delivering a message, the adversary can indeed
arbitrarily choose which correct process pb.Delivers which message.
This can be achieved by delaying the delivery of the Gossip messages issued by correct processes.
Noting that a correct process will accept a Gossip message from any source, the adversary can then
cause any of the processes it controls to quickly send a Gossip message with arbitrary content to any
correct process, effectively causing it to pb.Deliver an arbitrary message.
Echo messages As we stated in Appendices B.7.1 and B.7.2, the two minimal operations a (pcb or
cob) adversary can perform essentially reduce to causing a Byzantine process to either send a Gossip
or an Echo message to a correct process. We can see that those operations are indeed minimal: a
correct process atomically al.Delivers a message (i.e., a message is the minimal amount of information
that can be meaningfully transferred on the network), and a correct process will ignore any message
that is not a Gossip or an Echo message.
Upon pb.Delivering a message, a correct process will issue zero or more Echo messages. As we
discussed in Section 2, the adversary can arbitrarily delay those messages, but they will eventually be
delivered. As a result, the outcome of an adversarial execution is solely determined by the sequence of
operations performed by the adversary, and is not affected by network scheduling.
While the adversary could delay the delivery of Echo messages issued by correct processes, the
only effect this would have is to prevent the adversary from knowing the effect of an operation on the
system before performing the next one. An optimal adversary, therefore, performs an operation, then
waits until all the Echo messages issued by correct processes are delivered before performing the next
operation.
B.7.4 Interfaces
In Appendices B.7.1 and B.7.2, we defined the model underlying an adversarial execution of Sieve and
Simplified Sieve respectively. In Appendix B.7.3, we discussed the behavior of the Byzantine adversary
in relation to network scheduling. Throughout the rest of this appendix, we concretely model a (pcb
or cob) adversary as an algorithm that interacts with a system.
As we discussed, a (pcb or cob) adversary works in steps: at every step, the adversary either
performs one operation on the system, or queries the system for information about its state. In this
section, we model this interaction by defining four interfaces, respectively implemented by the (pcb or
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cob) adversary and the (pcb or cob) system.
Both the pcb adversary and the cob adversary interfaces (instance adv) expose the following
procedures:
• Init(): It is called once, at the beginning of the adversarial execution, before any operation is
performed on the system. Here the (pcb or cob) adversary setups its internal state.
• Step(): It is called repeatedly, until the adversarial execution is completed. Here the (pcb or
cob) adversary performs one operation on the system. The execution fails (e.g., an exception
is raised) if a call to adv.Step() does not result in one, and only one, call to sys.Deliver(...),
sys.Echo(...) or sys.End() (as we define them below).
The pcb system interface (instance sys) exposes the following procedures:
• Byzantine(process∈ΠC): Returns a list of all the Byzantine processes in process’ echo sample.
The pcb adversary can invoke this procedure an unlimited number of times both from the Init()
and the Step() procedure.
• State(): Returns a list of pairs (pi∈ΠC ,m∈M), representing which correct process currently
delivered which message. The pcb adversary can invoke this procedure an unlimited number of
times from the Step() procedure.
• Deliver(process∈ΠC ,message∈M): Causes process to pb.Deliver message. The execution
fails if Deliver is provided with the same process argument more than once: a correct process
does not pb.Deliver more than one message. The procedure does not return any value.
• Echo(process∈ΠC ,source∈Π\ΠC ,message∈M): Causes source to send an Echo(message)
message to process. The execution fails if Echo is provided with the same process and source
arguments more than once: a correct process does not consider more than one Echo message
from the same source. The procedure does not return any value.
• End(): Causes the execution to gracefully terminate. The execution fails if End() is called
before Deliver(...) is invoked exactly C times: under the assumption that pb satisfies totality,
every correct process eventually pb.Delivers a message. The procedure does not return any value.
The cob system interface (instance sys) exposes the following procedures:
• Byzantine(process∈ΠC): Returns a list of all the Byzantine processes in the first echo sample
of process. The cob adversary can invoke this procedure an unlimited number of times both
from the Init() and the Step() procedure.
• State(): Returns a list of pairs (pi∈ΠC ,m∈M), representing which correct process currently
delivered which message. The cob adversary can invoke this procedure an unlimited number of
times from the Step() procedure.
• Sample(process ∈ ΠC ,message ∈ M): Returns the processes in process’ echo sample for
message that sent an Echo(message, message′) to process, for some message message′. The
cob adversary can invoke this procedure an unlimited number of times from the Step() procedure.
The execution fails if no correct process has cob.Delivered message: a correct process does not
reveal its echo sample for message before message is delivered by at least one correct process.
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• Deliver(process∈Πc,message∈M): Causes process to pb.Deliver message. The execution
fails if Deliver is provided with the same process argument more than once: a correct process
does not pb.Deliver more than one message. The procedure does not return any value.
• Echo(process ∈ΠC ,sample ∈M,source ∈Π\ΠC ,message ∈M): Causes source to send an
Echo(sample, message) message to process. The execution fails if, throughout an execution,
Echo is provided with the same process, sample and source arguments more than once: a
correct process does not consider more than one Echo message for the same sample from the
same source. The procedure does not return any value.
• End(): Causes the execution to gracefully terminate. The execution fails if End() is called
before Deliver(...) is invoked exactly C times: under the assumption that pb satisfies totality,
every correct process eventually pb.Delivers a message. The procedure does not return any value.
B.8 Simplified adversarial power
In this section, we prove that an optimal consistency-only broadcast adversary is more powerful than
an optimal probabilistic consistent broadcast adversary. This result is intuitive: a correct proces in
Simplified Sieve can deliver more than one message, and in general more information is available to the
cob adversary than to the pcb adversary.
B.8.1 Preliminary definitions
Before proving that an optimal cob adversary is more powerful than an optimal pcb adversary, we
provide some definitions on pcb and cob systems and adversaries.
Definition 3 (Pcb system). A pcb system σ is an element of the set
Spcb = ECpcb
Epcb = ΠE
Intuitively, a system σ∈Spcb is defined by the echo sample of each of its C correct processes. The
echo sample of a correct process is a vector of E processes.
Let σ∈Spcb, we use σ[pi∈ΠC ][i∈1..E] to denote the i-th process in pi’s echo sample.










Intuitively, a system σ∈Scob is defined by the echo samples of each of its C correct processes.
Each correct process has C echo samples e1,...,eC (one per message), each represented by a vector of
E processes. Any two echo samples ei, ej of a given process satisfy M(ei,ej), i.e., they share the same
set of Byzantine processes.
We also use just S to denote the set of cob systems Scob. Let σ∈Scob, we use σ[pi∈ΠC ][m∈M][i∈
1..E] to denote the i-th process in pi’s echo sample for m.
Definition 5 (Adversary). A pcb adversary (cob adversary) is a terminating algorithm that
exposes the pcb adversary (cob adversary) interface and does not cause the adversarial execution to
fail (see Appendix B.7.4) when coupled with any system σ∈Spcb (σ∈Scob).
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Let α, α′ be two pcb (cob) adversaries such that, for every σ∈Spcb (σ∈Scob), the execution of
α coupled with σ is identical to the execution of α′ coupled with σ. We consider α and α′ to be
functionally the same adversary.
We use Apcb to denote the set of pcb adversaries. We use Acob (or just A) to denote the set of cob
adversaries.
Definition 6 (Adversarial power). Let α be a pcb (cob) adversary. The adversarial power of α
is the probability of α compromising the consistency of a pcb (cob) system, picked with uniform
probability from Spcb (Scob).
Definition 7 (Optimal adversary). Let α be a pcb (cob) adversary. We say that α is an optimal
adversary if its adversarial power is greater or equal to that of any other pcb (cob) adversary.
We note that Definition 7 is well defined: indeed, both Apcb and Acob are finite sets, and therefore
admit a maximum for the adversarial power.
Definition 8 (Optimal set of adversaries). Let A′ be a set of pcb (cob) adversaries. We say that A′
is an optimal set of adversaries if A′ includes an optimal pcb (cob) adversary.





i=(Echo,pi∈ΠC ,ξ∈Π\ΠC ,m∈M) r=⊥






i=(Echo,pi∈ΠC ,s∈M,ξ∈Π\ΠC ,m∈M) r=⊥
Definition 11 (Trace). A pcb trace (cob trace) is a finite sequence of pcb (cob) invocation/response
pairs. Let α be a (pcb or cob) adversary, let σ be a (pcb or cob, correspondingly) system. We use
τ(α,σ) to denote the trace produced by α coupled with σ. We use T to denote the set of traces.
Notation 5 (Power set). Let X be a set. We use P(X) to denote the power set of X. We
use PX(K) = {x∈P(X) | |x|=K} to denote the elements in P(X) that have K elements. We use
PX(K+)={x∈P(X) | |x|≥K} to denote the elements in P(X) that have at least K elements.
B.8.2 Consistency of Simplified Sieve
We can now prove that the -consistency of Simplified Sieve is strictly weaker than that of Sieve.
Lemma 12. An optimal cob adversary is more powerful than an optimal pcb adversary.
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Algorithm 6 Cob decorator
1: Implements:
2: CobAdversary + PcbSystem, instance cadv
3:
4: Uses:
5: PcbAdversary, instance padv, system cadv
6: CobSystem, instance sys
7:




12: procedure cadv.Step() is
13: padv.Step();
14:
15: procedure cadv.Byzantine(process) is
16: return sys.Byzantine(process);
17:
18: procedure cadv.State() is
19: state=∅;
20:
21: for all (pi,m)∈sys.State() do











33: procedure cadv.Echo(process,source,message) is
34: sys.Echo(process,message,source,message);
35:
36: procedure cadv.End() is
37: sys.End();
38:
Proof. Let α∗ be an optimal pcb adversary. In order to prove that an optimal cob adversary is
more powerful than α∗, we just need to find a cob adversary α+ that is more powerful than α∗. We
achieve this using a pcb-to-cob decorator, i.e., an algorithm that acts as an interface between
a pcb adversary and cob system. A pcb adversary coupled with a pcb-to-cob decorator effectively
implements a cob adversary. Here we show that a pcb-to-cob decorator ∆cob exists such that, for every
α∈Apcb, the cob adversary α′=∆cob(a) is more powerful than α. If this is true, the lemma is proved:
indeed, α+ =∆cob(α
∗) is more powerful than α∗.
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Decorator Algorithm 6 implements Cob decorator, a pcb-to-cob decorator. Provided with a pcb
adversary padv, Cob decorator acts as an interface between padv and a cob system sys, effectively
implementing a cob adversary cadv. Cob decorator exposes both the cob adversary and the pcb
system interfaces: the underlying pcb adversary padv uses cadv as its system.
Cob decorator works as follows:
• Procedure cadv.Init() initializes a deliveries array that is used to keep track of the message
pb.Delivered by each correct process, and a gap set that it uses to keep track of the messages
cob.Delivered by each correct process in sys.
• Procedure cadv.Step() simply forwards the call to padv.Step().
• Procedure cadv.State() returns a list of pairs (pi∈ΠC ,m∈M) such that pi both pb.Delivered
and delivered m in sys. This is achieved by querying sys.State(), then looping over each element
(pi,m) of the response and checking if deliveries[pi]=m.
• Procedure cadv.Byzantine(process) simply forwards the call to
sys.Byzantine(process).
• Procedure cadv.Deliver(process,message) updates deliveries[process] to message (to signify
that process pb.Delivered message). It then forwards the call to sys.Deliver(process,message),
causing process to pb.Deliver message.
• Procedure cadv.Echo(process,source,message) forwards the call to
sys.Echo(process,message,source,message), causing source to send an Echo(message, message)
message to process.
• Procedure cadv.End() simply forwards the call to sys.End().
Let ∆cob : Apcb → Acob denote the function implemented by Cob decorator, mapping pcb
adversaries into cob adversaries. We want to prove that, for every α∈Apcb, the adversarial power of
α′=∆cob(α) is greater than that of α.
System translation Let α be a pcb adversary. We start by noting that, since α is correct, α
always causes every correct process to pb.Deliver a message. We can therefore define a function
µ :Apcb×Spcb×ΠC→M
such that µ(α,σ,pi)=m if and only if α eventually causes pi to pb.Deliver m, when α is coupled with σ.
We then define a system translation function Ψ[α] :Spcb→P(Scob) that maps a pcb system into
a set of cob systems: (
σ′∈Ψ[α](σ))⇐⇒(∀pi∈ΠC ,σ[pi]=σ′[pi][µ(α,σ,pi)])
Let σ be a pcb system, let σ′ be a cob system, let pi be any correct process, let m be the message
that α eventually causes pi to pb.Deliver, when α is coupled with σ. Intuitively, σ′ is in Ψ[α](σ) if pi’s
echo sample for m in σ′ is identical to pi’s echo sample in σ.
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Roadmap Let α∈Apcb, α′=∆cob(α). Let σ∈Spcb such that α compromises the consistency of σ.
In order to prove that α′ is more powerful than α, we prove that:
• For every σ′∈Ψ[α](σ), α′ compromises the consistency of σ′.
• The probability of Ψ[α](σ) is equal to the probability of σ.
• For every σˆ∈Spcb such that σˆ 6=σ, the sets Ψ[α](σ) and Ψ[α](σˆ) are disjoint.
Indeed, if all of the above are true, then the probability of α′ compromising the consistency of a
random cob system σ′ is greater or equal to the probability of α compromising the consistency of a
random system σ, and the lemma is proved.
Trace We start by noting that, if we couple Cob decorator with σ′, we effectively obtain a pcb
system interface δ with which α directly exchanges invocations and responses. Here we show that the
trace τ (α,σ) is identical to the trace τ (α,δ). Intuitively, this means that α has no way of distinguishing
whether it has been coupled directly with σ, or it has been coupled with σ′, with Cob decorator











with n≥0 (here n=0 means that this is α’s first invocation). We start by noting that, since a is a




and we need to prove that rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Let us assume that in+1 =(Byzantine,pi). By hypothesis, at least one of the echo samples of pi in
σ′ is identical to the echo sample of pi in σ. Moreover, all pi’s echo samples in σ′ share the same set
of Byzantine processes. Therefore, the first of pi’s echo samples in σ′ contains the same Byzantine
processes as pi’s echo sample in σ. Finally, the decorator simply forwards the call to cadv.Byzantine(pi)
to sys.Byzantine(pi). Consequently, rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Before considering the case in+1 =(State), we prove some auxiliary results. Let pi be a correct
process, let ρ be a process, let ξ be a Byzantine process, let m be a message. For every j≤n+1, as we
established, we have ij = i
′
j . Therefore, after the (n+1)-th invocation, the following hold true:
• pi pb.Delivered m in σ′ if and only if pi pb.Delivered m in σ. Indeed, cadv.Deliver(pi,m) was
invoked if and only if sys.Deliver(pi,m) was invoked as well.
• pi pb.Delivered m in σ′ if and only if deliveries[pi]=m. Indeed, cadv.Deliver(pi,m) was invoked
if and only if deliveries[pi] was set to m.
• ξ sent an Echo(m) to pi in σ′ if and only if ξ sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σ. Indeed,
cadv.Echo(pi,ξ,m) was invoked if and only if sys.Deliver(pi,m,ξ,m) was invoked as well.
• If pi pb.Delivered m in σ, then pi’s echo sample for m in σ′ is identical to pi’s echo sample in σ.
This follows from the definition of Ψ (we recall that σ′∈Ψ[α](σ)).
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• If pi delivered m in σ, it also delivered m in σ′. Indeed, since pi pb.Delivered m in σ, pi’s echo
sample for m in σ′ is identical to pi’s echo sample in σ. Moreover, if pi received an Echo(m)
message from ρ in σ, then it also received an Echo(m, m) message from ρ in σ′.
• If pi both pb.Delivered and delivered m in σ′, it also delivered m in σ. Indeed, since pi pb.Delivered
m in σ′, then it also pb.Delivered m in σ, and pi’s echo sample in σ is identical to pi’s echo
sample for m in σ′. Moreover, if pi received an Echo(m) message from ρ in σ′, then it also
received an Echo(m, m) message from ρ in σ.
Let us assume in+1 =(State). We start by noting that cadv.State() returns all the pairs (pi
′,m′) in
sys.State() that satisfy deliveries[pi′]=m′. If (pi,m)∈rn+1, then pi both pb.Delivered and delivered m
both in σ. Therefore, pi both pb.Delivered and delivered m in σ′, and deliveries[pi]=m. Consequently,
(pi,m) ∈ r′n+1. If (pi,m) ∈ r′n+1, then (pi,m) was returned from sys.State(), and deliveries[pi] =m.
Therefore, pi both pb.Delivered and delivered m in σ′. Consequently, pi delivered m in σ, and
(pi,m)∈rn+1.
Noting that procedures Deliver(...) and Echo(...) never return a value, we trivially have that
if in+1 = (Deliver,pi,m) or in+1 = (Echo,pi,s,ξ,m) then rn+1 =⊥= r′n+1. By induction, we have
τ(α,σ)=τ(α,δ).
Consistency of σ′ We proved that τ (α,σ)=τ (α,δ). Moreover, we proved that if a correct process
pi eventually pcb.Delivers a message m in σ, then pi also cob.Delivers m in σ′.
Since α compromises the consistency of σ, two correct processes pi, pi′ and two distinct messages
m, m′ 6=m exist such that, in σ, pi pcb.Delivered m and pi′ pcb.Delivered m′. Therefore, in σ′, pi
cob.Delivered m and pi′ cob.Delivered m′. Therefore α′ compromises the consistency of σ′.
Translation probabilities We now prove that, for every σ∈Spcb, the probability of Ψ[α](σ) is
equal to the probability of σ.
The probability of σ is
P[σ]=P[σ[pi1][1]=pi1,1,...,σ[piC ][E]=piC,E ]=N−EC
and the probability of Ψ[α](σ) is
P[Ψ[α](σ)] =
P[σ[pi1][µ(α,σ,pi1)][1]=pi1,1,...,σ[piC ][µ(α,σ,piC)[E]=piC,E ]] = N−EC
which proves the result.
Translation disjunction We now prove that, for any two σa, σb 6=σa, we have Ψ[α](σa) 6=Ψ[α](σb).
We prove this by contradiction. Suppose a system σ′ exists such that σ′∈Ψ[α](σa) and σ′∈Ψ[α](σb).
We want to prove that σa=σb.
We start by noting that, if τ(α,σa)=τ(α,σb), then σa=σb. Indeed, we have
τ(α,σa) = τ(α,σb) =⇒
=⇒ µ(α,σa,pi) = µ(α,σb,pi)∀pi∈ΠC =⇒
=⇒ σa[pi] = σ′[pi][µ(α,σa,pi)]=
=σ′[pi][µ(α,σb,pi)] = σb[pi]∀pi =⇒
σa[pi]=σb[pi]∀pi =⇒ σa=σb
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with n≥0 (here n=0 means that this is α’s first invocation). We start by noting that, since a is a




and we need to prove that rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Let us assume that in+1 =(Byzantine,pi). By hypothesis, among the echo samples of pi in σ
′, at
least one is identical to the echo sample of pi in σa, and at least one is identical to the echo sample of
pi in σb. Noting that pi’s echo samples share the same set of Byzantine processes, we immediately have
that the Byzantine processes in σa[pi] are the same as in σb[pi], and rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Before considering the case in+1 =(State), we prove some auxiliary results. Let pi be a correct
process, let ρ be a process, let ξ be a Byzantine process, let m be a message. For every j≤n+1, as we
established, we have ij = i
′
j . Therefore, after the (n+1)-th invocation, the following hold true:
• pi pb.Delivered m in σa if and only if pi pb.Delivered m in σb.
• ξ sent an Echo(m) message to pi in σa if and only if ξ send an Echo(m) message to pi in σb.




• pi delivered m in σa if and only if pi delivered m in σb. Indeed, if pi delivered m in σa, then it
also pb.Delivered m in σa and, consequently, σb. Therefore, pi’s echo sample in σa is identical to
pi’s echo sample in σb. Since pi received the same Echo messages in σa and σb then pi delivered
m in σb. The argument can be trivially reversed to prove that, if pi delivered m in σb, then pi
also delivered m in σa.
Let us consider the case in+1 =(State). From the above follows rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Noting that procedures Deliver(...) and Echo(...) never return a value, we trivially have that
if in+1 = (Deliver,pi,m) or in+1 = (Echo,pi,s,ξ,m) then rn+1 =⊥= r′n+1. By induction, we have
τ(α,σa)=τ(α,σb).
Therefore, σa=σb, which contradicts the hypothesis.
B.9 Two-phase adversaries
In Appendix B.8 we proved the important result that it is easier to compromise the consistency of
Simplified Sieve than that of Sieve. Throughout the rest of this appendix, we compute a bound on the
-security of Simplified Sieve.
It is easy to see that the -security of Simplified Sieve is equal to the adversarial power of an
optimal adversary. Therefore, c is a bound on the -security of Simplified Sieve if c bounds the
adversarial power of every adversary in an optimal set of adversaries.
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In this section, we derive a set Atp⊆A of two-phase adversaries that we prove to be optimal.
Unlike A, Atp is small enough to be probabilistically tractable. In the next sections, we compute a
bound on the adversarial power of every a∈Atp.
In a similar way to Lemma 12, the proofs of optimality of most of the sets of adversaries presented
in this section make extensive use of decorators, and are in general lengthy and non-trivial. For the sake
of readability, in this section we only state our results, and defer each explicit proof to Appendix D.
B.9.1 Auto-echo adversary
As we introduced in Appendix B.6.3, an Echo message in Simplified Sieve has two fields: a sample s
and a message m. Intuitively, an Echo(s, m) message represents the following statement: “within the
context of message s, consider my Echo to be for message m”.
Upon pb.Delivering a message m, a correct process sends to every other process an Echo(s, m) for
every s. In other words, a correct process supports the message it pb.Delivers across all samples. A
Byzantine process, however, is not constrained to do this.
A correct process cob.Delivers a message m upon collecting enough Echo(m, m) messages from its
echo sample for m. It is easy to see, therefore, that the probability of a correct process pi cob.Delivering
m increases if all the Byzantine processes send an Echo(m, m) message to pi.
Definition 12 (Auto-echo adversary). An adversary a∈A is an auto-echo adversary if, at the
beginning of its execution, it causes ξ to send an Echo(m, m) message to pi, for every pi∈Πc, ξ∈Π\ΠC
and m∈M. We use Aae to denote the set of auto-echo adversaries.
In Appendix D.1, we formally prove this intuition, i.e., we prove that the set of auto-echo adversaries
Aae is optimal.
B.9.2 Process-sequential adversary
As we discussed in Appendix B.6.3, a correct process reveals its sample for a message m only after
delivering m. At the beginning of the execution, the adversary only knows which Byzantine processes
are in each correct process’ echo samples. In Appendix B.9.1, however, we proved that this does
not affect the optimal adversary’s strategy: the set of Byzantine processes in a correct process’ echo
samples don’t play any role in an optimal adversarial execution.
Intuitively, therefore, an optimal adversary has effectively no meaningful way to distinguish any
two correct processes based on the outcome that their actions will have on the system.
Definition 13 (Correct process enumeration). We define a bijection
ζ :1..C↔ΠC
that uniquely maps an integer identifier i∈1..C to a correct process.
Definition 14 (Process-sequential adversary). An auto-echo adversary α ∈ Aae is a process-
sequential adversary if it never causes ζ(i) to pb.Deliver a message before any ζ(j<i). We use
Aps to denote the set of process-sequential adversaries.
In Appendix D.2, we formally prove this intuition, i.e., we prove that the set of process-sequential
adversaries Aps is optimal.
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B.9.3 Sequential adversary
As we introduced in Appendix B.6.3, in Simplified Sieve a correct process independently selects C echo
samples, one for every message in M. Moreover, every echo sample shares the same set of Byzantine
processes. Finally, let pi be a correct process, let m be a message, no correct process in pi’s echo sample
for m is known to the adversary before pi delivers m.
Intuitively, therefore, an adversary has effectively no meaningful way of distinguishing two messages,
based on the outcome that their pb.Delivery will have on the system.
Definition 15 (Poisoned process). Let σ be a system, let pi be a correct process. We say that pi is
poisoned in σ if and only if at least Eˆ processes in pi’s first echo sample in σ are Byzantine.
Definition 16 (Sequential adversary). A process-sequential adversary α ∈ Aps is a sequential
adversary if it never causes a correct process to pb.Deliver m∈M before causing at least a correct
process to pb.Deliver every l<m∈M. We use Asq to denote the set of sequential adversaries.
In Appendix D.3, we formally prove this intuition, i.e., we prove that the set of sequential adversaries
Asq is optimal.
B.9.4 Non-redundant adversary
As we established in Appendix B.6.1, the consistency of consistency-only broadcast is compromised if
and only if at least two messages are delivered by at least one correct process.
It is easy to see, therefore, that an adversary that has already caused at least one correct process
to deliver a message m gains no advantage from causing more correct processes to pb.Deliver m.
Indeed, doing so would not increase the probability of at least one correct process delivering m (that
condition is verified with probability 1): an optimal adversary should focus its remaining pb.Deliveries
on achieving the goal to cause at least one other message to be delivered by at least one correct process.
Definition 17 (Non-redundant adversary). A sequential adversary α∈Asq is a non-redundant
adversary if, whenever exactly one message m has been delivered, it never causes a correct process
to pb.Deliver m. We use Anr to denote the set of non-redundant adversaries.
In Appendix D.4, we formally prove this intuition, i.e., we prove that the set of non-redundant
adversaries Anr is optimal.
B.9.5 Sample-blind adversary
In Appendix B.6.3, we discussed how, in Simplified Sieve, a correct process reveals its echo sample for
a message after at least one correct process delivered that message. Throughout Appendix B.9, we
extensively used Reveal messages (through the Sample(...) system interface) to build a sequence of
decorators that improved the power of any adversary in their domain.
In this section, we prove the counter-intuitive result that the information contained in a Reveal
message is actually useless to an optimal adversary. Indeed, the decorators we developed leveraged
Reveal messages to correct the sub-optimal behavior of a generic adversary. However, for every
decorator that we developed, we argue that we could develop an adversary in the codomain of that
decorator, that never uses the information provided by Reveal messages.
An intuitive insight on Reveal messages can be provided by the observation that the information
they provide is disclosed in the moment it ceases to actually be useful. Indeed, a correct process
reveals the content of its echo sample for a message m only after at least one correct process delivered
m. As we proved in Appendix B.9.4, causing additional processes to deliver m gives no advantage to
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the adversary. Moreover, since the correct processes in each echo sample are picked independently from
each other, the knowledge of a correct process pi’s echo sample for m does not grant any advantage in
causing pi to deliver m′ 6=m.
Notation 6 (Undefined minima and maxima). Let X⊂N, with X finite, let S :X→{True,False}
be a predicate on X. We use
(minn∈X |S(n)) = ⊥
(maxn∈X |S(n)) = ⊥
to denote that
@n∈X |S(n)
Definition 18 (Trace compatibility). Let τ be a trace, let σ be a system. We say that τ is
compatible with σ, or τ∼σ, if the sequence of invocations in τ , applied in order to σ, produces the
corresponding sequence of responses in τ .
Notation 7 (Consistency compromission). Let α be an adversary, let σ be a system, let τ be a trace.
We use α↘σ to signify that α compromises the consistency of σ. We use τ↘σ to signify that the
sequence of invocations in τ compromises the consistency of σ.
Definition 19 (Sample-blind adversary). A non-redundant adversary α∈Anr is a sample-blind
adversary if it never invokes Sample(...). We use Asb to denote the set of sample-blind adversaries.
In Appendix D.5, we formally prove this intuition, i.e., prove that the set of sample-blind adversaries
Asb is optimal.
B.9.6 Byzantine-counting adversary
In Appendix B.7.2 we discussed how an adversary for Simplified Sieve knows which Byzantine processes
are in the first echo sample of any correct process. In Appendix B.9.1, however, we proved that the
optimal adversarial behavior with respect to Echo messages is always to cause every Byzantine process
to send an Echo(m, m) message to every correct process, for every message m∈M.
Intuitively, therefore, a correct process gains no advantage from knowing specifically which
Byzantine processes are in the first echo sample of any correct process.
Definition 20 (Byzantine-counting adversary). A sample-blind adversary α∈Asb is a Byzantine-
counting adversary if, whenever it invokes Byzantine(pi ∈ ΠC), it invokes |Byzantine(pi)|. In
other words, the behavior of a Byzantine-counting adversary does not depend on the specific set of
Byzantine processes in the first echo sample of any correct process. We use Abc to denote the set of
Byzantine-counting adversaries.
In Appendix D.6, we formally prove this intuition, i.e., we prove that the set of Byzantine-counting
adversaries Abc is optimal.
B.9.7 Single-response adversary
As we introduced in Appendix B.7.2, the goal of a cob adversary is to compromise the consistency of a
cob system by causing two distinct messages to be delivered by at least one correct process. In order
to achieve this, it acts upon the system in steps, causing correct processes to pb.Deliver a sequence of
messages, until the consistency is compromised.
We distinguish two phases of an adversarial execution.
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Definition 21 (Trace phases). Let α be an adversary, let σ be a system. We call first phase of
τ(α,σ) the sequence τ(α,σ)1,...,τ(α,σ)n with n given by
n =
{
minj |S(j) iff∃j |S(j)
|τ(α,σ)| otherwise
S(j) = (τ(α,σ)j =(State,rh), rh 6=∅)
We call second phase of τ(α,σ) the sequence τ(α,σ)n+1,...,τ(α,σ)|τ(α,σ)|. We use η(α,σ) to
denote the first phase of τ(α,σ). We use θ(α,σ) to denote the second phase of τ(α,σ).
The first phase of a trace ends when, for the first time, a call to State() returns a non-empty set.
Intuitively, the first phase ends when the adversary becomes aware that at least one correct process
delivered a message.
Let us focus on the second phase of an adversarial execution carried out by a Byzantine-counting
adversary. We know that, at the beginning of the second phase, at least one message has been delivered
by at least one correct process. If more than one message has been delivered, the adversary already
compromised the consistency of the system, and the invocations in the second phase are irrelevant to
its success.
If exactly one message has been delivered, an optimal adversary will issue a sequence of invocations
that, given the information available on the system, maximizes the probability of at least one more
message being delivered by at least one correct process. Since the adversary is non-redundant, the
response provided by any invocation to State() will not change until the consistency is compromised.
Intuitively, therefore, the information available to the adversary throughout the second phase does
not change until consistency is compromised. Since any invocation issued by the adversary after
consistency is compromised is irrelevant to its success, an optimal adversary does not need to invoke
State() throughout the second phase of any adversarial execution.
Definition 22 (Single-response adversary). A Byzantine-counting adversary α∈Abc is a single-
response adversary if it never invokes State() throughout the second phase of any adversarial
execution. We use Asr to denote the set of single-response adversaries.
In Appendix D.7, we formally prove this intuition, i.e., we prove that the set of single-response
adversaries Asr is optimal.
B.9.8 State-monitoring adversary
In Appendix B.9.7, we proved that an optimal adversary does not need to invoke State() in the second
phase of an adversarial execution, i.e., after at least one message has been delivered by at least one
correct process.
It is easy to see, however, that, throughout the first phase, the information provided by State() is
useful to the adversary. Intuitively, the sooner a single-response adversary becomes aware that at least
one correct process delivered a message, the sooner it can focus its strategy to cause the delivery of a
second, distinct message.
In this section, we prove this intuition, i.e., we formally prove that the set of state-monitoring
adversaries is optimal.
Definition 23 (State-monitoring adversary). A single-response adversary α ∈ Asr is a state-
monitoring adversary if it invokes State() before the first invocation of Deliver(...) and after each
invocation of Deliver(...), until State() returns a non-empty set. We use Asm to denote the set of
state-monitoring adversaries.
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Lemma 13. The set of state-monitoring adversaries Asm is optimal.
Proof. It follows immediately from the observation that, for any adversary, not invoking State() is
equivalent to invoking State() and ignoring its response.
B.9.9 Two-phase adversary
In Appendix B.9.8, we proved that: throughout the first phase, an optimal adversary invokes State()
before the first invocation of Deliver(...) and after each invocation of Deliver(...); throughout the
second phase, an optimal adversary never needs to invoke State().
As we discussed, if the first phase is concluded with more than one message being delivered, the
adversary already compromised the consistency of the system, and the invocations in the second phase
are irrelevant to its success.
Let us consider the case where, at the beginning of the second phase, exactly one message m∗ has
been delivered. In Appendix B.6.3, we discussed how a correct process selects the correct component
of each echo sample independently. Intuitively, therefore, the knowledge of which processes delivered
m∗ is useless to the adversary, as it provides no information about the correct component of any echo
sample for a message m 6=m∗. In other words, an optimal adversary only needs to know when the first
phase of the execution is concluded, but not how.
Definition 24 (Two-phase adversary). A state-monitoring adversary α ∈ Asm is a two-phase
adversary if, whenever it invokes State(), it invokes (State() 6=∅). In other words, the behavior of a
two-phase adversary does not depend on the content of State(), but only on whether or not State() is
empty.
Lemma 14. Let α be a state-monitoring adversary, let σ,σ′ be systems such that
|η(α,σ)|= ∣∣η(α,σ′)∣∣



















and we need to prove that rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Let us assume that in+1 = (Byzantine,pi). By hypothesis, the number of Byzantine processes









Since α is a sample-blind adversary, we have in+1 6=(Sample,pi,m).
Noting that procedures Deliver(...) and Echo(...) never return a value, we trivially have that if
in+1 =(Deliver,pi,m) or in+1 =(Echo,pi,s,ξ,m) then rn+1 =⊥=r′n+1. By induction, we have that, for
every n< |η(α,σ)|, τ(α,σ)n=τ(α,δ)n.
Lemma 15. Let α be a state-monitoring adversary, let σ,σ′ be systems such that
η(α,σ)=η(α,σ′)





Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 14, and we omit it for the sake of brevity. The
lemma is proved by induction and noting that, since α is a single-response adversary, it never invokes
State() throughout the second phase of an adversarial execution.
In Appendix D.8, we formally prove that the set of two-phase adversaries Atp is optimal.
Before moving on to computing a bound on the adversarial power of Atp, we prove two additional
lemmas on the behavior of two-phase adversaries.
Lemma 16. Let α be a two-phase adversary. Let η(i)(α,σ) denote the sequence of invocations in




Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 14, and we omit it for the sake of brevity. The
lemma is proved by induction and noting that, except for the last one, every response to (State) in
η(α,σ), η(α,σ′) is, by definition, ∅.
Lemma 17. Let α be a two-phase adversary. Let θ(i)(α,σ) denote the sequence of invocations in




Proof. The proof is again similar to the proof of Lemma 14, and we omit it for the sake of brevity.
The lemma is proved by induction and noting that:
• Since α is two-phase, it only invokes State() 6=∅, the content of the |η(α,σ)|-th response does
not affect its behavior.
• Since α is single-response, it never invokes State() throughout the second phase.
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B.10 Consistency
In this section, we finally achieve the main goal of this appendix, i.e., to compute a bound on the
-consistency of Sieve. In order to achieve this, in Appendix B.6, we introduced Simplified Sieve, a
strawman algorithm designed to be analytically tractable.
In Appendix B.8, we proved that the consistency of Simplified Sieve is weaker than the consistency
of Sieve. More precisely, we proved that an optimal adversary has a greater probability of compromising
the consistency of Simplified Sieve than that of Sieve.
In doing so, we reduced the problem of bounding the -consistency of Sieve to that of bounding
the adversarial power of a set of adversaries for Simplified Sieve that provably includes an optimal
adversary.
Throughout Appendix B.9, we employed a sequence of decorators to iteratively reduce the size
of the set that provably includes an optimal adversary. Specifically, we proved that the set Atp of
two-phase adversaries is optimal. Intuitively, we proved that the behavior of an optimal adversary
reduces to:
• (Echo phase): Causing every Byzantine process to send an Echo(m, m) message to every correct
process, for every message m.
• (First phase): In sequence, causing correct processes to deliver a predefined sequence of messages
until at least one correct process delivers a message.
• (Second phase): In sequence, causing the remaining set of correct process to deliver a predefined
sequence of messages, determined only by the number of correct processes that pb.Delivered a
message throughout the first phase.
In particular, the only information that we did not prove to be unnecessary to the Byzantine
adversary is:
• The number of Byzantine processes in the first echo sample of each correct process pi. This
information is available to the adversary from the beginning of the adversarial execution, and
does not change throughout the execution. We conjecture this information to still be of no use
to the adversary, but we don’t rely on this conjecture in proving what follows.
• The number of correct processes that pb.Deliver a message throughout the first phase of the
adversarial execution, i.e., before at least one correct process delivers a message.
In this section, we redefine a two-phase adversary as a table of messages. In doing so, we provide
a sound structure to a set of adversaries that provably includes an optimal one. We then use this
structure to analitically bound the probability of any two-phase adversary compromising the consistency
of a random Simplified Sieve system.
First, we focus on the second phase of an adversarial execution, and study the probability of any
two-phase adversary compromising the consistency of Simplified Sieve, given the number of correct
processes that pb.Delivered, throughout the first phase, the message that was delivered by at least one
correct process at the end of the first phase.
We then focus on the first phase of an adversarial execution, and study the probability of any
two-phase adversary concluding the first phase of an adversarial execution having caused less than n
correct processes to pb.Deliver m, m being the message that at least one correct process delivers at
the end of the first phase.
We finally join the two above results to compute a bound c on the probability of a two-phase
adversary compromising the consistency of Simplified Sieve. Since at least one two-phase adversary is
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provably optimal, Simplified Sieve satisfies c-consistency. Since the -consistency of Sieve is provably
bound by the -consistency of Simplified Sieve, Sievesatisfies c-consistency.
B.10.1 Two-phase adversaries
In Appendix B.9.9, we proved that the set Atp is optimal. In this section, we use Lemmas 16 and 17
to re-define the set of two-phase adversaries as a set of triangular message tables.
Definition 25 (Byzantine population). A Byzantine population is a vector in the set
F={0..E}ΠC
Let σ be a system. We define the Byzantine population of σ by
∀pi,F (σ)pi=σ.Byzantine(pi)
Definition 26 (Two-phase adversary). A two-phase adversary α∈Atp is a triangular table defined
by:
α[F ]i∈M F ∈F , i∈1..C
α[F ]ni ∈M F ∈F ,n∈0..C, i∈1..(C−i)
Coupled with a system σ, a two-phase adversary α:
• (Echo phase) Causes every Byzantine process to send an Echo(m, m) message to every correct
process in σ, for every message m.
• (First phase) Sequentially causes ζ(1) to pb.Deliver α[F (σ)]1, ζ(2) to pb.Deliver α[F (σ)]2, ... in
σ, until, as a result of the n-th pb.Delivery, at least one correct process delivers a message in σ.
We note that, if σ is poisoned, then at least one correct process delivers a mesage in σ as a
result of the echo phase, and n=0.
• (Second phase) Sequentially causes ζ(n+ 1) to pb.Deliver α[F (σ)]n1 , ..., ζ(C) to pb.Deliver
α[F (σ)]nC−n in σ.
B.10.2 Random variables
Let α be a two-phase adversary. In the next sections, we compute a bound on the probability of α
compromising the consistency of a random, non-poisoned system. To this end, in this section we
introduce a set of random variables.
Notation 8 (Delivery indicator). Let σ be a system, let m, m1,...,mn be messages. We use
δm[m1,...,mn](σ)∈{True,False}
to indicate whether or not at least one correct process delivers m in σ, if ζ(1) pb.Delivers m1, ..., ζ(n)





Let σ be a random, non-poisoned system. We define:
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• Byzantine population Fpi∈ΠC (σ): represents the number of Byzantine processes in the first
echo sample of pi in σ.
• First phase duration η(σ): represents the number of correct processes that pb.Deliver a
message in the first phase, when α is coupled with σ. More formally,
η(σ)=minn |(δ[α[F (σ)]1,...,α[F (σ)]n]=True∨n=C)
• First-phase deliveries Sm∈M(σ): represents the number of correct processes that pb.Deliver
message m throughout the first phase, when α is coupled with σ. More formally,
Sm(σ)= |{n∈1..η(σ) |α[F (σ)]n=m}|
• Second-phase deliveries Tm∈M(σ): represents the number of correct processes that pb.Deliver
message m throughout the second phase, when α is coupled with σ. More formally,
Tm(σ)=
∣∣∣{n∈1..(C−η(σ)) |α[F (σ)]η(σ)n =m}∣∣∣
• Deliveries Nm∈M(σ): represents the number of correct processes that pb.Deliver message m,
when α is coupled with σ. More formally,
Nm(σ)=Sm(σ)+Tm(σ)
• First delivered message H(σ)∈M∪{⊥}: if, when α is coupled with σ, at least one correct
process delivers a message, H(σ) represents the first message to be delivered by at least one
correct process in σ. Otherwise, H(σ)=⊥. More formally,
H(σ)=
{
α[F (σ)]η(σ) iffδ[α[F (σ)]1,...,α[F (σ)]C ]=True
⊥ otherwise
• Correct echoes Ek∈0..Cm∈M [pi](σ)∈0..E∪{⊥}: if k≤Ni(σ), then Eki [pi](σ) represents the number
of correct processes in pi’s echo sample for m that sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σ, when
exactly k correct processes pb.Delivered m in σ. Otherwise, Ekm[pi](σ)=⊥.
• Delivery Ak∈0..Cm∈M [pi ∈ΠC ](σ)∈ {True,False,⊥}: if k≤Nm(σ), Akm[pi] represents, when α is






• Global delivery Ak∈0..Cm∈M (σ): if k≤Nm(σ), Aki represents, when α is coupled with σ, whether







• First phase plan Lm(σ): represents the number of times m appears in the sequence
α[F (σ)]1,...,α[F (σ)]C
Intuitively, Lm represents the number of correct processes that α would eventually cause to
pb.Deliver m, if no correct process ever delivered any message.
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• Adversarial success W : W represents whether or not the adversary successfully compromises





E(s)m [pi](σ) = E
Sm(σ)
m [pi](σ)






B.10.3 Byzantine population, correct echoes, delivery
In this section, we compute the probability distributions underlying Byzantine population. Given the
Byzantine population, we then compute the number of correct echoes and the probability of delivery.
Byzantine population As we discussed in Appendix B.6.3, every correct process selects its first
echo sample using the Sample(...) procedure, which, in turn, picks each element independently from
the set of processes. Therefore, the number of correct processes in the first echo sample of each correct
process is independently binomially distributed:
P[F¯pi]=Bin[E,f ](F¯pi)
Correct echoes Let pi be a correct process, let m be a message. If pi has F¯pi Byzantine processes in
its first echo sample, and exactly k correct processes pb.Delivered m, then each of the E−F¯pi correct













)P[k≤Nm | F¯pi] iff E¯km[pi] 6=⊥
P[k>Nm | F¯pi] otherwise
We underline that the above holds true only because the adversary α is non-redundant. Indeed,
since α knows the first phase duration η, it also knows H (this immediately follows from H=α[F ]η).
Therefore, if α was not non-redundant, the value of Ekm[pi] would not necessarily be independent from
the event k≤Nm.
We can see this with an example. With a minor slip of notation, consider an adversary α such that
α[{0}ΠC ]1 = 1
α[{0}ΠC ]i>1 6= 1
α[{0}ΠC ]11 = 1
We can immediately see that α is not non-redundant: if no correct process has any Byzantine
process in its echo samples, and at least one correct process delivers 1 as an immediate result of ζ(1)
pb.Delivering 1, α causes ζ(2) to pb.Deliver 1 again. If η=1, then l≥1 correct process pi∗1,...,pi∗l exists
such that ζ(1) appears at least Eˆ times in pi∗i ’s echo sample for 1. Since a correct process pi has a


























which is clearly not a binomial. Intuitively, if α was not non-redundant, it could cause the value of
Nm to depend on whether or not m was delivered by at least one correct process, which obviously
correlates with the value of Ekm[pi].
Since α is non-redundant, however, and every correct process picks each echo sample independently,
the value of Ekm[pi] is indeed independent from the event k≤Nm.
Delivery Noting that a correct process pi delivers a message m if it collects at least Eˆ Echo(m, m)














































In the previous sections, we computed the probability of any correct process delivering a message m,
given that k correct processes pb.Delivered m. In Appendix B.10.1, we discussed how an optimal
adversarial execution unfolds in two phases: the first takes place before any correct process delivers
any message; throughout the second, the goal of the adversary is to cause at least one correct process
to deliver one additional message.
In this section, we focus on the second phase. We assume that a message H has already been
delivered by at least one correct process. Given the number of correct processes that pb.Delivered
each message throughout the first phase, we compute (where possible) a bound on the probability of
any message different from H being delivered before the end of the adversarial execution, i.e., the
probability of the adversary successfully compromising the consistency of the system.
Correct echoes for a non-delivered message Let pi be a correct process that has F¯ Byzantine
processes in its first echo sample. Let m be a message such that pi does not deliver m after k correct
processes pb.Delivered m. Here we use Bayes’ theorem to compute the probability distribution
underlying the number of correct echoes received by pi for m.





































where the numerator of the last term includes an indicator function because any condition A<B,
given A¯ and B¯, is always satisfied deterministically.
Conditions Let pi be a correct process, let m be a message. Throughout the rest of this section, we
compute the probability of pi eventually delivering m under the following conditions:
• F¯pi processes in pi’s first echo sample are Byzantine.
• m is not the message that is delivered at the end of the first phase, i.e., H 6=m.
• S¯m correct processes pb.Deliver m throughout the first phase.
• T¯m correct processes pb.Deliver m throughout the second phase.
First phase correct echoes Here we compute, under the above conditions, the probability
distribution underlying E
(s)
m [pi], i.e., the number of correct echoes that pi collects for m throughout the
first phase.
Since H 6=m, pi does not deliver m throughout the first phase. In other words, pi does deliver m
after S¯m correct processes pb.Delivered m, and we immediately have
P
[









Second phase correct echoes Here we compute, under the above conditions and given E¯
(s)
m [pi],
the probability distribution underlying E¯
(t)
m [pi], i.e., the number of correct echoes that pi collects for m
throughout the second phase.
We start by noting that, out of the E elements in pi’s echo sample for m:
• F¯pi are Byzantine.
• E¯(s)m [pi] belong to the set of S¯m processes that pb.Delivered m throughout the first phase.
• E−F¯pi−E¯(s)m [pi] belong to the set of C−S¯m processes that did not pb.Deliver m throughout the
first phase.
Moreover, out of the C−S¯m processes that did not pb.Deliver m throughout the first phase, T¯m
pb.Delivered m throughout the second phase. Therefore, each of the processes in pi’s echo sample for
m that did not pb.Deliver m throughout the first phase has an independent probability T¯m/(C−S¯m)
of pb.Delivering m throughout the second phase.
Consequently, E¯
(t)
m is binomially distributed:
P
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Delivery probability (given message) We can finally compute, under the above conditions, the
probability of pi eventually delivering m.
We start by expanding the definition of Am[pi] to get
P[Am[pi] |H 6=m,S¯m,T¯m,F¯pi]=P[Em[pi]≥ Eˆ−F¯pi |H 6=m,S¯m,T¯m,F¯pi]=(?1)
and then expand the definition of E
(t)
m [pi] to get
(?1)=P
[
E(t)m [pi]≥ Eˆ−F¯pi−E(s)m [pi] |H 6=m,S¯m,T¯m,F¯pi
]
=(?2)
Finally, using the law of total probability on each possible value of E
(s)


















As we previously established,
P
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Therefore, following from Lemma 7, (?a) is an increasing function of E¯
(s)






















ES¯mm [pi]=e | F¯pi
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ES¯mm [pi]=x | F¯pi
]
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with f(x) increasing and
∑K
x=0g(x)=1. Following from Corollary 1, we therefore have















m [pi] | F¯pi
]
= (?3)
which, as we previously established, can be restated as



















which, using Lemma 6, yields the bound








Delivery probability (any message) We now move on to compute the probability that a correct
process pi will eventually deliver any message other than H, under the following assumptions:
• The first phase of the adversarial execution is concluded.
• The number F¯pi of Byzantine processes in the first echo sample of pi is given.
• The number S¯m, T¯m of correct processes that pb.Delivered each message m throughout the first
and second phase respectively is given.



















































At a first glance, the second branch of the bound above could seem unreasonably lax. We underline,



















Therefore, even in the second branch, the bound introduces a limited multiplicative error. Moreover,
as we will see in the numerical analysis, the error introduced by the bound is non-negligible only for
extremely unlikely values of N¯H¯ .
Adversarial success probability Throughout this section, we computed the probability that a
correct process pi will deliver a message different from the message that was delivered throughout the
first phase.
We showed that such probability can be bound by a function that only depends on the number of
Byzantine processes in the first echo sample of pi, and the number of correct processes that pb.Delivered


























Since H was delivered by at least one correct process at the end of the first phase, we know that:
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• One correct process pi+ delivered H immediately after H was pb.Delivered by N¯H correct
processes.
• Every other correct process did not deliver H before H was pb.Delivered by N¯H correct processes.
We start by computing the probability distribution underlying F¯pi+ . Using Bayes’ theorem we get

















and noting that AN¯H−1H [pi



































Similarly, for pi− 6=pi+, we get









































In the previous section, we computed, given the number of correct processes that pb.Delivered the first
delivered message, the probability of a two-phase adversary successfully compromising the consistency
of a system.
In this section, we compute the probability distribution underlying the number of correct processes
that pb.Deliver the first delivered message.
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Definition 27 (Deafened adversary). Let α be a two-phase adversary. We define ∆(α) the deafened
version of α if:
• ∆(α) is a process-sequential adversary.
• Coupled with a system σ, ∆(α) sequentially causes the pb.Delivery of α[F (σ)]1,...,α[F (σ)]C .
Intuitively, the deafened version of a two-phase adversary α is an adversary whose adversarial
execution would be identical to α’s, if no correct process ever delivered any message.
Lemma 18. Let α be a two-phase adversary, let σ be a system. We have
η(α,σ)=η(∆(α),σ)
Proof. It follows immediately from Definition 27: ∆(α) causes the same processes to pb.Deliver the
same messages as α throughout the first phase.
Definition 28 (Delivery cost). Let α be an auto-echo adversary, let σ be a non-poisoned system, let
m be a message such that, when α is coupled with σ, at least one correct process delivers m. We
define the delivery cost of m λ(α,σ,m) as the minimum λ∈1..C such that, when α is coupled with
σ, at least one correct process delivers m after λ correct processes pb.Delivered m.
Lemma 19. Let α be a two-phase adversary, let σ be a non-poisoned system such that, when coupled
with σ, α causes at least one correct process to deliver one message. Let H¯ be the first message





Proof. Following from Lemma 18 η(α,σ)=η(∆(α),σ). Therefore, at least one correct process delivers
H¯ after λ(α,σ,H¯) processes pb.Deliver H¯, when ∆(α) is coupled with σ.
In this section, we bound the cumulative probability P[NH≤L] for an adversary α by bounding
the probability that the deafened adversary ∆(α) will cause the delivery of at least one message m,
with a cost smaller or equal to L.
Let m be a message. We start by noting that, by definition, ∆(α) eventually causes Lm correct
processes to pb.Deliver m. Let pi be a correct process, let F¯pi be the number of Byzantine processes in
pi’s first echo sample.
We denote with Λm[pi] the random variable representing the minimum number of correct processes
that pb.Deliver m, before pi delivers m. If pi never delivers m, we set Λm[pi]=∞.
Let L∈1..C. Using the tools we developed in the previous section, we immediately get





































Λm[pi]≤L | L¯1,...,L¯C ,F¯pi
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(−(E−F¯pi)MC ) iff MC ≤ (Eˆ−F¯pi)−√Eˆ−F¯piE−F¯pi
1 otherwise
(10)












1−(1−ψ(L,F¯pi))bCL c(1−ψ(C mod L,F¯pi))P[F¯pi] (11)






We now have all the elements to prove

































f(x) = P[W |N¯H =x]
g(x) = P[NH≤x]










The probability of compromising a non-poisoned system is obtained by applying the bounds in
Equations (9), (12) and (13).
It is easy to see that p represents the probability of a random system being poisoned: indeed,







of having more than Eˆ Byzantine processes in its first echo sample, i.e., of being poisoned.
Therefore, the bound on c bounds the probability of any two-phase adversary compromising
the consistency of a cob system. Due to Lemma 39, the set Atp of two-phase adversaries is optimal.
Therefore, Simplified Sieve satisfies c-consistency.
Due to Lemma 12, the adversarial power of an optimal pcb adversary is bound by the adversarial
power of an optimal cob adversary, and the theorem is proved.
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C Contagion
In this section, we present in greater detail the probabilistic Byzantine reliable broadcast
abstraction and discuss its properties. We then present Contagion, an algorithm that implements
probabilistic Byzantine reliable broadcast, and evaluate its security and complexity as a function
of its parameters.
The probabilistic Byzantine reliable broadcast abstraction allows the entire set of correct processes
to agree on a single message from a potentially Byzantine designated sender. Probabilistic Byzantine
reliable broadcast is a strictly stronger abstraction than probabilistic consistent broadcast: in the case
of a Byzantine sender, while probabilistic consistent broadcast only guarantees that every correct
process that delivers a message delivers the same message (consistency), probabilistic Byzantine
reliable broadcast also guarantees that either no or every correct process delivers a message (totality).
C.1 Definition
The probabilistic Byzantine reliable broadcast interface (instance psb, sender σ) exposes the
following two events:
• Request: 〈psb.Broadcast |m〉: Broadcasts a message m to all processes. This is only used by
σ.
• Indication: 〈psb.Deliver |m〉: Delivers a message m broadcast by process σ.
For any ∈ [0,1], we say that probabilistic Byzantine reliable broadcast is -secure if:
1. No duplication: No correct process delivers more than one message.
2. Integrity: If a correct process delivers a message m, and σ is correct, then m was previously
broadcast by σ.
3. -Validity: If σ is correct, and σ broadcasts a message m, then σ eventually delivers m with
probability at least (1−).
4. -Totality: If a correct process delivers a message, then every correct process eventually delivers
a message with probabiity at least (1−).
5. -Consistency: Every correct process that delivers a message delivers the same message with
probability at least (1−).
C.2 Algorithm
Algorithm 7 implements Contagion. Let pi be a correct process, let m be a message. Contagion securely
distributes a single message across the system as follows:
• Initially, probabilistic consistent broadcast distributes a consistent message to a subset of the
correct processes.
• pi can issue a Ready message for more than one message. pi issues a Ready message m when
either:
– pi receives m from probabilistic consistent broadcast, or
– pi collects enough Ready messages for m from its ready sample.





2: ProbabilisticByzantineReliableBroadcast, instance psb
3:
4: Uses:
5: AuthenticatedPointToPointLinks, instance al
6: ProbabilisticConsistentBroadcast, instance pcb
7:
8: Parameters:
9: R: ready sample size Rˆ: contagion threshold
10: D: delivery sample size Dˆ: delivery threshold
11:
12: upon event 〈psb.Init〉 do







20: upon event 〈al.Deliver |pi,[ReadySubscribe]〉 do
21: for all (message,signature)∈ready do




26: upon event 〈psb.Broadcast |message〉 do . only process σ
27: trigger 〈pcb.Broadcast | [Send,message,sign(message)]〉;
28:
29: upon event 〈pcb.Deliver | [Send,message,signature]〉 do
30: if verify(σ,message,signature) then
31: ready←ready∪{(message,signature)};
32: for all ρ∈R˜ do




A correct process collects Ready messages from two randomly selected samples, the ready sample
of size R, and the delivery sample of size D. A correct process issues a Ready message for m upon
collecting Rˆ Ready messages for m from its ready sample, and it delivers m upon collecting Dˆ Ready
messages for m from its delivery sample. We discuss the values of the four parameters of Contagion in
Section 5.3.
Sampling Upon initialization (line 12), a correct process randomly selects a ready sample R of
size R, and a delivery sample D of size D. Samples are selected with replacement by repeatedly
calling Ω (Algorithm 2, line 4).
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37: upon event 〈al.Deliver |pi,[Ready,message,signature]〉 do
38: if verify(σ,message,signature) then
39: reply=(message,signature);
40: if pi∈R then
41: replies.ready[pi]←replies.ready[pi]∪{reply};
42: end if





48: upon exists message such that |{ρ∈R|(message,signature)∈replies.ready[ρ]}|≥Rˆ do
49: ready←ready∪{(message,signature)};
50: for all ρ∈R˜ do
51: trigger 〈al.Send |ρ,[Ready,message,signature]〉;
52: end for
53:
54: upon exists message such that |{ρ ∈ D | (message, signature) ∈ replies.delivery[ρ]}| ≥
Dˆanddelivered=False do
55: delivered←True;
56: trigger 〈psb.Deliver |message〉;
57:
Publish-subscribe Like Sieve, Contagion uses publish-subscribe to reduce its communication
complexity. This is achieved by having each correct process send Ready messages only to its ready
subscription set (lines 32 and 50), and accept Ready messages only from its ready and delivery samples
(lines 40 and 43).
Consistent broadcast The designated sender σ initially broadcasts its message using probabilistic
consistent broadcast (line 27). Upon pcb.Delivery of a message m (correctly signed by σ) (line 29), a
correct process sends a Ready message for m (line 33) to all the processes in its ready subscription set.
Contagion Upon collectiong Rˆ Ready messages for a message m (line 48), a correct process sends a
Ready message for m (line 51) to all the nodes in its ready subscription set.
Delivery Upon collecting Dˆ Ready messages for a message m for the first time, (line 54), a correct
process delivers m (line 56).
C.3 No duplication and integrity
We start by verifying that Contagion satisfies both no duplication and integrity.
Theorem 10. Contagion satisfies no duplication.
Proof. A message is delivered (line 56) only if the variable delivered is equal to False (line 54).
Before any message is delivered, delivered is set to True. Therefore no more than one message is ever
delivered.
Theorem 11. Contagion satisfies integrity.
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Proof. Upon receiving a Ready message, a correct proces checks its signature against the public key of
the designated sender σ (line 38), and the (message,signature) pair is added to the replies.delivery
variable only if this check succeeds. Moreover, a message is delivered only if it is represented at least
Dˆ times in replies.delivery (line 54).
If σ is correct, it only signs message when broadcasting (line 27). Since we assume that
cryptographic signatures cannot be forged, this implies that the message was previously broadcast by
σ.
C.4 Validity
We now compute, given D and Dˆ, the -validity of Contagion. To this end, we prove one preliminary
lemma.
Lemma 20. In an execution of Contagion, if pcb satisfies total validity and the sender has no more
than D−Dˆ Byzantine processes in its delivery sample, then psb satisfies validity.
Proof. Let m be the message broadcast by the correct sender σ. Since pcb satisfies total validity,
every correct process eventually issues a Ready(m) message (i.e., a Ready message for m) (line 33).
By hypothesis, σ has no more than D−Dˆ Byzantine processes in its echo sample. Obviously,
σ has at least Dˆ correct processes in its echo sample. Therefore, σ eventually receives at least Dˆ
Ready(m) messages (line 37), and delivers m (line 56).
Lemma 20 allows us to bound the -validity of Contagion, given D and Dˆ.













if the underlying abstraction of pcb satisfies pcbv -total validity.
Proof. We compute a bound on v by assuming that, if the total validity of the underlying pcb instance
is compromised, the validity of psb is compromised as well. Following from Lemma 20, the validity of
psb can be compromised only if the total validity of pcb is compromised as well, or if σ has more than
D−Dˆ Byzantine processes in its delivery sample.
Since procedure sample independently picks D processes with replacement, each element of a
correct process’ echo sample has an independent probability f of being Byzantine, i.e., the number of
Byzantine processes in a correct delivery sample is binomially distributed.
Therefore, σ has a probability o of having more then D−Dˆ Byzantine processes in its delivery
sample.
C.5 Adversarial execution
In this section, we define the model underlying an adversarial execution of Contagion. Here, a Byzantine
adversary is an agent that acts upon a system with the goal to compromise its consistency and / or
totality. The main goal of this section is to formalize the information available to the adversary, and
the set of actions that it can perform on the system throughout an adversarial execution.
Throughout the rest of this appendix, we bound the probability of compromising the consistency
and totality of Contagion by assuming that, if the consistency of the pcb instance used in Contagion is
compromised, then both the consistency and the totality of Contagion are compromised as well. In
what follows, therefore, we assume that Sieve satisfies consistency.
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C.5.1 Model
Let pi be any correct process. We make the following assumptions about an adversarial execution of
Contagion:
• As we established in Section 2, the adversary does not know which correct processes are in pi’s
ready or delivery samples. The adversary knows, however, which Byzantine processes are in pi’s
ready sample, and which Byzantine processes are in pi’s delivery sample.
• At any time, the adversary knows the set of messages for which pi sent a Ready message.
• At any time, the adversary knows if pi delivered a message. If pi delivered a message, then the
adversary knows which message did pi deliver.
• The adversary can arbitrarily cause pi to pcb.Deliver a given message m∗. Since we assume
that the underlying pcb instance satisfies consistency, the adversary cannot cause two correct
processes to pcb.Deliver two different messages.
Throughout an adversarial execution of Contagion, an adversary performs a sequence of minimal
operations on the system. Each operation consists of either of the following:
• Selecting a correct process that did not pcb.Deliver m∗ and causing it to pcb.Deliver m∗.
• Selecting a Byzantine process and causing it to send a Ready message to a correct process.
As a result of each operation, zero or more processes send issue a Ready message and/or deliver a
message. The adversary is successful if, at the end of the adversarial execution, either the consistency
or the totality of the system is compromised.
C.6 Epidemic processes
In the next sections, we compute bounds for the -consistency and -totality of Contagion. In order to
do so, in this section we study the feedback mechanism produced by Ready messages in an execution
of Contagion.
As we discussed in Appendix C.2, a correct process issues a Ready message for a message m after
either pcb.Delivering m (line 33) or collecting at least Rˆ Ready(m) messages from its ready sample
(line 51). We formalize this observation in the following definition.
Definition 29 (Ready, E-ready, R-ready). Let pi be a correct process, let m be a message. Throughout
an execution of Contagion, pi is E-ready for m if pi eventually pcb.Delivers m; pi is R-ready for m if
pi eventually receives at least Rˆ Ready(m) messages from its ready sample; pi is ready for m if pi is
either E-ready or R-ready for m.
We note how a correct process can simultaneously be E-ready and R-ready for the same message.
It is easy to observe that the R-ready condition creates a feedback process: as a result of a correct
process being R-ready for a message m, it issues a Ready(m) message that might cause other correct
processes to become R-ready for m as well.
Intuitively, this feedback process is designed to have two stable configurations:
• Few processes are ready: the fraction of correct processes that are E-ready for a message m
is significantly smaller than Rˆ/R. As a result, the probability of a correct process being R-ready
for m becomes very small, and the set of processes that are ready for m is, with high probability,
nearly identical to the set of processes that are E-ready for m.
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• All processes are ready: the fraction of correct processes that are E-ready for a message m
is not significantly smaller than Rˆ/R. As a result, a correct process that is not E-ready for m
has a significant probability of becoming R-ready for m. If this happens, the probability of a
correct process becoming R-ready for m further increases, and eventually every correct proces is
ready for m.
In this section, we show that the R-ready feedback mechanism is isomorphic to an epidemic process
as we define it in Appendix E. In summary, an epidemic process depends on one parameter (contagion
threshold Rˆ) to mimic the spread of a disease in a population:
• A population is represented on the nodes of a directed multigraph, allowing multi-edges and
loops. Intuitively, an a→b edge represents the relation a can infect b.
• Each member of the population (or node) can be in either of two states: healthy or infected. An
infected node stays infected: there is no cure for the infection.
• A set of nodes is initially infected. The epidemic process evolves in steps. At every step, all
the nodes that have at least Rˆ infected predecessors become infected as well. The process
is completed when either all nodes are infected, or no healthy node has at least Rˆ infected
predecessors.
We refer the reader to Appendix E for a more formal discussion of epidemic processes. In this
section, we prove the critical result that the R-ready feedback mechanism in Contagion is isomorphic
to an epidemic process.
Definition 30 (Adversarial execution). A adversarial execution (or just execution) is the
sequence of events produced by an execution of Contagion on N processes, a fraction f of which are
under the control of the adversary described in Section C.5.1. For the sake of brevity, we omit a more
formal definition.
Let x,x′ be executions. We say that x is equivalent to x′ (x=x′) if:
• The sequences of messages exchanged are identical in x and x′.
• The values produced by each correct, local source of randomness are identical in x and x′.
Definition 31 (Ready sample matrix). A ready sample matrix is an element of the set
J =(ΠR)ΠC
Definition 32 (Ready sample matrix of an execution). Let x be an execution, let j be a ready sample
matrix. j is x’s sample matrix if, for every correct process pi, pi’s ready sample in x is jpi.
Definition 33 (Random ready sample matrix). A random ready sample matrix is a random
variable representing the sample matrix of a random execution.







Proof. As we discussed in Section 2, the adversary has no control over the local source of randomness
of each correct process. Each correct process independently selects with uniform probability R elements
for its ready sample.
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Lemma 22. Let j be a ready sample matrix. Let x,x′ be executions of Contagion such that:
• No Byzantine process issues any Ready message in x or x′.
• The ready sample matrix of both x and x′ is j.
Let ρE ,ρ
′
E denote the set of correct processes that are E-ready for m in x, x
′ respectively. Let ρ, ρ′







Proof. Let us assume ρE =ρ
′
E . Let pi be a correct process. As we established, pi is ready for m if pi is
either E-ready or R-ready for m. Since ρE =ρ
′
E , we immediately have that pi is E-ready for m in x if
and only if pi is E-ready for m in x′.
By definition, pi is R-ready for m in x (x′) if it eventually receives at least Rˆ Ready(m) messages
from its ready sample in x (x′). By hypothesis, no Byzantine process issues any Ready message in x
(x′). Therefore, pi is eventually R-ready for m in x (x′) if pi receives at least Rˆ Ready(m) messages
from the correct processes in its ready sample in x (x′).
As we discussed in Section 2, we assume that every message is eventually delivered in an unbounded
but finite amount of time. Therefore, pi is eventually R-ready for m in x (x′) if at least Rˆ correct
processes in pi’s sample eventually issue a Ready(m) message in x (x′), i.e., if at least Rˆ correct
processes in pi’s sample are eventually ready for m in x (x′).
Since the above condition does not depend on the network scheduling, a correct process pi is
eventually ready for m in x if and only if pi is also eventually ready for m in x′. Therefore, ρ=ρ′.
Lemma 23. Let x be an execution of Contagion where no Byzantine process ever issues any Ready
message. Let j be x’s ready sample matrix. Let m be a message, let ρE denote the set of correct
processes that are E-ready for m in x. Let ρ denote the set of correct processes that are eventually
ready for m in x.





Let s∞=((v,e),w∞) be the contagion state resulting from the epidemic process with input s0. We
have
ρ=w∞
Proof. Following from Lemma 22, ρ does not depend on x’s network scheduling. Without loss of
generality, we can therefore make a synchrony assumption for x, and assume that every message delay
is unitary.
Let ρt denote the set of correct processes that are ready for m in x at time t. We have
ρ0 =w0 =ρE
In x, a correct process that is not ready for m at time t becomes ready for m at time t+1 if at






As we discuss in Appendix E, at step t+1, all the healthy nodes in an epidemic process that have





Therefore, if ρt = wt, then ρt+1 = wt+1, and, by induction, for all t, ρt = wt. In Appendix E,
we prove that an epidemic process identically converges in a finite number of steps. Consequently,
ρ∞=w∞, which proves the lemma.
Lemma 24. Let m be a message. Let x be an execution of Contagion where every Byzantine process
sends a Ready(m) message to every correct process from which it received a ReadySubscribe message.
Let j be x’s ready sample matrix. Let ρE denote the set of correct processes that are E-ready for m in
x. Let ρ denote the set of correct processes that are eventually ready for m in x.





Let s∞=((v,e),w∞) be the contagion state resulting from the epidemic process with input s0. We
have
ρ=w∞\(Π\ΠC)
Proof. It follows immediately from Lemma 23 and the observation that, in x, a Byzantine process
sends the same Ready messages as a correct process that is E-ready for m.
C.7 Threshold contagion
As we discussed in the previous section, in Appendix E we introduce epidemic processes, an abstract
model of the feedback mechanism produced by Ready messages in an execution of Contagion. Given the
multigraph on which it occurs, an epidemic process is deterministic. In Appendix E, we also generalize
epidemic processes to the probabilistic setting: we introduce and analyze Threshold Contagion, a game
where a player infects in rounds arbitrary subsets of a population, causing a sequence of epidemic
processes on a random, unknown multigraph.
Threshold Contagion depends on six parameters: node count N , sample size R, link probability l,
round count K, infection batch S, and contagion threshold Rˆ.
In summary, a game of Threshold Contagion is played as follows:
• A random multigraph with N nodes is generated. The number of predecessors of each node
follows a Bin[R,l] distribution. Each predecessor of a node is independently picked with uniform
probability from the set of nodes.
The topology of the network is not disclosed to the adversary.
• For K rounds:
– The player infects an arbitrary set of S healthy nodes.
– An epidemic process with contagion threshold Rˆ is ran on the resulting contagion state.
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We refer the reader to Appendix E for a more formal discussion of Threshold Contagion. There we
introduce the random variable
γ(N,R,l,K,S,Rˆ)
representing the number of nodes that are infected at the end of a game of Threshold Contagion. We
then prove that, by arbitrary choosing which nodes to infect, the adversary has no way to bias γ.
Finally, we analitically compute the probability distribution underlying γ.
In this section, we prove the critical result that a game of Threshold Contagion can be used to
model two classes of adversarial executions of Contagion.
Lemma 25. Let m∗ be a message. Let x be an adversarial execution of Contagion where:
• No Byzantine process issues any Ready message.
• For K rounds:
– The adversary selects, if possible, S correct process that are not ready for m∗, and causes
them to pcb.Deliver m∗.
– The adversary waits until every resulting Ready message is delivered.
Let ρ denote the number of correct processes in σ that, at the end of the adversarial execution, are














We start by noting that, for every g¯∈G,
P[g¯]=P[g−1(g)]













P[jpi,k∈Π\ΠC ] = f
P[jpi,k=(p¯i′∈ΠC)] = 1
C
We now build from x a game of Threshold Contagion y, played on g(j). At the beginning of each
round, if the adversary causes a correct process pi to pcb.Deliver m∗, then ζ(pi) is infected.
We can prove that, if pi is eventually ready for m∗ in x, then ζ(pi) is eventually infected in y.
Indeed, following from Lemma 23, if pi is ready for m∗ at the end of a round in x, then ζ(pi) is infected
at the end the same round in y.
Therefore, the following hold true:
75
• The probability of j¯ is identical to the probability of g(j¯).
• The number of correct processes that are eventually ready for m∗ in x is identical to the number
of nodes that are eventually infected in y.
Lemma 26. Let m be a message. Let x be an adversarial execution of Contagion where:
• No correct process pcb.Delivers m.
• Every Byzantine process sends a Ready(m) message to every correct process from which it
received a ReadySubscribe message.
Let ρ denote the number of correct processes in σ that, at the end of the adversarial execution, are





Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 25, using Lemma 24 instead of Lemma 23.
C.8 Preliminary lemmas
In order to compute an upper bound for the probability of the consistency of Contagion being
compromised, we will make use of some preliminary lemmas. The statements of those lemmas are
independent from the context of Contagion. For the sake of readability, we therefore gather them in
this section, and use them throughout the rest of this appendix.



























































Since the derivative is positive for all p∈ [0,1], the lemma is proved.
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C.9 Consistency
In this section, we compute a bound on the -consistency of Contagion. As we discussed in Ap-
pendix C.5.1, here we bound the probability of compromising the consistency of Contagion by assuming
that, if the consistency of the pcb instance used in Contagion is compromised, the consistency of
Contagion is compromised as well.
Let m∗ denote the only message that any correct process can pcb.Deliver. We start by noting that,
simply by having every Byzantine process behave like a correct process, an adversary can cause any
correct process to deliver m∗: indeed, with f=0, Contagion satisfies validity with deterministically 2.
As we discussed in Appendix C.2, a correct process can issue a Ready message for an arbitrary
number of messages. In other words, causing a correct process to become E-ready for m∗ does not
affect its behavior with respect to a message m 6=m∗.
Therefore, if an adversary can cause at least one correct process pi to eventually receive at least Rˆ
Ready messages for a message m 6=m∗, it can also compromise the consistency of Contagion.
Indeed, as we discussed in Section 2, the adversary has arbitrary control over the network scheduling.
Even if pi would eventually receive enough Ready(m∗) messages to deliver m∗, the adversary can slow
those messages down, and cause pi to first receive enough Ready(m) messages to deliver m. Every
other correct process will eventually deliver m∗, thus compromising the consistency of the system.
We formalize the above intuition in the following lemma.
Lemma 28. Let m∗ denote the only message that any correct process can pcb.Deliver. An optimal
adversary causes every Byzantine process to send a Ready(m) message to every correct process from
which it received a ReadySubscribe message, for some m 6=m∗.
Proof. Let B denote the number of Byzantine processes that eventually issue a Ready(m) message.
Let pi be a correct process, let Q denote the number of Ready(m) messages that pi eventually collects.















is an increasing function of B, and maximized by B = (N −C). Therefore, the probability of pi
eventually receiving enough Ready(m) messages to deliver m is maximized if every Byzantine process
issues a Ready(m) message.
As we previously established, the adversary can cause every correct process to also receive at least
Dˆ Ready(m∗) messages. Since the adversary has control over network scheduling, it can cause pi to
deliver m, and every other process to deliver m∗, thus compromising the consistency of the system.
Lemma 29. Let m∗ denote the only message that any correct process can pcb.Deliver, let m 6=m∗. If,
throughout an optimal adversarial execution, no correct process eventually collects enough Ready)(m)
messages to deliver m, then no correct process eventually collects enough Ready(m) messages to deliver
any message m′ 6=m.
2Here we are slightly abusing the result of Theorem 12, as it only guarantees that a correct sender will eventually
deliver its message. The result, however, independently holds for any other correct process as well.
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Proof. Following from Lemma 28, the optimal adversary causes every Byzantine process to issue a
Ready(m) message. In Lemma 24, we use the fact that this strategy makes the Byzantine processes
behave identically to correct processes that are E-ready for m to show that the set of correct processes
that are eventually ready for m only depends on the ready sample matrix of the execution.
Since a correct process does not change its ready or delivery samples throughout an execution, the
set of processes that will eventually be ready for m′ is at most the same as the set of processes that
will eventually be ready for m. In turn, this means that if no correct process eventually delivers m, no
correct process eventually delivers m′ either.
We can now use Lemma 28 to compute a bound on the -consistency of Contagion.
We introduce the random variable γ+ by
P[γ¯+]=P[γ(N,R,0,1,N−C,Rˆ)= γ¯+]
Following from Lemmas 26 and 28, γ+ represents the number of processes (Byzantine or correct)
that eventually issue a Ready message for a message m 6=m∗, when an optimal adversary is trying to
compromise the consistency of the system.
























if the underlying abstraction of pcb satisfies pcbc -consistency.
Proof. We start by noting that µ(γ¯+) represents the probability that a specific correct process will
eventually collect enough Ready(m) messages to deliver m, given the number γ¯+ of processes that
eventually issue a Ready(m) message.
Indeed, since every correct process picks its delivery sample independently, each of the D elements
of a correct process’ delivery sample has a probability γ¯+/N of issuing a Ready(m) message.
We then note that µ represents the probability of any correct process eventually collecting enough
Ready(m) messages to deliver m. µ is obtained by applying the law of total probability to µ(γ¯+).
Finally, c is obtained by the assumption that, if the consistency of the underlying pcb instance is
compromised, the consistency of Contagion is compromised as well.
C.10 Totality
In this section, we compute a bound on the -totality of Contagion. As we discussed in Appendix C.5.1,
here we bound the probability of compromising the totality of Contagion by assuming that, if the




Let m∗ be the only message that any correct process can pcb.Deliver. As we discussed in Appendix C.5.1,
throughout an execution of Contagion, an adversary performs a sequence of minimal operations on the
system, i.e., it either causes a correct process to pcb.Deliver m∗, or it causes a Byzantine process to
send an arbitrary Ready(m) message to a correct process.
We further relax the bound by assuming that, if the adversary can cause any message m 6=m∗ to
be delivered by at least one correct process, the totality of Contagion is compromised as well.
Under the assumption that no correct process can eventually collect enough Ready(m) messages to
deliver any message m different from m∗, causing a Byzantine process to send a Ready(m) message
has no effect on the totality of the system.
This reduces the set of adversarial operations that have a non-null effect on the totality of the
system to:
• Causing an arbitrary correct process to pcb.Deliver m∗.
• Causing a Byzantine adversary to send a Ready(m∗) message to a correct process.
We now prove a lemma to further reduce the set of minimal operations of an optimal adversary.
Lemma 30. Let m∗ be the only message that any correct process can pcb.Deliver. Let pi be a correct
process, let ξ be a Byzantine process in pi’s ready sample. An optimal adversary never causes ξ to send
a Ready(m) message to pi.
Proof. As a result of receiving a Ready(m∗) message from ξ, pi can either:
• Have collected less than Dˆ Ready(m∗) messages from its ready sample. The operation has no
effect.
• Have collected exactly Dˆ Ready(m∗) messages from is ready sample. Then pi becomes ready for
m∗. However, the same outcome could have been achieved deterministically by causing pi to
pcb.Deliver m∗.
Since every outcome of ξ’s Ready(m∗) message to pi can be deterministically emulated by causing
pi to pcb.Deliver (or not pcb.Deliver) m∗, the operation is useless to an optimal adversary.
C.10.2 Delivery probability
Let γ− denote the random variable counting the number of correct processes that are eventually ready
for m∗. In this section, we study the probability of totality being compromised, given the value of γ−.
By definition, totality is compromised if at least one correct process delivers m∗ and one correct
process does not deliver m∗.
Let pi be a correct process. We introduce the following events:
• Api: process pi delivers m∗.
• A: all correct processes deliver m∗.
• A˜: no correct process delivers m∗.
• T : the totality of the system is compromised.
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Given γ¯−, the probability of Api is bound by
α−pi (γ¯


























The lower bound is attained when no Byzantine process issues a Ready(m∗) message, and the
upper bound is attained when all Byzantine processes issue a Ready(m∗) message.
Noting that each correct process independently picks its delivery sample, we can compute, given
γ¯−, a lower bound for the probability of A:
P[A | γ¯−]≥(α−(γ¯−))C






The above allow us to compute, given γ¯−, an upper bound for the probability of T :
P[T | γ¯−] = P[ A,˜A | γ¯−]≤




C.10.3 C-step Threshold Contagion
Due to Lemma 30, the minimal set of operations for an optimal adversary reduces to
• Causing an arbitrary correct process to pcb.Deliver m∗.
• Causing a Byzantine process ξ in the delivery sample of a correct process pi to send a Ready(m∗)
message to pi.
It is immediate to see that the latter operation has no effect over which correct processes eventually
become Ready for m∗. In the previous section, we computed an upper bound on the probability of
compromising the totality of the system, given the number of correct processes that are eventually
ready for m∗.
In this section, we prove a final constraint on the optimal adversarial strategy, and finally compute
a bound on the -totality of Contagion.
Lemma 31. Let m∗ denote the only message that any correct process can pcb.Deliver. An optimal
adversary executes in C rounds. At every round, the adversary causes one correct process to pcb.Deliver
m∗, then waits until all the resulting Ready messages are delivered.
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Proof. Due to Lemma 23, the outcome of the execution is not affected by network scheduling: causing
one correct process at a time to pcb.Deliver m∗ has the same effect, e.g., as causing any set of correct
processes to simultaneously pcb.Deliver m∗.
Following from Lemma 31, we can intuitively see an adversarial execution whose goal is to
compromise the totality of Contagion as a game similar to blackjack. The game unfolds in C rounds. At
every round, the adversary causes one more correct process to pcb.Deliver m∗. With high probability,
this will have two possible negative outcomes for the player:
• Nothing happens: no correct process is able to deliver m∗, even if the Byzantine processes in its
delivery sample issue a Ready(m∗) message. The only possible move is to play again.
• The execution is busted : a feedback loop is generated that eventually causes, with high probability,
every correct process to deliver m∗, even if no Byzantine process issues any Ready(m∗) message.
The adversary fails in compromising the totality of the system.
If the adversary is lucky enough, however, one of the rounds will result in a configuration where no
feedback loop occurred, but at least one correct process can deliver m∗. In that case, the adversary
causes that process to deliver m∗, and stops: totality is compromised.
Following from Lemma 25, the probability distribution underlying the number of correct processes
that are ready for m∗ at the end of the n-th step is
P[γ¯−n ]=P[γ(C,R,1−f,C,1,Rˆ)]
We can finally compute a bound on the -totality of Contagion.








if the underlying abstraction of pcb satisfies pcbc -consistency.
Proof. Let Tn denote the event of totality being compromised at the end of round Tn.
Under the assumption that the consistency of pcb is satisfied, and no message other than m∗ can




P[Tn | γ¯−n ]P[γ¯−n |Tn−1]
Indeed, the adversary will proceed to round n only if round n−1 was unsuccessful in compromising








P[Tn | γ¯−n ]P[γ¯−n ]
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P[Tn | γ¯−n ]≤α(γ−n )
we have that b bounds the probability of compromising totality, if the consistency of pcb is satisfied,
and no message other than m∗ can be delivered by any correct process.
The value provided for t follows from applying again Boole’s inequality to include 
pcb
c and µ
(which, in Appendix C.9, we proved to bound the probability of any correct process delivering a
message other than m∗).
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D Decorators
In this appendix, we provide the proof that each of the sets of cob adversaries presented in Appendix B.9
is optimal.
D.1 Auto-echo adversary
Algorithm 8 Auto-echo decorator
1: Implements:
2: AutoEchoAdversary + CobSystem, instance aeadv
3:
4: Uses:
5: CobAdversary, instance adv, system aeadv
6: CobSystem, instance sys
7:
8: procedure aeadv.Init() is
9: queue=∅;
10:
11: for all pi∈ΠC do
12: for all m∈M do










23: procedure aeadv.Step() is















38: procedure aeadv.State() is
39: state=∅;
40:
41: for all (pi,m)∈sys.State() do
42: n=0;
43:
44: for all ρ∈sys.Sample(pi,m) do












57: procedure aeadv.Sample(process,message) is
58: sample=∅;
59:
60: for all ρ∈sys.Sample(process,message) do







68: procedure aeadv.Deliver(process,message) is
69: executed=True;
70:
71: for all pi∈ΠC do








79: procedure aeadv.Echo(process,sample,source,message) is
80: echoes[process][sample][source]=message;
81:




Lemma 32. The set of auto-echo adversaries Aae is optimal.
Proof. We prove the result using a decorator, i.e., an algorithm that acts as an interface between an
adversary and a system. An adversary coupled with a decorator effectively implements an adversary.
Here we show that a decorator ∆ae exists such that, for every α∈A, the adversary α′=∆ae(α) is an
auto-echo adversary, and more powerful than α. If this is true, then the lemma is proved: let α∗ be an
optimal adversary, then the auto-echo adversary α+ =∆ae(α
∗) is optimal as well.
Decorator Algorithm 8 implements Auto-echo decorator, a decorator that transforms an
adversary into an auto-echo adversary. Provided with an adversary adv, Auto-echo decorator acts
an interface between adv and a system sys, effectively implementing an auto-echo adversary aeadv.
Auto-echo decorator exposes both the adversary and the system interfaces: the underlying adversary
adv uses aeadv as its system.
Auto-echo decorator works as follows:
• Procedure aeadv.Init() initializes the following variables:
– A queue list that contains every combination of (pi,m,ξ), pi being a correct process, m
being a message and ξ being a Byzantine process: queue is used to initially cause every
Byzantine process ξ to send an Echo(m, m) message to every correct process pi, for every
message m.
– An echoes table, initialized with ⊥ values: echoes is used to keep track of all the Echo
messages that would have been sent to each correct process in sys, if adv was playing
instead of aeadv.
• Procedure aeadv.Step() checks if queue is not empty. If it is not empty, it pops (i.e., picks and
removes) its first element (pi,m,ξ), with ξ∈Π\ΠC , pi∈ΠC and m∈M. It then causes ξ to send
pi an Echo(m, m) message.
If queue is empty instead, the procedure calls adv.Step() until either sys.Deliver(...) or
sys.End() are called: this is achieved using the executed flag.
• Procedure aeadv.Byzantine(process) simply forwards the call to
sys.Byzantine(process).
• Procedure aeadv.State() returns a list of pairs (pi∈ΠC ,m∈M) such that pi delivered m in sys,
and pi would have delivered m in sys, if adv was playing instead of aeadv.
This is achieved by querying sys.State(), then looping over each element (pi,m) of the response.
For each (pi,m), the procedure loops over every element ρ of sys.Sample(pi,m), and computes
the number n of Echo(m, m) messages that pi would have received from its echo sample for
m in sys, if adv was playing instead of aeadv. This is achieved using the echoes table. If n is
greater or equal to Eˆ, (pi,m) is included in the list returned by the procedure.
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• Procedure aeadv.Sample(process,message) returns every process in
sys.Sample(process,message) that would have sent an Echo(message, message′) message for
some message message′ to process in sys, if adv was playing instead of aeadv. This is achieved
using the echoes table.
• Procedure aeadv.Deliver(process,message) updates the echo table to reflect all the Echo
messages that process will send, as a result of having pb.Delivered message. It then forwards
the call to
sys.Deliver(process,message), causing process to pb.Deliver message.
• Procedure aeadv.Echo(process,sample,source,message) updates the echo table to include the
Echo(sample, message) message that process would receive from source, if adv was playing
instead of aeadv.
• Procedure aeadv.End() simply forwards the call to sys.End().
Correctness We start by proving that no adversary, coupled with Auto-echo decorator, causes the
execution to fail.
We start by establishing a preliminary result. Let pi∈ΠC , let m∈M. If (pi,m) is returned from
aeadv.State(), then pi delivered m in sys. Indeed, (pi,m) is returned from aeadv.State() only if (pi,m)
is returned from sys.State().
Let pi∈ΠC , let m∈M. The following hold true:
• An invocation to aeadv.Step() results in one and only one call to
sys.Deliver(...), sys.Echo(...) or sys.End(). Indeed, if queue is not empty, exactly one call to
sys.Echo(...) is issued. Otherwise, adv.Step() is called until executed=True, and executed is
set to True only after an invocation to sys.Deliver(...) or sys.End().
• Procedure aeadv.State() never causes the execution to fail. Indeed,
sys.Sample(pi,m) is called only if (pi,m) is returned from sys.State(). This means that
sys.Sample(pi,m) is called only if pi delivered m in sys. Therefore, sys.Sample(pi,m) is never
invoked from aeadv.State() unless at least one correct process delivered m in sys.
• No invocation of aeadv.Sample(...) causes the execution to fail. Noting that adv is correct, it
will never invoke aeadv.Sample(pi,m) unless (pi′,m) was returned from a previous invocation
of aeadv.State(), for some pi′ ∈ ΠC . As we previously established, (pi′,m) is returned from
aeadv.State() only if pi′ delivered m in sys. Therefore, sys.Sample(pi,m) is never invoked from
aeadv.Sample(...) unless at least one correct process delivered m in sys.
Auto-echo It is easy to prove that Auto-echo decorator always implements an auto-echo adversary.
Indeed, every call to aeadv.Step() results in a call to sys.Echo(pi,m,ξ,m), causing the Byzantine
process ξ to send an Echo(m, m) message to the correct process pi, until queue is exhausted.
Therefore, only sys.Echo(...) is invoked until ξ sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi, for every pi∈ΠC ,
every m∈M, and every ξ∈Π\ΠC .
Roadmap Let α∈A, let α′=∆ae(α). Let σ be a system such that α compromises the consistency
of σ. Let σ′ be an identical copy of σ. In order to prove that α′ is more powerful than α, we prove
that α′ compromises the consistency of σ′.
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Trace We start by noting that, if we couple Auto-echo decorator with σ′, we effectively obtain a
system instance δ with which α directly exchanges invocations and responses. Here we show that the
trace τ (α,σ) is identical to the trace τ (α,δ). Intuitively, this means that α has no way of distinguishing
whether it has been coupled directly with σ, or it has been coupled with σ′, with Auto-echo decorator















and we need to prove that rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Let us assume that in+1 =(Byzantine,pi). Since aeadv.Byzantine(pi) simply forwards the call to
sys.Byzantine(pi), and σ′ is an identical copy of σ, we immediately have rn+1 =r′n+1.
Before considering the remaining possible values of in+1, we prove some auxiliary results. Let pi be
a correct process, let ξ be a Byzantine process, let ρ be a process, let s,m be messages. For every
j≤n+1, as we established, we have ij = i′j . Therefore, after the (n+1)-th invocation, the following
hold true:
• ρ sent an Echo(s, m) message to pi in σ if and only if echoes[pi][s][ρ] = m. Indeed, if ρ
is correct, ρ sent an Echo(s, m) message to pi in σ if and only if aeadv.Deliver(ρ,m) was
invoked. In turn, echo[pi′][s′][ρ] was set to m for every pi′ ∈ ΠC , s′ ∈ M if and only if
aeadv.Deliver(ρ,m) was invoked. If ρ is Byzantine, ρ sent an Echo(s, m) message to pi in σ if
and only if aeadv.Echo(pi,s,ρ,m) was invoked. In turn, echo[pi][s][ρ] was set to m if and only if
aeadv.Echo(pi,s,ρ,m) was invoked.
• If ρ sent an Echo(m, m′) message to pi in σ for some m′ ∈M, then ρ sent an Echo(m, m′′)
message to pi in σ′ as well, for some m′′∈M. Indeed, if ρ is correct, then aeadv.Deliver(ρ,m′)
was invoked. As a result, sys.Deliver(ρ,m′) was called, and ρ sent an Echo(s′, m′) message to
pi′ for every pi′∈ΠC , s′∈M. If ρ is Byzantine, then it sent an Echo(m′′′, m′′′) message to pi′,
for every pi′∈ΠC , m′′′∈M.
• If ρ sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σ, then ρ sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σ′ as well.
Indeed, if ρ is correct, then aeadv.Deliver(ρ,m) was invoked. As a result, sys.Deliver(ρ,m)
was called, and ρ sent an Echo(s′, m) message to pi′ for every pi′∈ΠC , s′∈M. If ρ is Byzantine,
then it sent an Echo(m′, m′) message to pi′, for every pi′∈ΠC , m′∈M.
• If pi delivered m in σ, then pi delivered m in σ′ as well. This follows from the above and the fact
that σ′ is an identical copy of σ (i.e., pi’s echo sample for m in σ is identical to pi’s echo sample
in σ′.
Let us assume that in+1 =(State). Let pi be a correct process, let m be message. We start by
noting that aeadv.State() returns (pi,m) if and only if pi delivered m in σ′, and pi delivered m in
σ. Indeed, (pi,m) is added to the return list of aeadv.State() if and only if (pi,m) is returned from
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sys.State(), and at least Eˆ processes sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σ. If (pi,m)∈rn+1, then pi
delivered m in σ, and pi delivered m in σ′ as well. Therefore (pi,m)∈r′n+1. If (pi,m)∈r′n+1, then we
immediately have that pi delivered m in σ, and (pi,m)∈rn+1.
Let us assume that in+1 = (Sample, pi,m). Let ρ be a process. We start by noting that
aeadv.Sample(pi,m) returns ρ if and only ρ sent an Echo(m, m′′) message to pi in σ′ for some
m′′ ∈M, and echoes[pi][m][ρ] 6= ⊥. If ρ ∈ rn+1, then ρ sent an Echo(m, m′) message to pi in σ,
for some m′ ∈M. Therefore, ρ sent an Echo(m, m′′) message to pi in σ′, for some m′′ ∈M, and
echoes[pi][m][ρ]=m′ 6=⊥. Consequently, ρ∈r′n+1. If ρ∈r′n+1, then echoes[pi][m][ρ]=m′ 6=⊥ for some
m′∈M. Therefore, ρ sent an Echo(m, m′) message to pi in σ, and ρ∈rn+1.
Noting that procedures Deliver(...) and Echo(...) never return a value, we trivially have that
if in+1 = (Deliver,pi,m) or in+1 = (Echo,pi,s,ξ,m) then rn+1 =⊥= r′n+1. By induction, we have
τ(α,σ)=τ(α,δ).
Consistency of σ′ We proved that τ (α,σ)=τ (α,δ). Moreover, we proved that if a correct process
pi eventually delivers a message m in σ, then pi also delivers m in σ′.
Since α compromises the consistency of σ, two correct processes pi, pi′ and two distinct messages
m, m′ 6=m exist such that, in σ, pi delivered m and pi′ delivered m′. Therefore, in σ′, pi delivered m
and pi′ delivered m′. Therefore α′ compromises the consistency of σ′.
Consequently, the adversarial power of α is smaller or equal to the adversarial power of α′=∆ae(a),
and the lemma is proved.
D.2 Process-sequential adversary
Lemma 33. The set of process-sequential adversaries Aps is optimal.
Proof. We prove again the result using a decorator, i.e., an algorithm that acts as an interface between
an adversary and a system. An adversary coupled with a decorator effectively implements an adversary.
Here we show that a decorator ∆ps exists such that, for every α∈Aae, the adversary α′=∆ps(α) is a
process-sequential adversary, and as powerful as α. If this is true, then the lemma is proved: let α∗ be
an optimal adversary, then the process-sequential α+ =∆ps(α
∗) is optimal as well.
Decorator Algorithm 9 implements Process-sequential decorator, a decorator that transforms
an auto-echo adversary into a process-sequential adversary. Provided with an auto-echo adversary
aeadv, Process-sequential decorator acts as an interface between aeadv and a system sys, effectively
implementing a process-sequential adversary psadv. Process-sequential decorator exposes both the
adversary and the system interfaces: the underlying adversary aeadv uses psadv as its system.
Process-sequential decorator works as follows:
• Procedure psadv.Init() initializes the following variables:
– A perm array of C elements: perm is used to consistently translate process identifiers
between aeadv and sys.
– A cursor variable, initially set to 1: at any time, cursor identifies the next process that
will pb.Deliver a message in sys.
• Procedure psadv.Step() simply forwards the call to aeadv.Step().
• Procedure psadv.Byzantine(process) simply forwards the call to
sys.Byzantine(process).
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Algorithm 9 Process-sequential decorator
1: Implements:
2: ProcessSequentialAdversary + CobSystem, instance psadv
3:
4: Uses:
5: AutoEchoAdversary, instance aeadv, system psadv
6: CobSystem, instance sys
7:
8: procedure psadv.Init() is
9: perm={⊥}C ; cursor=1;
10: aeadv.Init();
11:
12: procedure psadv.Step() is
13: aeadv.Step();
14:
15: procedure psadv.Byzantine(process) is
16: return sys.Byzantine(process);
17:
18: procedure psadv.State() is
19: return sys.State();
20:
21: procedure psadv.Sample(process,message) is
22: sample=∅;
23:
24: for all ρ∈sys.Sample(process,message) do














39: procedure psadv.Echo(process,sample,source,message) is
40: sys.Echo(process,sample,source,message);
41:




• Procedure psadv.State() simply forwards the call to sys.State().
• Procedure psadv.Sample(process,message) returns the list of processes returned by sys.Sample(process,message),
translated through perm. More specifically, for every process ρ in sys.Sample(process,message):
if ρ is correct, it is translated to ζ(perm[ζ−1(ρ)]); if ρ is Byzantine, it is left unchanged.
• Procedure psadv.Deliver(process,message) sets perm[cursor] to ζ−1(process), then forwards
the call to sys.Deliver(ζ(cursor),message). Finally, it increments cursor. This serves the
purpose to sequentially cause ζ(1), ζ(2), ... to deliver a message, while storing the translation
in perm in order for psadv.Sample(...) to provide a response consistent with any previous
invocation of psadv.Deliver(...).
• Procedure psadv.Echo(process,sample,source,message) simply forwards the call to sys.Echo(process,sample,source,message).
• Procedure pasdv.End() simply forwards the call to sys.End().
Correctness We start by proving that no adversary, coupled with Process-sequential decorator,
causes the execution to fail.
The following hold true:
• No invocation of psadv.Sample(...) causes the execution to fail. Noting that aeadv is correct, it
will never invoke psadv.Sample(pi,m) unless (pi′,m) was returned from a previous invocation
of psadv.State(), for some pi′∈ΠC . Moreover, since psadv.State() simply forwards the call to
sys.State(), if (pi′,m) was returned from psadv.State(), then pi′ delivered m in sys. Therefore,
sys.Sample(pi,m) is never invoked from psadv.Sample(...) unless at least one correct process
delivered m in sys.
• Procedure sys.Sample(...) never calls ζ(⊥). We defer the proof of this result to a later section
of this lemma.
• Procedure sys.Deliver(...) is never invoked twice on the same process. Indeed, by definition, ζ
is a bijection between 1..C and ΠC , and cursor is incremented every time sys.Deliver(...) is
called.
Process-sequential It is easy to prove that Process-sequential decorator always implements a
process-sequential adversary. Indeed, sys.Deliver(...) is invoked sequentially on ζ(1), ζ(2), ... as
cursor is incremented, regardless of the process originally provided to psadv.Deliver(...).
System translation Let α be an adversary. We start by noting that, since α is correct, α always
causes every correct process to pb.Deliver a message. We can therefore define a function
µ :A×S×ΠC→1..C
such that µ(α,σ,pi)=d if and only if pi is the d-th process that α causes to pb.Deliver a message, when
α is coupled with σ. We additionally define(
µ−1(α,σ,d)=pi
) def⇐⇒(µ(α,σ,pi)=d)
We then define a system translation function Ψ[α] :S→S such that, for every system σ, every






Let σ be a system, let σ′=Ψ[α](σ). Intuitively, σ′ is obtained from σ simply by relabeling every
correct process in every echo sample. Whenever a correct process pi appears in an echo sample in σ,
it is replaced with ζ(d), d being the position of pi in the ordered list of processes that α causes to
pb.Deliver a message, when coupled with σ. Byzantine processes are left unchanged.
Roadmap Let α∈A, let α′=∆ps(α). Let σ∈S such that α compromises the consistency of σ. In
order to prove that α′ is as powerful as α, we prove that:
• α′ compromises the consistency of σ′=Ψ[α](σ).
• Ψ[α](σ) is a permutation on S.
Indeed, if the above are true, then the probability of α′ compromising the consistency of a random
system σ′ is equal to the probability of α compromising the consistency of a random system σ, and
the lemma is proved.
Trace We start by noting that, if we couple Process-sequential decorator with σ′, we effectively
obtain a system interface δ with which α directly exchanges invocations and responses. Here we
show that the trace τ (α,σ) is identical to the trace τ (α,δ). Intuitively, this means that α has no way
of distinguishing whether it has been coupled directly with σ, or it has been coupled with σ′, with











with n≥0 (here n=0 means that this is α’s first invocation). We start by noting that, since a is a




and we need to prove that rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Let us assume that in+1 = (Byzantine,pi). Let ξ be a Byzantine process. If ξ ∈ rn+1 then, by
definition, ξ∈σ[pi][1], i.e., for at least one e∈1..E, σ[pi][1][e]=ξ. Therefore, σ′[pi][1][e]=ξ, and ξ∈r′n+1.
If ξ /∈ rn+1 then, for all e∈ 1..E, σ[pi][1][e] 6= ξ. If σ[pi][1][e]∈ΠC , then σ′[pi][1][e]∈ΠC as well, so
σ′[pi][1][e] 6=ξ. If σ[pi][1][e]∈Π\ΠC , then σ′[pi][1][e]=σ[pi][1][e] 6=ξ. Therefore, ξ /∈r′n+1.
Before considering the remaining possible values of in+1, we prove some auxiliary results. Let pi be
a correct process, let m be a message, let d∈1..C, let e∈1..E. For every j≤n+1, as we established,
we have ij = i
′
j . Therefore, after the (n+1)-th invocation, the following hold true:
• pi pb.Delivered m in σ if and only if ζ(µ(α,σ,pi)) pb.Delivered m in σ′. Indeed:
– If pi pb.Delivered m in σ, then psadv.Deliver(pi,m) was invoked. Moreover, by definition,
psadv.Deliver(pi,m) was the µ(α,σ,pi)-th invocation of psadv.Deliver(...). Noting that
cursor is incremented at each invocation of psadv.Deliver(...), when psadv.Deliver(pi,m)
was invoked we had cursor=µ(α,σ,pi). Finally, psadv.Deliver(pi,m) forwards the call to
sys.Deliver(ζ(cursor),m). Consequently,
ζ(µ(α,σ,pi)) pb.Delivered m in σ′.
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– If ζ(µ(α,σ,pi)) pb.Delivered m in σ′ then sys.Deliver(ζ(cursor),m) was invoked, with
cursor=µ(α,σ,pi). Noting that cursor is incremented after each invocation of sys.Deliver(...),
we have that psadv.Deliver(...) was invoked at least µ(α,σ,pi) times. By definition, this
means that psadv.Deliver(pi,m) was invoked. Consequently, pi pb.Delivered m in σ.
• If pi pb.Delivered a message in σ′, then perm[ζ−1(pi)] 6= ⊥. Indeed, noting that cursor is
incremented every time psadv.Deliver(...) is invoked, we have that ρ pb.Delivered a message in
σ′ as a result of the ζ−1(pi)-th invocation of psadv.Deliver(...). As a result, perm[ζ−1(pi)] was
set to a value other than ⊥. From this follows that procedure sys.Sample(...) never calls ζ(⊥).
• If perm[d] 6=⊥, then perm[d] = ζ−1(µ−1(α,σ,d)). Indeed, noting that cursor is incremented
every time psadv.Deliver(...) is invoked, perm[d] was set to a value other than ⊥ upon the d-th
invocation of
psadv.Deliver(...). By definition, the d-th invocation of psadv.Deliver(...) is psadv.Deliver(µ−1(α,σ,d),m′),
for some m′∈M.
• σ[pi][m][e] sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σ if and only if σ′[pi][m][e] sent an Echo(m, m)
message to pi in σ′. Indeed, if σ[pi][m][e]∈ΠC , then σ′[pi][m][e]=ζ(µ(α,σ,σ[pi][m][e])). Therefore,
σ[pi][m][e] pb.Delivered m in σ if and only if σ′[pi][m][e] pb.Delivered m in σ′. Noting that α is
an auto-echo adversary, if σ[pi][m][e]∈Π\ΠC , then σ′[pi][m][e]=σ[pi][m][e], and both sent an
Echo(m, m) message to pi (in σ and σ′, respectively).
• pi delivered m in σ if and only if pi delivered m in σ′. This immediately follows from the above.
Let us assume in+1 =(State). From the above immediately follows rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Let us assume in+1 =(Sample,pi,m). Let ρ be a process. The following hold true:
• If ρ∈rn+1, then ρ∈r′n+1. Indeed, if ρ∈ΠC , then ρ∈σ[pi][m] and ρ sent an Echo(m, m′) message
to pi in σ, for some m′∈M. Therefore, ρ delivered m′ in σ. By definition, ζ(µ(α,σ,ρ))∈σ′[pi][m].
Moreover, ζ(µ(α,σ,ρ)) delivered m′ in σ′ and, as a result, it sent an Echo(m, m′) message to pi in
σ′. Therefore, ζ(µ(α,σ,ρ))∈sys.Sample(pi,m). Finally, perm[µ(α,σ,ρ)]=ζ−1(ρ). Consequently,
ρ∈ r′n+1. If ρ∈Π\ΠC then ρ∈ σ[pi][m] and ρ∈ σ′[pi][m]. Moreover, ρ sent an Echo(m, m′)
message to pi, for some m′∈M, both in σ and σ′. Consequently, ρ∈r′n+1.
• If ρ ∈ r′n+1, then ρ ∈ rn+1. Indeed, if ρ ∈ ΠC , then ζ(perm−1[ζ−1(ρ)])3 was returned from
sys.Sample(pi,m), i.e., ζ(perm−1[ζ−1(ρ)]) pb.Delivered some message m′∈M in σ′. Moreover,
using our auxiliary result on perm we obtain
ζ(perm−1[ζ−1(ρ)])=ζ(µ(α,σ,ρ))
therefore ζ(µ(α,σ, ρ)) pb.Delivered m′ in σ′, and ρ pb.Delivered m′ in σ. Finally, since
ζ(µ(α,σ,ρ))∈σ′[pi][m], then by definition ρ∈σ[pi][m]. Consequently, ρ∈rn+1.
Noting that procedures Deliver(...) and Echo(...) never return a value, we trivially have that
if in+1 = (Deliver,pi,m) or in+1 = (Echo,pi,s,ξ,m) then rn+1 =⊥= r′n+1. By induction, we have
τ(α,σ)=τ(α,δ).
Consistency of σ′ We proved that τ (α,σ)=τ (α,δ). Moreover, we proved that if a correct process
pi eventually delivers a message m in σ, then ζ(µ(α,σ,pi)) also delivers m in σ′.
Since α compromises the consistency of σ, two correct processes pi, pi′ and two distinct messages
m, m′ 6=m exist such that, in σ, pi delivered m and pi′ delivered m′. Therefore, in σ′, ζ(µ(α,σ,pi))
delivered m and ζ(µ(α,σ,pi′)) delivered m′. Therefore α′ compromises the consistency of σ′.
3Noting that perm is injective, we define perm−1[b]=a⇐⇒perm[a]=b.
92
Translation permutation We now prove that, for any two σa, σb 6=σa, we have Ψ[α](σa) 6=Ψ[α](σb).
We prove this by contradiction. Suppose a system σ′ exists such that σ′=Ψ[α](σa)=Ψ[α](σb). We
want to prove that σa=σb.
We start by noting that, if τ(α,σa)=τ(α,σb), then σa=σb. Indeed, if τ(α,σa)=τ(α,σb), then for
every pi∈ΠC and every d∈1..C we have
µ(α,σa,pi) = µ(α,σb,pi)
µ−1(α,σa,d) = µ−1(α,σb,d)
























with n≥0 (here n=0 means that this is α’s first invocation). We start by noting that, since a is a




and we need to prove that rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Let us assume that in+1 =(Byzantine,pi). Let ξ be a Byzantine process. if ξ∈rn+1, then for at
least one e∈1..E we have σa[pi][m][e]=ξ. Therefore, σ′[pi][m][e]=ξ, and σb[pi][m][e]=ξ. Consequently,
ξ∈r′n+1. The argument can be reversed to prove ξ∈r′n+1 =⇒ ξ∈rn+1.
Before considering the remaining possible values of in+1, we prove some auxiliary result. Let pi be
a correct process, let m be a message, let e∈1..E. For every j≤n+1, as we established, we have
ij = i
′
j . Therefore, after the (n+1)-th invocation, the following hold true:
• pi pb.Delivered m in σa if and only if pi pb.Delivered m in σb. Indeed, if pi pb.Delivered m in
σa, then some j≤(n+1) exists such that ij =(Deliver,pi,m). Since i′j = ij , pi pb.Delivered m
in σb as well. The argument can be reversed to prove that, if pi pb.Delivered m in σb, then pi
pb.Delivered m in σa as well.
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• If pi pb.Delivered m in σa (or, equivalently, σb), then µ(α,σa,pi) = µ(α,σb,pi). Indeed, some
j≤ (n+1) exists such that ij = i′j =(Deliver,pi,m). Since, for all h<j, we also have ih= i′h, then∣∣{h∈1..(j−1) | ih=(Deliver,pi′∈ΠC ,m′∈M)}∣∣ =∣∣{h∈1..(j−1) | i′h=(Deliver,pi′∈ΠC ,m′∈M)}∣∣
• σa[pi][m][e] sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σa if and only if σb[pi][m][e] sent an Echo(m,
m) message to pi in σb. We prove this by cases:
– Let us assume that σa[pi][m][e] is correct, and pb.Delivered m in σa. By definition, we have
σ′[pi][m][e]=ζ(µ(α,σa,σa[pi][m][e]))
σ′[pi][m][e]=ζ(µ(α,σb,σb[pi][m][e]))
and from the above we have
ζ(µ(α,σa,σa[pi][m][e]))=ζ(µ(α,σb,σa[pi][m][e]))
Equating the two above we get
ζ(µ(α,σb,σa[pi][m][e]))=ζ(µ(α,σb,σb[pi][m][e]))
and noting that µ is always injective, we have σa[pi][m][e]=σb[pi][m][e]. Therefore σb[pi][m][e]
pb.Delivered m in σb.
The argument can be inverted to prove that, if σb[pi][m][e] is correct, and pb.Delivered m
in σb, then σa[pi][m][e] pb.Delivered m in σa as well.
– Let us assume that σa[pi][m][e] is correct, but did not pb.Deliver m. From the definition
of Ψ[α], we know that σb[pi][m][e] is correct as well. By contradiction, following from the
above, we have that if σb[pi][m][e] pb.Delivered m in σb, σa[pi][m][e] would have pb.Delivered
m in σa as well.
The argument can be inverted to prove that, if σb[pi][m][e] is correct, but did not pb.Deliver
m in σb, then σa[pi][m][e] did not pb.Deliver m in σa either.
– Let us assume that σa[pi][m][e] is Byzantine. Then, from the definition of Ψ[α], we
immediately have σb[pi][m][e] =σa[pi][m][e] and, since α is an auto-echo adversary, both
sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi (in their respective systems).
• pi delivered m in σa if and only if pi delivered m in σb as well. This follows immediately from
the above.
Let us assume in+1 =(State). From the above immediately follows rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Let us assume in+1 = (Sample,pi,m). Let ρ be a process. If ρ ∈ rn+1, then for some e ∈ 1..E,
σa[pi][m][e] = ρ, and ρ sent an Echo(m, m
′) message to pi in σa, for some m′ ∈M. Following from
the above, we have σb[pi][m][e] = ρ as well, and ρ sent an Echo(m, m
′) message to pi in σb as well.
Therefore, ρ∈r′n+1. The argument can be inverted to prove that, if ρ∈r′n+1, then ρ∈rn+1 as well.
Noting that procedures Deliver(...) and Echo(...) never return a value, we trivially have that
if in+1 = (Deliver,pi,m) or in+1 = (Echo,pi,s,ξ,m) then rn+1 =⊥= r′n+1. By induction, we have
τ(α,σa)=τ(α,σb).
Therefore, σa=σb, which contradicts the hypothesis.
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Algorithm 10 Sequential decorator
1: Implements:
2: SequentialAdversary + CobSystem, instance sqadv
3:
4: Uses:
5: ProcessSequentialAdversary, instance psadv, system sqadv
6: CobSystem, instance sys
7:
8: procedure sqadv.Init() is
9: perm={⊥}C ; cursor=1; step=0;
10:
11: poisoned=False;
12: for all pi∈ΠC do







20: procedure sqadv.Step() is
21: step←step+1;
22:
23: if poisoned=False or step≤(N−C)C2 then
24: psadv.Step();






31: procedure sqadv.Byzantine(process) is
32: return sys.Byzantine(process);
33:
34: procedure sqadv.State() is
35: state=∅;
36:







43: procedure sqadv.Sample(process,message) is
44: return sys.Sample(process,perm−1[message]);
45:
46: procedure sqadv.Deliver(process,message) is








55: procedure sqadv.Echo(process,sample,source,message) is
56: sys.Echo(process,sample,source,message);
57:




Lemma 34. The set of sequential adversaries Asq is optimal.
Proof. We prove again the result using a decorator. Here we show that a decorator ∆sq exists such
that, for every α∈Aps, the adversary α′=∆sq(α) is a sequential adversary, and as powerful as α. If
this is true, then the lemma is proved: let α∗ be an optimal adversary, then the sequential α+ =∆sq(α∗)
is optimal as well.
Decorator Algorithm 10 implements Sequential decorator, a decorator that transforms a process-
sequential adversary into a sequential adversary. Provided with a process-sequential adversary psadv,
Sequential decorator acts as an interface between psadv and a system sys, effectively implementing a
sequential adversary sqadv. Sequential decorator exposes both the adversary and the system interfaces:
the underlying adversary psadv uses sqadv as its system.
Sequential decorator works as follows:
• Procedure sqadv.Init() initializes the following variables:
– A perm array of C elements: perm is used to consistently translate messages between
psadv and sys.
– A cursor variable, initially set to 1: at any time, cursor identifies the next message that
will be pb.Delivered in sys, if psadv will invoke the delivery of a process whose delivery
psadv never invoked before.
– A poisoned variable: poisoned is set to True if and only if at least one correct process
in sys is poisoned. This condition is verified by looping over sys.Byzantine(pi) for every
correct process pi.
– A step variable, initially set to 0: at any time, step counts how many times sqadv.Step()
has been invoked.
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• Procedure sqadv.Step() increments step, then implements two different behaviors depending on
the value of poisoned:
– If poisoned= True, it forwards the call to psadv.Step() for the first (N −C)C2 times.
For the next C steps, it sequentially invokes sys.Deliver(ζ(1),1), ..., sys.Deliver(ζ(C),1).
Finally, it calls sys.End().
– If poisoned=False, it forwards the call to psadv.Step().
• Procedure sqadv.Byzantine(process) simply forwards the call to
sys.Byzantine(process).
• Procedure sqadv.State() returns the list of process / message pairs returned by sys.State(), with
each message translated through perm. More specifically, sqadv.State() returns (pi,perm[m])
for every (pi,m) in sys.State().
• Procedure sqadv.Sample(process,message) simply forwards the call to sys.Sample(process,perm−1[message]).
• Procedure sqadv.Deliver(process,message) checks if psadv has already invoked the delivery
of message (this is achieved by checking if message is in perm). If so, it forwards the call
to sys.Deliver(process,perm−1[message]). Otherwise, it sets perm[cursor] to message, then
forwards the call to sys.Deliver(process,cursor). Finally, it increments cursor. This mechanism
serves two purposes:
– To consistently translate a sqadv.Deliver(...) invocation to a
sys.Deliver(...) invocation. More specifically, the set of invocations psadv.Deliver(pi1,m),
..., psadv.Deliver(pik,m) is always translated to sys.Deliver(pi1,m
′), ..., sys.Deliver(pik,m′).
– To never cause the pb.Delivery of a message b in sys before every message a<b has been
pb.Delivered in sys at least once.
• Procedure sqadv.Echo(process,sample,source,message) simply forwards the call to sys.Echo(process,sample,source,message).
• Procedure sqadv.End() simply forwards the call to sys.End().
Correctness We start by proving that no adversary, coupled with Sequential decorator, causes the
execution to fail. We distinguish two cases, based on the value of poisoned.
Let us assume poisoned = True. When sqadv.Step() is invoked, the call is forwarded to
psadv.Step() only for the first (N −C)C2 times. Noting that psadv is an auto-echo adversary,
every call to psadv.Step() results in a call to sqadv.Echo(...). For the next C steps, sqadv.Step()
sequentially causes ζ(1),ζ(2),... to pb.Deliver message 1. Finally, sqadv.Step() invokes sys.End().
Therefore, sqadv never causes the execution to fail, and it implements a process-sequential adversary.
Let us assume poisoned=False. Let pi be a correct process, let m be a message. The following
hold true:
• Procedure sqadv.State() never returns a (pi,⊥) pair. Indeed, if (pi,m)∈ sys.State(), then pi
pb.Delivered m in sys. Since pi is not poisoned, pi received at least one Echo(m, m) message
from a correct process. Consequently, if (pi,m) is returned from sys.State(), then at least one
correct process pb.Delivered m in sys, i.e., sys.Deliver(pi′,m) was invoked for some pi′∈ΠC .
The statement is proved by noting that, whenever sys.Deliver(pi′,m) is invoked for some pi′∈ΠC ,
we have perm[m] 6=⊥: indeed, either
sys.Sample(process,perm−1[message]) is invoked, andmessage∈perm, or sys.Sample(process,cursor)
is invoked, and perm[cursor]=message 6=⊥.
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• No invocation of sqadv.Sample(...) causes the execution to fail. Noting that psadv is correct, it
will never invoke sqadv.Sample(pi,m) unless (pi′,m) was returned from a previous invocation
of sqadv.State(), for some pi′ ∈ΠC . Since pi′ is not poisoned, (pi′,perm−1[m]) was returned
from sys.State(), therefore pi′ delivered perm−1[m] in sys. Therefore sys.Sample(pi,m) is never
invoked from sqadv.Sample(...) unless at least one correct process delivered m in sys.
Sequential It is easy to prove that Sequential decorator always implements a sequential adversary.
Indeed, if poisoned=True, sqadv simply causes every correct process to pb.Deliver message 1 (which
trivially implements a sequential adversary). If poisoned=False, then whenever sys.Deliver(pi,m) is
invoked, either of the following holds true:
• m=perm−1[message] for some message∈perm. Then sys.Deliver(...) was previously invoked
on m (i.e., some process pi′ exists such that sys.Deliver(pi′,m) was previously invoked).
• m=cursor. Then sys.Deliver(...) was never invoked onm. Noting that, whenever sys.Deliver(...)
is invoked on a new message, cursor is incremented, we have that every message l <m was
previously pb.Delivered by at least one correct process in sys.
System translation Let α be an adversary. We can define a function
µ :A×S×M→1..C∪{⊥}
such that:
• µ(α,σ,m)=(d∈1..C) if and only if m is the d-th distinct message that α causes at least one
correct process to pb.Deliver, when α is coupled with σ.
• µ(α,σ,m) =⊥ if and only if α never causes any correct process to pb.Deliver m, when α is
coupled with σ.







for all d≤ ν(α,σ). Here ν(α,σ) counts the number of distinct messages that α causes at least one
correct process to pb.Deliver, when coupled with σ. It is immediate to see that µ(α,σ,d)=⊥ for all
d>ν(α,σ).





For a given α and σ, the permutation χ maps d to the d-th distinct message that is pb.Delivered
when α is coupled with σ, if such a message exists. If such a message does not exist, χ simply
enumerates sequentially the messages that are never pb.Delivered when α is coupled with σ.
For example, let us consider the case where C=10 and α coupled with σ causes the pb.Delivery
of messages 3,7,1,4 (in this order of first appearance). Then χ will assume the following values for
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d∈1..C: 3,7,1,4,2,5,6,8,9,10.
Finally, we define a system translation function Ψ[α] :S→S such that, for system σ, every
correct process pi and every message m,
Ψ[α](σ)[pi][m]=
{
σ[pi][m] iff∃pi′∈ΠC |pi′ is poisoned inσ
σ[pi][χ(α,σ,m)] otherwise
Let σ be a system, let σ′=Ψ[α](σ). Intuitively, if at least one correct process is poisoned in σ,
then σ′=σ. Otherwise, σ′ is obtained from σ by permuting the echo samples of each correct process
in σ using χ.
Roadmap Let α∈A, let α′=∆sq(α). Let σ∈S such that α compromises the consistency of σ. In
order to prove that α′ is as powerful as α, we prove that:
• α′ compromises the consistency of σ′=Ψ[α](σ).
• Ψ[α](σ) is a permutation on S.
Indeed, if the above are true, then the probability of α′ compromising the consistency of a random
system σ′ is equal to the probability of α compromising the consistency of a random system σ, and
the lemma is proved.
Poisoned case We start by considering the case where poisoned=True. Let pi be a correct process
that is poisoned in σ. Noting that psadv is an auto-echo adversary, pi eventually delivers every message.
Indeed, every Byzantine process eventually sends to pi an Echo(m, m) message, for every m∈M.
Since all of pi’s echo samples share the same set of at least Eˆ Byzantine processes, pi eventually delivers
every message.
As a result, if at least one correct process in σ is poisoned, the consistency of σ is compromised
by any auto-echo adversary. Noting that σ′=Ψ[α](σ)=σ, and ∆sq(α) is an auto-echo adversary, we
immediately have that α′ compromises the consistency of σ′ as well.
In the next sections of this proof, we consider the case poisoned=False.
Trace We start by noting that, if we couple Process-sequential decorator with σ′, we effectively
obtain a system interface δ with which α directly exchanges invocations and responses. Here we show
that, if poisoned=False, the trace τ(α,σ) is identical to the trace τ(α,δ). Intuitively, this means
that, if poisoned=False, α has no way of distinguishing whether it has been coupled directly with σ,
or it has been coupled with σ′, with Process-sequential decorator acting as an interface. We prove this
by induction.










with n≥0 (here n=0 means that this is α’s first invocation). We start by noting that, since a is a





and we need to prove that rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Let us assume that in+1 =(Byzantine,pi). Noting that sqadv.Byzantine(process) simply forwards
the call to sys.Byzantine(process), and χ defines a permutation over 1..C, a message m exists such
that pi’s first echo sample for in σ′ is identical to pi’s echo sample for m in σ. Moreover, all of pi’s echo
samples in σ share the same set of Byzantine processes. Consequently, rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Before considering the remaining possible values of in+1, we prove some auxiliary results. We start
by noting the following:
• Let d∈1..C. At any time, if perm[d] 6=⊥, then perm[d]=µ−1(α,σ,d). Indeed, at any time, a
message m is in perm if and only if sqadv.Deliver(...) was previously invoked on m. Moreover,
whenever sqadv.Deliver(...) is invoked on a message m that is not in perm, m is added to perm
and cursor is incremented. Therefore perm[cursor] is set to m if and only if sqadv.Deliver(...)
was never invoked on m, and sqadv.Deliver(...) was previously invoked on exactly cursor−1
distinct messages. Moreover, by definition, when sqadv.Deliver(...) is invoked on m for the
first time, sqadv.Deliver(...) was previously invoked on exactly µ(α,σ,m)−1 distinct messages.
Consequently, cursor=µ(α,σ,m), and m=µ−1(α,σ,cursor).
• No two values of perm are equal to each other. Indeed, a message m is added to perm only if
m /∈perm.
• Let pi∈ΠC , let m∈M. If pi delivered m, then at least one correct process pb.Delivered m. This
separately holds true both in σ and σ′. Indeed, if pi delivered m, then it received at least Eˆ
Echo(m, m) messages from its echo sample for m and, since no correct process is poisoned in
neither σ nor σ′, at least one of them must have come from a correct process.
Let pi be a correct process, let ρ be a process, let m, s be messages. For every j≤n+1, as we
established, we have ij = i
′
j . By hypothesis, α is an auto-echo adversary, so ij = i
′
j , rj =r
′
j =⊥ for every
j≤ (N−C)C2. Let us consider the non-trivial case n≥ (N−C)C2. After the (n+1)-th invocation,
the following hold true:
• pi pb.Delivered m in σ if and only if pi pb.Delivered µ(α,σ,m) in σ′. Indeed:
– If pi pb.Delivered m in σ, then sqadv.Deliver(pi,m) was invoked.
If sqadv.Deliver(pi,m) was the first invocation of sqadv.Deliver(...) on m, then m was
not in perm, perm[cursor] was set to m, and sys.Deliver(pi,cursor) was invoked. As we
previously proved, however, we have perm[cursor]=µ−1(α,σ,m), so cursor=µ(α,σ,m).
Consequently, sys.Deliver(pi,µ(α,σ,m)) was invoked, and pi
pb.Delivered µ(α,σ,m) in σ′. If sqadv.Deliver(pi,m) was not the first invocation of
sqadv.Deliver(...) on m, then m was in perm, and sys.Deliver(pi, perm−1(m)) was
invoked. Due to the above, we have again perm−1[m] = µ(α, σ,m). Consequently,
sys.Deliver(pi,µ(α,σ,m)) was invoked, and pi pb.Delivered µ(α,σ,m) in σ′.
– If pi pb.Delivered µ(α, σ, m) in σ′, then sys.Deliver(pi, µ(α, σ, m)) was invoked. If
sys.Deliver(pi,cursor) was invoked, we have that cursor=µ(α,σ,m), and sqadv.Deliver(pi,m′)




and sqadv.Deliver(pi,m) was invoked. Consequently, pi pb.Deliveredm in σ. If sys.Deliver(pi,perm−1(m′))
was invoked for some m′ ∈ perm, we have perm−1[m′] = µ(α,σ,m), and again m′ =m.
Consequently, sqadv.Deliver(pi,m) was invoked, and pi pb.Delivered m in σ.
• pi received an Echo(m, m) message from ρ in σ if and only if pi received an Echo(µ(α,σ,m),
µ(α,σ,m)) message from ρ in σ′. Indeed:
– If ρ is a correct process, from the above we have that pi pb.Delivered m in σ if and only if
pi pb.Delivered µ(α,σ,m) in σ′. Therefore, ρ sent to pi an Echo(m, m) message if and only
if ρ sent to pi an Echo(µ(α,σ,m), µ(α,σ,m)) message.
– If ρ is a Byzantine process then, noting that α is an auto-echo adversary, ρ sent to pi an
Echo(m, m) both in σ and σ′.
• pi received an Echo(s, m′) message for some m′∈M from ρ in σ if and only if pi received an
Echo(µ(α,σ,s), m′′) message for some m′′∈M from ρ in σ′′. Indeed:
– If ρ is correct, it sent an Echo(s′, m′) message for every s′∈S and some m′∈S to pi in σ if
and only if ρ pb.Delivered a message in σ. Moreover, ρ pb.Delivered a message in σ if and
only if ρ pb.Delivered a message in σ′. Finally, ρ pb.Delivered a message in σ′ if and only
if ρ sent an Echo(s′′, m′′) message for every s′′∈S and some m′′∈S to pi in σ′.
– If ρ is Byzantine, it sent an Echo(m′, m′) message for every m′∈S both in σ and σ′.
• pi delivered m in σ if and only if pi delivered µ(α,σ,m) in σ′. Indeed, if pi delivered m in σ, then
at least one correct process pb.Delivered m in σ, and at least one correct process pb.Delivered
µ(α,σ,m) in σ′; if pi delivered µ(α,σ,m) in σ′, then at least one correct process pb.Delivered
µ(α,σ,m) in σ′, and at least one correct process pb.Delivered m in σ. Following from the
definition of χ, pi’s echo sample for m in σ is identical to pi’s echo sample for µ(α,σ,m) in
σ′. Moreover, pi received an Echo(m, m) message from ρ in σ if and only if pi received an
Echo(µ(α,σ,m), µ(α,σ,m)) message from ρ in σ′. Therefore pi delivered m in σ if and only if pi
delivered µ(α,σ,m) in σ′.
Let us assume in+1 =(State). Let pi be a correct process, let m be a message. The following hold
true:
• If (pi,m)∈rn+1, then (pi,m)∈r′n+1. Indeed, pi delivered m in σ, therefore pi delivered µ(α,σ,m)
in σ′. Moreover, sqadv.Deliver(...) was invoked at least once on m, and perm[µ(α,σ,m)]=m.
Finally, perm[µ(α,σ,m)] was returned from sqadv.State(), i.e., (pi,m)∈r′n+1.
• If (pi,m)∈r′n+1, then pi delivered perm−1[m] in σ′. Since perm[m]=µ−1(α,σ,m), pi delivered
µ(α,σ,m) in σ′. Therefore pi delivered m in σ, and (pi,m)∈rn+1.
Let us assume in+1 = (Sample,pi,m). At least one correct process delivered m in σ. Since no
correct process is poisoned, at least one correct process pb.Delivered m in σ, and sqadv.Deliver(...)
was invoked at least once on m. Therefore, perm[m]=µ−1(α,σ,m). Moreover, from the definition of
χ, we have that pi’s echo sample for m in σ is identical to pi’s echo sample for µ(α,σ,m) in σ′. Finally,
every process that sent an Echo(s, m′) for some m′∈M to pi in σ sent an Echo(µ(α,σ,s), m′′) for
some m′′∈M to pi in σ′. Since sqadv.Sample(pi,m) forwards the call to sys.Sample(pi,perm−1(m)),
we again have rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Noting that procedures Deliver(...) and Echo(...) never return a value, we trivially have that
if in+1 = (Deliver,pi,m) or in+1 = (Echo,pi,s,ξ,m) then rn+1 =⊥= r′n+1. By induction, we have
τ(α,σ)=τ(α,δ).
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Consistency of σ′ We proved that, if poisoned= False, then τ(α,σ) = τ(α,δ). Moreover, we
proved that if a correct process pi eventually delivers a message m in σ, then pi delivers µ(α,σ,m) in σ′.
Since α compromises the consistency of σ, two correct processes pi, pi′ and two distinct messages m,
m′ 6=m exist such that, in σ, pi delivered m and pi′ delivered m′. Therefore, in σ′, pi delivered µ(α,σ,m)
and pi′ delivered µ(α,σ,m′) 6=µ(α,σ,m) (since µ is a permutation). Therefore α′ compromises the
consistency of σ′.
Translation permutation We now prove that, for any two σa, σb 6=σa, we have Ψ[α](σa) 6=Ψ[α](σb).
We prove this by contradiction. Suppose a system σ′ exists such that σ′=Ψ[α](σa)=Ψ[α](σb). We
want to prove that σa=σb.
Following from the definition of Ψ[α], if at least one correct process in σ′ is poisoned, then we
immediately have σa=σ
′=σb. Consequently, no correct process in σ′ is poisoned.
We start by noting that, if τ(α,σa)=τ(α,σb), then σa=σb. Indeed, if τ(α,σa)=τ(α,σb), then for
every pi∈ΠC and every m∈M we have
µ(α,σa,m)=µ(α,σb,m)
from which immediately follows
χ(α,σa,m)=χ(α,σb,m)

















with n≥0 (here n=0 means that this is α’s first invocation). We start by noting that, since a is a




and we need to prove that rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Let us assume that in+1 =(Byzantine,pi). As we previously established, the Byzantine processes




Before considering the remaining possible values of in+1, we prove some auxiliary result. Let pi be
a correct process, let ρ be a process, let m, s be messages. For every j≤n+1, as we established, we
have ij = i
′
j . By hypothesis, α is an auto-echo adversary, so ij = i
′
j , rj =r
′
j =⊥ for every j≤ (N−C)C2.
Let us consider the non-trivial case n≥(N−C)C2. After the (n+1)-th invocation, the following hold
true:
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• ρ sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σa if and only if ρ sent an Echo(m, m) message to
pi in σb. Indeed, if ρ is a correct process, and ρ pb.Delivered m in σa, then some j≤ (n+1)
exists such that ij = (Deliver,ρ,m). Since i
′
j = ij , ρ pb.Delivered m in σb as well. If ρ is
Byzantine, and ρ sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σa, then some j≤ (n+1) exists such that
ij = (Echo,pi,m,ρ,m). Since i
′
j = ij , ρ sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σb as well. Both
arguments can be reversed to prove that, if ρ sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σb, then ρ
sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σa as well.
• ρ sent an Echo(s, m′) for some m′∈M to pi in σa if and only if ρ sent an Echo(s, m′′) message
for some m′′∈M to pi in σb. Indeed:
– If ρ is correct, and it sent an Echo(s, m′) message to pi in σa, then it pb.Delivered m′ in
both σa and σb. Consequently, ρ sent an Echo(s, m
′) message to pi in σb as well. The
argument can be inversed to prove that, if ρ is correct and it sent an Echo(s, m′′) message
for some m′′∈M to pi in σb, then ρ sent an Echo(s, m′) message for some m′∈M in σa.
– If ρ is Byzantine, then it sent an Echo(m′, m′) message for every m′∈M, both in σ and σ′.
• If at least one correct process pb.Delivered m in σa (or, equivalently, σb), then µ(α,σa,m) =









• pi delivered m in σa if and only if pi delivered m in σb. Indeed, if pi delivered m in σa, then at
least one correct process pb.Delivered m both in σa and σb, and µ(α,σa,m)=µ(α,σb,m). From
the definition of χ, we immediately get χ(α,σa,m)=χ(α,σb,m) and, as we previously established,
pi’s echo sample for m in σa is identical to pi’s echo sample for m in σb. Since pi received the
same Echo(m, m) messages in σa and σb, pi delivered m in σb as well. The argument can be
reversed to prove that, if pi delivered m in σb, then pi delivered m in σa as well.
Let us assume in+1 =(State). From the above it immediately follows rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Let us assume in+1 = (Sample,pi,m). As we established, pi an Echo(m, m
′) message for some
m′∈M from the same set of processes in σa and σb. Moreover, since at least one correct process
pb.Delivered m in both σa and σb, pi’s echo sample for m in σa is identical to pi’s echo sample for m
in σb. Therefore, rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Noting that procedures Deliver(...) and Echo(...) never return a value, we trivially have that
if in+1 = (Deliver,pi,m) or in+1 = (Echo,pi,s,ξ,m) then rn+1 =⊥= r′n+1. By induction, we have
τ(α,σa)=τ(α,σb).
Therefore, σa=σb, which contradicts the hypothesis.
D.4 Non-redundant adversary
Lemma 35. The set of non-redundant adversaries Anr is optimal.
Proof. We prove again the result using a decorator. Here we show that a decorator ∆nr exists such
that, for every α∈Asq, the adversary α′=∆sq(α) is a non-redundant adversary, and more powerful
than α. If this is true, then indeed the lemma is proved: let α∗ be an optimal adversary, then the
sequential α+ =∆nr(α
∗) is optimal as well.
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Algorithm 11 Non-redundant decorator
1: Implements:
2: NonRedundantAdversary + CobSystem, instance nradv
3:
4: Uses:
5: SequentialAdversary, instance sqadv, system nradv
6: CobSystem, instance sys
7:




12: procedure nradv.Step() is
13: sqadv.Step();
14:
15: procedure nradv.Byzantine(process) is
16: return sys.Byzantine(process);
17:
18: procedure nradv.State() is
19: state=∅;
20:
21: for all (·,m)∈sys.State() do
22: for all pi∈ΠC do
23: n=0;
24:
25: for all ρ∈sys.Sample(pi,m) do













Decorator Algorithm 11 implements Non-redundant decorator, a decorator that transforms a
sequential adversary into a non-redundant adversary. Provided with a sequential adversary sqadv,
Non-redundant decorator acts as an interface between sqadv and a system sys, effectively implementing
a non-redundant adversary nradv. Non-redundant decorator exposes both the adversary and the
system interfaces: the underlying adversary sqadv uses nradv as its system.
Non-redundant decorator works as follows:
• Procedure nradv.Init() initializes a deliveries array that is used to keep track of the message
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39: procedure nradv.Sample(process,message) is
40: return sys.Sample(process,message);
41:
42: procedure nradv.Deliver(process,message) is
43: state=∅;
44:












57: procedure nradv.Echo(process,sample,source,message) is
58: sys.Echo(process,sample,source,message);
59:
60: procedure nradv.End() is
61: sys.End();
62:
each correct process would have delivered, if sqadv was playing instead of nradv.
• Procedure nradv.Step() simply forwards the call to sqadv.Step();
• Procedure nradv.Byzantine(process) simply forwards the call to
sqadv.Byzantine(process).
• Procedure nradv.State() returns a list of pairs (pi∈PiC ,m∈m) such at least one correct process
delivered m in sys, and pi would have delivered m in sys, if sqadv was playing instead of nradv.
This is achieved by querying sys.State(), then looping over each message m in the response.
For every pi∈ΠC , the procedure loops over every element ρ of sys.Sample(pi,m), and computes
the number n of Echo(m, m) messages that pi would have received from its echo sample for
m in sys, if sqadv was playing instead of nradv. This is achieved using the deliveries table,
and the hypothesis that sqadv is an auto-echo adversary. If n is greater or equal to Eˆ, (pi,m) is
included in the list returned by the procedure.
• Procedure nradv.Sample(process,message) simply forwards the call to sys.Sample(process,message).
• Procedure nradv.Deliver(process,message) uses sys.State() to determine which messages have
been delivered by at least one correct process in sys. If message is the only message that was
delivered, the procedure forwards the call to sys.Deliver(process,message+1). Otherwise, it
forwards the call to sys.Deliver(process,message). Finally, it updates the deliveries array
to reflect the fact that process would have pb.Delivered message in sys, if sqadv was playing
instead of nradv.
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• Procedure nradv.Echo(process,sample,source,message) simply forwards the call to sys.Echo(process,sample,source,message).
• Procedure nradv.End() simply forwards the call to sys.End().
Correctness We start by proving that no adversary, coupled with Non-redundant decorator, causes
the execution to fail.
Let pi∈ΠC , let m∈M. The following hold true:
• Procedure nradv.State() never causes the execution to fail. Indeed, sys.Sample(pi,m) is
called only if (pi′,m) was returned from sys.State(), for some pi′ ∈ ΠC . This means that
sys.Sample(pi,m) is called only if at least one correct process delivered m in sys.
• No invocation of nradv.Sample(...) causes the execution to fail. Noting that sqadv is correct, it
will never invoke nradv.Sample(pi,m) unless (pi′,m) was returned from a previous invocation of
nradv.State(), for some pi′∈ΠC . Moreover, (pi′,m) is returned from nradv.State() is and only
if, for some pi′′∈Πc, (pi′′,m) is returned from sys.State(). Therefore, sys.Sample(pi,m) is never
invoked unless at least one correct process delivered m in sys.
• Procedure nradv.Deliver(...) never calls sys.Deliver(...) on a message greater than C. Let
m∈M. If m is the only message that was delivered in sys, then no correct process is poisoned
in sys: indeed, as we proved, if a correct message was poisoned in sys, it would have delivered
every message. Therefore, at least one correct process pb.Delivered m. Moreover, since sqadv is
a sequential adversary, it invokes nradv.Deliver(...) for the n-th time only on a message m≤n.
Since nradv.Deliver(...) is invoked at most C times, we have n≤C, and, since m was delivered
as a result of a previous invocation of nradv.Deliver(...), we have m≤n−1. Consequently,
m+1≤C.
We further prove that nradv is a sequential adversary. Let pi∈ΠC , let m∈M. Since sqadv is
sequential, it invokes nradv.Deliver(pi,m) only if it previously invoked nradv.Deliver(...) on every
message l<m∈M. Therefore, nradv can be a non-sequential adversary only as a result of a call to
sys.Deliver(pi,m+1). If m is the only message that was delivered by at least one correct process in
sys, then no correct process is poisoned in sys. Therefore, if sys.Deliver(pi,m+1) is invoked, then, as
we established, at least one correct process pb.Delivered m in sys. Noting that the set of messages
that are delivered by at least one correct process in sys is non-decreasing, if no correct process is
poisoned in sys then sqadv invoked nradv.Deliver(...) on m at least once when no correct process
had delivered m. Consequently, for every l<m, nradv.Deliver(...), and as a result sys.Deliver(...),
was invoked on l.
Non-redundant It is easy to prove that Non-redundant decorator always implements a non-
redundant adversary. Indeed, let pi∈ΠC , let m∈M, sys.Deliver(pi,m) is never invoked if m is the
only message that was delivered.
Roadmap Let α∈Asq, let α′=∆nr(α). Let σ be a system such that α compromises the consistency
of σ. Let σ′ be an identical copy of σ. In order to prove that α′ is more powerful than α, we prove
that α′ compromises the consistency of σ′.
Trace We start by noting that, if we couple Non-redundant decorator with σ′, we effectively obtain
a system instance δ with which α directly exchanges invocations and responses. Here we show that the
trace τ (α,σ) is identical to the trace τ (α,δ). Intuitively, this means that α has no way of distinguishing
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whether it has been coupled directly with σ, or it has been coupled with σ′, with Non-redundant















and we need to prove that rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Let us assume that in+1 =(Byzantine,pi). Since nradv.Byzantine(pi) simply forwards the call to
sys.Byzantine(pi), and σ′ is an identical copy of σ, we immediately have rn+1 =r′n+1.
Before considering the remaining possible values of in+1, we prove some auxiliary results. Let pi be
a correct process, let ρ be a process, let m be a message . For every j≤n+1, as we established, we
have ij = i
′
j . Therefore, after the (n+1)-th invocation, the following hold true:
• pi pb.Delivered m in σ if and only if deliveries[pi]=m. This follows immediately from the fact
that, whenever nradv.Deliver(pi,m) is invoked, deliveries[pi] is set to m.
• pi pb.Delivered a message in σ if and only if pi pb.Delivered a message in σ′. This follows
immediately from the fact that every nradv.Deliver(pi,m) is always either forwarded to
sys.Deliver(pi,m) or sys.Deliver(pi,m+1).
• If m was delivered by at least one correct process in σ, then m was delivered by at least one
correct process in σ′ as well. Indeed:
– If at least one correct process is poisoned, then it delivered every message both in σ and σ′.
– If no correct process is poisoned then, for some j∗≤n+1, after the j-th invocation, exactly
one message m∗ was delivered by at least one correct process in σ. This follows from the
fact that a non-poisoned process delivers m only as a result of receiving an Echo(m, m)
message, and no two messages Echo(m, m), Echo(m′ 6=m, m′) are ever issued as a result
of a single invocation.
– If no correct process is poisoned, and m=m∗, then some correct process pi∗ delivered m
in σ as a result of the j∗-th invocation. It is easy to see that, up to the j∗-th invocation,
every call to nradv.Deliver(pi,m) was simply forwarded to sys.Deliver(pi,m). Therefore,
noting that pi∗’s echo sample for m is identical in σ and σ′, pi∗ delivered m in sys as well.
– If no correct process is poisoned, and m 6=m∗, then no invocation of nradv.Deliver(...)
sees m as the only message delivered by at least one correct process in sys. Therefore,
all calls to nradv.Deliver(pi,m) are simply forwarded to sys.Deliver(pi,m). Consequently,
noting that pi’s echo sample for m is identical in σ and σ′, if pi delivered m in σ, then pi
delivered m in σ′ as well.
Let us assume that in+1 =(State). Let pi be a correct process, let m be message. The following
hold true:
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• If (pi,m) ∈ rn+1, then pi delivered m in σ. Therefore, at least one correct process delivered
m in σ′. Let pi′ be a correct process in pi’s echo sample for m that pb.Delivered m in σ: as
we established, we have deliveries[pi′] =m and pi′ pb.Delivered a message in σ′. Therefore,
pi′∈sys.Sample(pi,m). Since nradv.State(...) counts the processes in sys.Sample(pi,m) that
are either Byzantine or have their deliveries value set to m, we have (pi,m)∈r′n+1.
• If (pi,m) /∈rn+1, then less than Eˆ processes in pi’s echo sample for m are either Byzantine or have
pb.Delivered m. Therefore, less than Eˆ processes in pi’s echo sample are either Byzantine or have
their deliveries value set to m. Since sys.Sample(pi,m) is a subset of pi’s echo sample for m,
and since nradv.State(...) counts the processes in sys.Sample(pi,m) that are either Byzantine
or have their deliveries value set to m, (pi,m) /∈r′n+1.
Let us assume that in+1 =(Sample,pi,n). By hypothesis, pi’s echo sample for m is identical in σ and
σ′. Moreover, the set of processes that pb.Delivered a message is identical in σ and σ′. Noting that
nradv.Sample(pi,m) simply forwards the call to sys.Sample(pi,m), we immediately get rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Noting that procedures Deliver(...) and Echo(...) never return a value, we trivially have that
if in+1 = (Deliver,pi,m) or in+1 = (Echo,pi,s,ξ,m) then rn+1 =⊥= r′n+1. By induction, we have
τ(α,σ)=τ(α,δ).
Consistency of σ′ We proved that τ(α,σ)=τ(α,δ). Moreover, we proved that if a message m is
eventually delivered by at least a correct process in σ, then m is eventually delivered by at least a
correct process in σ′ as well.
Since α compromises the consistency of σ, two distinct messages m, m′ 6=m exist such that, in σ,
both m and m′ are delivered by at least one correct process. Therefore, in σ′, both m and m′ are
delivered by at least one correct process as well. Therefore, α′ compromises the consistency of σ′.
Consequently, the adversarial power of α is smaller or equal to the adversarial power of α′=∆nr(α),
and the lemma is proved.
D.5 Sample-blind adversary
Lemma 36. The set of sample-blind adversaries Asb is optimal.
Proof. We prove again the result using a decorator. Here we show that a decorator ∆sm exists such
that, for every α∈Anr, the adversary α′=∆C2sm(α) is a sample-blind adversary, and more powerful




∗) is optimal as well.
Decorator Algorithm 12 implements Sample-masking decorator, a decorator that masks every
invocation of Sample(pi,m) issued by a non-redundant adversary, if Sample(pi,m) is the first invocation
of Sample(...) issued by that adversary.
Provided with a non-redundant adversary nradv, Sample-masking decorator acts as an interface
between nradv and a system sys. Sample-masking decorator is only guaranteed to mask any invocation
to sys.Sample(pi,m), for one process pi and one message m. Noting that |ΠC |=C and |M|=C, we
have that, for every α∈Anr, α′=∆C2sm(α) is a sample-blind adversary: indeed, all of α’s C2 possible
calls to Sample(...) are necessarily masked.
Sample-masking decorator exposes both the adversary and the system interfaces: the underlying
adversary nradv uses smadv as its system. Sample-masking decorator works as follows:
• Procedure smadv.Init() initializes the following variables:
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Algorithm 12 Sample-masking decorator
1: Implements:
2: SampleMaskedAdversary + CobSystem, instance smadv
3:
4: Uses:
5: NonRedundantAdversary, instance nradv, system smadv
6: CobSystem, instance sys
7:















23: for all σ∈S do
24: if trace∼σ and σ[process][message]=sample then
25: systems←systems+1;



























52: for all ρ∈cache do












65: procedure smadv.Sample(process,message) is





71: if (process,message)= index then
72: sample={};
73: for all pi∈cache do



















92: procedure smadv.End() is
93: sys.End();
94:
– An index and a cache variable, both initially set to ⊥: index is used to store the pair
(pi∈ΠC ,m∈M) that was provided as argument to the first invocation of smadv.Sample(...);
cache is used to store the content of the echo sample smadv generates for (pi,m) when
smadv.Sample(...) is invoked for the first time. This guarantees that subsequent invocations
of smadv.Sample(pi,m) are provided with consistent responses throughout the entire
adversarial execution.
– A trace array: trace is used to store the sequence of invocations and responses exchanged
between nradv and sys.
– A deliveries array of C elements: deliveries is used to track the message pb.Delivered in
sys by each correct process.
• Procedure optimize(process,message) returns the sample sample for
(process,message) that maximizes the probability of nradv winning against a random system
σ that is compatible with trace, and satisfies
σ[process][message]=sample. This is achieved as follows:
– The procedure calls smadv.Byzantine(process), causing an invocation to sys.Byzantine(process)
to be appended to trace along with its response. This is necessary because, if smadv.Byzantine(process)
was never invoked before, the set of Byzantine processes in the generated sample might
differ from the Byzantine processes in process’ echo sample for message in sys. Noting
that all of process’ echo samples in sys share the same set of Byzantine processes, a
subsequent call to smadv.Byzantine(process) could return a set of Byzantine processes
that is inconsistent with the sample, causing undefined behavior on nradv.
– The procedure loops over every possible value of sample. For each value of sample, it
counts the number systems of systems σ that are compatible with trace, and satisfy
σ[process][message]=sample. Among the systems that satisfy those two constraints, the
procedure counts the number compromissions of systems whose consistency the adversary
would compromise.
– The procedure returns the value of sample that satisfies systems > 0, and maximizes
compromissions/systems. In other words, the procedure returns a sample sample that
is compatible with at least with one of the systems that are compatible with trace, and
maximizes the probability that the adversary would compromise the consistency of a
randomly selected system compatible with trace, picked among those where process’ echo
sample for message is sample.
• Procedure smadv.Byzantine(process) appends to trace the invocation of sys.Byzantine(process)
along with its response. It then forwards the call to sys.Byzantine(process).
• Procedure smadv.State() appends to trace the invocation of sys.State() along with its response.
It then returns the response of sys.State(), modified to be compatible with any previous
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masked invocation of sys.Sample(...). More specifically, if index=(pi,m) 6=⊥ (i.e., nradv’s first
invocation of smadv.Sample(...) was smadv.Sample(pi,m)), then (pi,m) is included in the set
of pairs returned by smadv.State() only if pi would have delivered m in sys, if pi’s echo sample
for m was cache. This is achieved by looping over every process in cache, and counting the
number n of those processes that are either Byzantine, or pb.Delivered m (this is achieved using
the deliveries array).
• Procedure smadv.Sample(process,message) determines whether
smadv.Sample(...) has ever been invoked before by checking the value of index. If it has not,
it sets index to (process,message), and generates a sample for (process,message) by setting
cache to optimize(process,sample).
If (process,message) is equal to index, the procedure returns the set of processes in cache that
pb.Delivered a message in sys. This is achieved by looping over every process ρ in cache, and
adding ρ to the response if ρ is either Byzantine, or satisfy deliveries[ρ] 6=⊥.
If (process,message) is not equal to index, the call is forwarded to
sys.Sample(process,message).
• Procedure smadv.Deliver(process,message) appends to trace the invocation of sys.Deliver(process,message).
It then updates the deliveries array to reflect the fact that process pb.Delivered m in sys.
Finally, it forwards the call to sys.Deliver(process,message).
• Procedure smadv.Echo(process,sample,source,message) appends to trace the invocation of
sys.Echo(process,sample,source,message). It then forwards the call to sys.Echo(process,sample,source,message).
• Procedure smadv.End() simply forwards the call to sys.End().
Correctness We start by proving that no adversary, coupled with Sample-masked decorator, has
undefined behavior. An adversary has undefined behavior if, at any point, the sequence of invocations
and responses it exchanges with smadv is incompatible with every system.
Let pi ∈ ΠC , let m ∈ M, let us assume that the first invocation to smadv.Sample(...) is
smadv.Sample(pi,m).
We start by noting that every invocation in smadv is forwarded to the corresponding invocation
in sys except for smadv.State() and smadv.Sample(pi,m). Moreover, before the first invocation
of smadv.Sample(pi,m), index is set to ⊥ and, as a result, smadv.State() effectively forwards to
sys.State(). Therefore, the trace exchanged between nradv and smadv is trivially compatible with
sys before the first invocation of smadv.Sample(pi,m).
When smadv.Sample(pi,m) is invoked for the first time, cache is set to optimize(pi,m). When
optimize(pi,m) is called, it calls smadv.Byzantine(pi), which appends the invocation and the cor-
responding response to trace. After that, the set of systems that are compatible with trace is non
empty, as it trivially includes sys. The procedure optimize(pi,m) returns a sample sample only if at
least one system σ is compatible with trace, and satisfies σ[pi][m]=sample. Since sys.Byzantine(pi)
is in trace, the Byzantine component of sample is identical to sys.Byzantine(pi): indeed, any system
σ where the Byzantine component of σ[pi][m] is different from sys.Byzantine(pi) is incompatible with
σ.
Therefore, the system obtained by replacing pi’s echo sample for m in sys with cache is a valid
system, and it is compatible with trace up to the first invocation of smadv.Sample(pi,m). Moreover,
trace will always be compatible with such system. Indeed:
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• Every subsequent call to smadv.Sample(pi,m) uses the deliveries table to determine which
processes in cache pb.Delivered a message in sys, thus returning a response that is consistent
with pi’s echo sample for m being cache.
• Every subsequent call to smadv.State() includes (pi,m) in its response only if at least Eˆ processes
in cache are either Byzantine or pb.Delivered m in sys (this is verified using the deliveries
table).
Sample-blind It is easy to see that Sample-masking decorator masks the first invocation to
Sample(...) issued by the decorated adversary. Indeed, if smadv.Sample(pi,m) is the first invocation
of smadv.Sample(...) issued by nradv, then index is set to (pi,m), and sys.Sample(pi,m) is never be
invoked.
Let α be a non-redundant adversary, we have that ∆sm(α) issues calls to Sample(...) for at most
C2−1 pairs (pi′∈ΠC ,m′∈M). The same argument can be applied again to see that, by composing
Sample-masking decorator with itself C2 times, all possible calls to Sample(...) are masked. Therefore,
α′=∆C2sm(α) is a sample-blind adversary.
Sample replacement Let α be an adversary, let σ be a system. We define a function ν :A×S→
N∪{⊥} by
ν(α,σ)=minn |τ(α,σ)n=((Sample,pi∈ΠC ,m∈M),⊥)
Intuitively, ν(α,σ) returns the index of the first invocation of Sample(...) in τ (α,σ) if such invocation
exists, and ⊥ otherwise. We additionally define pi(α,σ) and m(α,σ) by
τ(α,σ)ν(α,σ) =((Sample,pi(α,σ),m(α,σ)),⊥)
if ν(α,σ) 6=⊥, and by
pi(α,σ)=m(α,σ)=⊥
if ν(α,σ)=⊥. Whenever at least an invocation to Sample(...) is issued when α is coupled with σ,
pi(α,σ) and m(α,σ) are the arguments to that invocation.
We then define σ− :A×S→N∪{⊥}, σ+ :A×S→N∪{⊥} by
σ−(α,σ) = maxn<ν(α,σ) |τ(α,σ)n=((State),rn),(pi(α,σ),m(α,σ)) /∈rn
σ+(α,σ) = minn<ν(α,σ) |τ(α,σ)n=((State),rn),(pi(α,σ),m(α,σ))∈rn
if ν(α,σ) 6=⊥, and
σ−(α,σ)=σ+(α,σ)=⊥
otherwise. Intuitively, when ν(α,σ) 6=⊥: σ−(α,σ) returns the index of the last invocation of State()
prior to ν(α,σ) that did not include (pi(α,σ),m(α,σ)) in its response; σ+(α,σ) returns the index of the
first invocation of State() prior to ν(α,σ) that included (pi(α,σ),m(α,σ)) in its response.
We additionally define δ :A×S×M×N→P(ΠC) by
pi∈δ(α,σ,m,n) def⇐⇒∃j<n |τ(α,σ)j =((Deliver,pi,m),⊥) (15)
Intuitively, pi is in δ(α,σ,m,n) if α invokes Deliver(pi,m) before the n-th invocation it issues, when
coupled with σ. In other words, δ(α,σ,m,n) represents the set of correct processes that pb.Deliver m
before the n-th invocation, when α is coupled with σ.
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• When σ−(α,σ) 6=⊥, δ−(α,σ) represents the set of processes that pb.Delivered m(α,σ) before
σ−(α,σ). Intuitively, δ− is designed to guarantee that less than Eˆ elements of σ[pi(α,σ)][m(α,σ)]
are either Byzantine or included in δ−(α,σ). If this was not the case, the σ−(α,σ)-th invocation
of State() would have included (pi(α,σ),m(α,σ)) in its response.
• When σ+(α,σ) 6=⊥, δ+(α,σ) represents the set of processes that pb.Delivered m(α,σ) before
σ+(α,σ). Intuitively, δ+ is designed to guarantee that at least Eˆ elements of σ[pi(α,σ)][m(α,σ)]
are either Byzantine or included in δ+(α,σ). If this was not then case, the σ+(α,σ)-th invocation
of State() would not have included (pi(α,σ),m(α,σ)) in its response.






σ[pi(α,σ)][m(α,σ)][n]∈Π\ΠC =⇒ E¯[n]=σ[pi(α,σ)][m(α,σ)][n]∣∣{n∈1..E | E¯[n]∈δ−(α,σ)∪(Π\ΠC)}∣∣<Eˆ∣∣{n∈1..E | E¯[n]∈δ+(α,σ)∪(Π\ΠC)}∣∣≥ Eˆ
otherwise. Intuitively, E [α] is designed so that, if α is non-redundant, when ν(α,σ) 6=⊥, a sample E
is in E [α](σ) if, by replacing pi(α,σ)’s echo sample for m(α,σ) in σ with E, we obtain a system σ′
that is interchangeable with σ, i.e., a system that cannot be distinguished from σ up to the ν(α,σ)-th
invocation, and whose consistency is compromised by the same set of traces. We prove these two
properties in the next section of this proof.
More specifically, a sample E¯ is in E [α](σ) if it satisfies the following conditions:
• E¯ shares the set of Byzantine processes in σ[pi(α,σ)][m(α,σ)].
• Less than Eˆ processes in E¯ pb.Deliver m(α,σ) before the last invocation of State(...) in τ (α,σ)
(before ν(α,σ)) that does not include (pi(α,σ),m(α,σ)) in its response.
• At least Eˆ processes in E¯ pb.Deliver m(α,σ) before the first invocation of State(...) in τ(α,σ)
(before ν(α,σ)) that includes (pi(α,σ),m(α,σ)) in its response.
Sample interchangeability Let α be a non-redundant adversary, let σ be a system such that
ν(α,σ) 6= ⊥. Let pi∗ = pi(α,σ), let m∗ = m(α,σ). Let σ′ be a system such that, for every pair
(pi,m) 6=(pi∗,m∗) (i.e., pi 6=pi∗ or m 6=m∗), we have
σ′[pi∗][m∗] ∈ E [α](σ)
σ′[pi][m] = σ[pi][m]
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In this section, we prove the following:
∀n<ν(α,σ),τ(α,σ)=τ(α,σ′)
(α↘σ) =⇒ (τ(α,σ)↘σ′)










with n≥0 (here n=0 means that this is α’s first invocation). We start by noting that, since a is a




and we need to prove that rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Let us consider the case in+1 =(Byzantine,pi,m). Following from the definition of E [α](σ), pi∗’s
echo sample for m∗ in σ′ includes the same set of Byzantine processes as pi∗’s echo sample for m∗ in σ.
Since all other echo samples are trivially identical in σ and σ′, we have rn+1 =r′n+1.
Let us consider the case in+1 = (State). Let pi ∈ ΠC , let ρ ∈ Π, let m ∈ M. Noting that
ij = i
′
j∀j≤n+1, we trivially have that ρ sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σ if and only if ρ sent
an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σ. Noting that all echo samples but pi∗’s echo sample for m∗ are
identical in σ, we immediately get that the symmetric difference between rn+1 and r
′
n+1 can only
include (pi∗,m∗). The following hold true:
• If (pi∗,m∗)∈rn+1, then (pi∗,m∗)∈r′n+1. Indeed, if (pi∗,m∗)∈rn+1, then by definition σ+(α,σ)≤
n+1. Therefore, by definition, every correct process in δ+(α,σ) pb.Delivered m∗ (both in σ
and σ′). Noting that α is an auto-echo adversary, every process in δ+(α,σ)∪(Π\ΠC) sent an
Echo(m∗, m∗) message to pi∗, both in σ and σ′. Finally, by definition, E [α](σ) includes at least
Eˆ processes in δ+(α,σ)∪(Π\ΠC). Therefore pi∗ delivered m∗ in σ′, and (pi∗,m∗)∈rn+1.
• If (pi∗,m∗) /∈rn+1, then (pi∗,m∗) /∈r′n+1. Indeed, if (pi∗,m∗)∈rn+1, then by definition σ−(α,σ)≥
n+ 1. Therefore, by definition, every correct process that pb.Delivered m∗ (both in σ and
σ′) is included in δ+(α,σ). Finally, by definition, E [α](σ) includes less than Eˆ processes in
δ−(α,σ)∪(Π\ΠC). Therefore pi∗ did not deliver m∗ in σ′, and (pi∗,m∗)∈rn+1.
which proves rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Noting that, by definition, n<ν(α,σ), in+1 cannot be (Sample,pi,m).
Noting that procedures Deliver(...) and Echo(...) never return a value, we trivially have that if
in+1 =(Deliver,pi,m) or in+1 =(Echo,pi,s,ξ,m) then rn+1 =⊥=r′n+1. By induction, we have
∀n<ν(α,σ),τ(α,σ)=τ(α,σ′)
Let us assume that α compromises the consistency of σ. We want to prove that τ (α,σ) compromises
the consistency of σ′.
We start by noting that, since by definition α’s ν(α,σ)-th invocation in τ (α,σ) is (Sample,pi∗,m∗)
then, since α is correct, for some j<ν(α,σ), the j-th invocation in τ (α,σ) is (State), and its response
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includes (pi,m∗) for some pi∈ΠC . Therefore, before the ν(α,σ)-th invocation, at least one correct
process in σ delivered m∗.
We previously proved, however, that since j<ν(α,σ), we have τ(α,σ)j =τ(α,σ
′)j . Therefore, at
least one correct process delivered m∗ in σ′ as well.
Since α compromises the consistency of σ, at least one correct process pi′ eventually delivers a
message m′ 6=m∗ in σ. Noting that pi′’s echo sample for m′ is identical in σ and σ′, we immediately
have that pi′ delivers m′ in σ′ as well.
System optimization Let α be a non-redundant adversary, let σ be a system. In the previous
section of this proof, we proved that, if we replace pi(α,σ)’s echo sample for m(α,σ) in σ with any
sample in E [α](σ), we obtain a system σ′ such that τ(α,σ)n=τ(α,σ′)n for all n<ν(α,σ).
We start by defining a function N :A→P(S) by
N (α)={σ∈S |ν(α,σ) 6=⊥}
Provided with an adversary α, N returns the set of systems coupled with which α issues at least one
invocation to Sample(...).
We then define a function S[α] :N (α)→P(N (α)) by
S[α](σ)={σ′∈S |τ(α,σ)1..(ν(α,σ)−1)∼σ′}
Intuitively, when ν(α,σ) 6=⊥, (S)[α](σ) returns the set of systems that α cannot distinguish from σ,
before the first invocation of Sample(...).





from which immediately follows
S[α](σ′)=S[α](σ)
Let α be a non-redundant adversary, let σ, σ′ be systems in N (α). Let σ S[α] σ′ denote the
relationship
σ′∈S[α](σ)
Since τ (α,σ)∼σ, we immediately have that S[α] is reflexive. Since we established S[α](σ′)=S[α](σ),
S[α] is also symmetric and transitive. Therefore, S[α] is an equivalence relation on N (α).
Let
S[α]1,...S[α]h=N (α)S[α]
intuitively, each S[α]i is a distinct set of systems that are indistinguishable to α, before the first
invocation of Sample(...).
Let i∈1..h. Let σ∈S[α]i, let E∈E [α](σ), let σ′ be identical to σ, with the exception of pi(α,σ)’s
echo sample for m(α,σ), which is replaced with E. As we previously proved, τ(α,σ)1..(ν(α,σ)−1)∼σ′,
therefore have σ′∈S[α]i. Moreover, we proved that for every σ in S[α]i, E [α](σ) yields the same set of
samples.
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Let σ,σ′ be systems in S[α]i, let pi∗=pi(α,σ)=pi(α,σ′), let m∗=m(α,σ)=m(α,σ′). Let σE [α]σ′
denote the relationship
σ[pi∗][m∗]=σ′[pi∗][m∗]∈(E [α](σ)=E [α](σ′))




with ∣∣E [α]i1∣∣= ...= ∣∣E [α]il∣∣
Let C[α]i1,...,C[α]il denote the probability of α compromising a random element of E [α]i1,...,E [α]il:
C[α]ij =
∣∣∣{σ∈E [α]ij |α↘σ}∣∣∣∣∣∣E [α]ij∣∣∣










As we previously proved, every E [α]ij has the same number of elements. Moreover, O[α] maps a
system σ in E [α]ij to the corresponding system σ′ in E [α]iC[α]i∗ that is identical to σ, except for pi(α,σ)’s
echo sample for m(α,σ), which is replaced with E [α](σ)C[α]i∗ .
Therefore, for every σ,σ′∈E iC[α]i∗ ,∣∣O[α]−1(σ)∣∣= ∣∣O[α]−1(σ′)∣∣= |S[α]i|∣∣E [α]i1∣∣
System masking Let α be a non-redundant adversary, let α′=∆sm(α), let σ be a system.
We start by noting that, if ν(α,σ), then τ(α,σ)=τ(α′,σ). Indeed, if α never invokes Sample(...)
when coupled with σ, all calls to smadv are simply forwarded to the corresponding calls in sys.
Therefore, if α compromises the consistency of σ, then trivially α′ compromises the consistency of σ
as well.
Let us assume that ν(α,σ) 6=⊥. Let σ′ be an identical copy of σ. We start by noting that, if we
couple Sample-masking decorator with σ′, we effectively obtain a system instance δ with which α
directly exchanges invocations and responses. Here we show that the trace τ(α,O[α](σ)) is identical
to the trace τ(α,δ). Intuitively, this means that α has no way of distinguishing whether it has been
coupled directly with O[α](σ), or it has been coupled with σ′, with Non-redundant decorator acting as
an interface.
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We previously proved that the trace exchanged between nradv and smadv is identical to the trace
that nradv would exchange with sys, if pi(α,σ)’s echo sample for m(α,σ) in sys was replaced with
cache.
Let i ∈ N such that σ ∈ S[α]i. Procedure optimize explicitly loops over all possible values of
sample∈ΠE . For every value of sample, if loops over all the systems σ¯ that are compatible with trace,
and satisfy σ¯[pi(α,σ)][m(α,σ)]=sample. If, at the end of the loop, systems 6=0, then compromissions
effectively represents, for some j, the number of systems in E [α]ij that α compromises. Since optimize
selects the value of sample that maximizes compromissions/system, the value that is eventually
assigned to cache is effectively E [α](σ)C[α]i∗ , which proves the statement.
We previously proved that, if α compromises the consistency of O[α](σ), then τ(α,O[α](σ))
compromises the consistency of σ as well. Noting that every invocation to smadv.Deliver(...) or
smadv.Echo(...) is respectively forwarded to sys.Deliver(...) or sys.Echo(...), we finally obtain that
if α compromises the consistency of O[α](σ), then α′ compromises the consistency of σ as well.
Adversarial power We can finally show that the adversarial power of α′ is greater than the
adversarial power of α. Let σ be a system.
As we previously established, if σ /∈N (α), then the probability of α compromising σ is identical to
the probability of α compromising σ′.
Let us assume that σ∈N (α). Let i,j∈N such that σ∈E [α]ij . The probability of α compromising
the consistency of σ is
P[α↘σ]=C[α]ij
and, since α′ compromises the consistency of σ if α compromises the consistency of O[α](σ), the
probability of α′ compromising the consistency of σ is
P[α′↘σ]=P[α↘O[α](σ)]=C[α]iC[α]i∗≥C[α]ij =P[α↘σ]
Which proves that the adversarial power of α′ is greater or equal to the adversarial power of α.
D.6 Byzantine-counting adversary
Lemma 37. The set of Byzantine-counting adversaries Abc is optimal.
Proof. We prove again the result using a decorator. Here we show that a decorator ∆bc exists such
that, for every α ∈ Asb, the adversary α′ = ∆bc(α) is a Byzantine-counting adversary, and more
powerful than α. If this is true, then the lemma is proved: let a∗ be an optimal adversary, then the
Byzantine-counting α+ =∆bc(α
∗) is optimal as well.
Decorator Algorithm 13 implements Byzantine-counting decorator, a decorator that trans-
forms a sample-blind adversary into a Byzantine-counting adversary. Provided with a sample-blind
adversary sbadv, Byzantine-counting decorator acts as an interface between sbadv and a system sys,
effectively implementing a sample-blind adversary bcadv. Byzantine-counting decorator exposes both
the adversary and the system interface: the underlying adversary sbadv uses bcadv as its system.
Byzantine-counting decorator works as follows:
• Procedure bcadv.Init() generates best.byzantine, an array of C pre-computed responses that
bcadv will provide to any subsequent invocation of
bcadv.Byzantine(...), optimized to maximize the probability of compromising sys. This is
achieved as follows:
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Algorithm 13 Byzantine-counting decorator
1: Implements:
2: ByzantineCountingAdversary + CobSystem, instance bcadv
3:
4: Uses:
5: SampleBlindAdversary, instance sbadv, system bcadv
6: CobSystem, instance sys
7:









17: for all byzantine∈space[pi1]×...×space[piC ] do
18: compromissions=0;
19: for all σ∈S do
20: match=True;
21: for all pi∈ΠC do
















38: procedure bcadv.Byzantine(process) is
39: return best.byzantine[process];
40:




44: procedure bcadv.Sample(process,message) is
45: raise error;
46:
47: procedure bcadv.Deliver(process,message) is
48: sys.Deliver(process,message);
49:
50: procedure bcadv.Echo(process,sample,source,message) is
51: sys.Echo(process,sample,source,message);
52:
53: procedure bcadv.End() is
54: sys.End();
55:
– The procedure loops over every correct process pi, and queries
|sys.Byzantine(pi)| to determine how many Byzantine processes there are in the first echo
sample of pi. For each pi, the procedure sets space[pi] to the set of all possible responses to
bcadv.Byzantine(pi) that satisfy |bcadv.Byzantine(pi)|= |sys.Byzantine(pi)|.
– The procedure loops over every possible array byzantine of C responses that, for every pi∈
ΠC , satisfies byzantine[pi]∈space[pi]. It then counts the number of systems σ that are com-
patible with byzantine (i.e., that satisfy, for every pi∈ΠC , σ.Byzantine(pi)=byzantine[pi])
and whose consistency is compromised by the underlying adversary SampleBlindAdversary.
– The procedure sets best.byzantine to the array byzantine that maximizes the number of sys-
tems compatible with byzantine whose consistency is compromised by SampleBlindAdversary.
• Procedure bcadv.Byzantine(process) simply returns best.byzantine[process].
• Procedure bcadv.State() simply forwards the call to sys.State().
• Procedure bcadv.Sample(process,message) is never called. This is due to the fact that sbadv
is sample-blind.
• Procedure bcadv.Deliver(process,message) simply forwards the call to sys.Deliver(process,message).
• Procedure bcadv.Echo(process,sample,source,message) simply forwards the call to sys.Echo(process,sample,source,message).
• Procedure bcadv.End() simply forwards the call to sys.End().
Correctness We start by proving that no adversary, coupled with Byzantine-counting decorator, has
undefined behavior. An adversary has undefined behavior if, at any point, the sequence of invocations
and responses it exchanges with bcadv is incompatible with every system.
Upon initialization, bcadv generates an array best.byzantine of C responses, one for every
call to bcadv.Byzantine(pi ∈ ΠC). For every correct process pi, best.byzantine[pi] contains only
Byzantine processes and satisfies |best.byzantine[pi]|= |sys.Byzantine(pi)|. Let sys′ be the system
obtained by replacing the Byzantine component of each correct process pi’s echo samples in sys with
best.byzantine[pi]. The trace exchanged between sbadv and bcadv is always compatible with sys′.
Indeed:
• Every call to bcadv.Byzantine(pi) returns best.byzantine[pi] which is equal, by definition, to
sys.Byzantine(pi).
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• Every call to bcadv.State() is simply forwarded to sys.State(). Let pi be a correct process, let
m be a message. Since that bcadv is an auto-echo adversary, when bcadv.State() is invoked,
every Byzantine process in pi’s echo sample for m has sent an Echo(m, m) message both in sys
and sys′. Moreover, the number of Byzantine processes in pi’s echo sample for m is identical in
sys and sys′. Finally, set of correct processes in pi’s echo sample for m is identical in sys and
sys′. Consequently, bcadv.State()=sys.State()=sys′.State().
Byzantine-counting It is immediate to see that Byzantine-counting decorator always implements
a Byzantine-counting adversary. Indeed, for any pi ∈ΠC , sys.Byzantine(pi) is only invoked from
|sys.Byzantine(pi)|.
Byzantine interchangeability Let α be a sample-blind system. Let σ be a system, let σ′ be a
system such that, for every correct process pi, every message m, and every n∈1..E,
(σ[pi][m][n]∈ΠC) =⇒ (σ′[pi][m][n]=σ[pi][m][n])
(σ[pi][m][n] /∈ΠC) =⇒ (σ′[pi][m][n] /∈ΠC)
In other words, for every pi∈ΠC and every m∈M, the set of correct processes in pi’s echo sample for
m is identical in σ and σ′.
Here we prove that, if α compromises σ, then τ (α,σ) compromises σ′. In order to do this, we first
establish some auxiliary results.
Let us consider the case where α is run against σ and τ(α,σ) is applied to σ′. Let pi be a correct
process, let ρ be a process, let m be a message. At the end of both adversarial executions, the following
hold true:
• If pi pb.Delivered m in σ, then pi pb.Delivered m in σ′ as well. This follows immediately from
the fact that τ(α,σ) is applied to σ′, and ((Deliver,pi,m),⊥)∈τ(α,σ).
• If ρ sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σ, then ρ sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in
σ′. Indeed, if ρ is a correct process, and it sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σ, then it
pb.Delivered m both in σ and σ′. Therefore, it sent an Echo(m, m) message to pi in σ′ as
well. If ρ is a Byzantine process then, since α is an auto-echo adversary, ρ sent an Echo(m, m)
message to pi both in σ and σ′.
• If pi delivered m in σ, then pi also delivered m in σ′. This follows from the above, and the fact
that the correct processes in pi’s echo sample for m are identical in σ and σ′.
If α compromises the consistency of σ, then two correct processes pi, pi′ and two distinct messages
m, m′ 6=m exist such that pi delivered m, and pi′ delivered m′ in σ. From the above, however, pi
delivered m, and pi′ delivered m′, in σ′ as well. Consequently, τ (α,σ) compromises the consistency of
σ′.






In other words, σ
|F |∼ σ′ if, for every pi, the n-th element of the first of pi’s echo samples is either correct
both in σ and σ′, or Byzantine both in σ and σ′.
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It is immediate to see that
|F |∼ is an equivalence relation. We can therefore partition S with |F |∼ to
obtain
S1,...,Sh= S|F |∼






F∼σ′ if the Byzantine processes in each echo sample are identical in σ and σ′. Again, F∼ is




and noting that, in Simplified Sieve, every correct process selects independently the correct processes in
its echo samples, we have ∣∣Si1∣∣= ...= ∣∣Sil ∣∣
Let α be a sample-blind adversary. We define C[α]ij as the number of systems in Sij whose
consistency is compromised by α:
C[α]ij =
∣∣{σ∈Sij |α↘σ}∣∣




Intuitively, C[α]i∗ identifies the partition of Si that α has the highest probability of compromising.
Finally, we define an optimization function O[α] :S→S. Let σ∈Si, we define O[α] by
O[α](σ) ∈ SiC[α]i∗
σ[pi][m][n]∈ΠC =⇒ O[α](σ)[pi][m][n]=σ[pi][m][n]
As we previously proved, every Sij has the same number of elements. Moreover, O[α] maps a
system σ in Sij to the corresponding system σ′ in SiC[α]i∗ such that every correct process in an echo
sample in σ is identical to the corresponding process in σ′.




System masking Let α be a sample-blind adversary, let α′=∆bc(α), let σ be a system, let σ′ be
an identical copy of σ. We start by noting that, if we couple Byzantine-counting decorator with σ′, we
effectively obtain a system instance δ with which α directly exchanges invocations and responses. Here
we show that the trace τ(α,O[α](σ)) is identical to the trace τ(α,δ). Intuitively, this means that α
has no way of distinguishing whether it has been coupled directly with O[α](σ), or it has been coupled
with σ′, with Byzantine-counting decorator acting as an interface.
We previously proved that the trace exchanged between sbadv and bcadv is identical to the trace
that sbadv would exchange with the system sys′ that is obtained by replacing the Byzantine component
of each correct process pi’s echo samples in sys with best.byzantine[pi].
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Let i∈N such that σ∈Si. Procedure bcadv.Init() explicitly loops over all the possible values of
byzantine that satisfy |byzantine[pi]|= |sys.Byzantine(pi)| for all pi∈ΠC . It then loops over every
system σ that satisfies σ.Byzantine(pi) = byzantine[pi], and counts the number of systems that α
compromises. It finally selects the value of byzantine that maximizes the number of compromissions.
In doing so, bcadv.Init() is effectively looping over every Sij , and selecting the j that maximizes the
probability of α compromising a random element of Sij . Since bcadv.Init() is effectively masking σ
with the element of SiC[α]i∗ with which σ shares the correct component of every sample, the trace
τ(α,O[α](σ)) is identical to the trace τ(α,δ).
We previously proved that, if α compromises the consistency of O[α](σ), then τ(α,O[α](σ))
compromises the consistency of σ as well. Noting that every invocation to bcadv.Deliver(...) or
bcadv.Echo(...) is respectively forwarded to sys.Deliver(...) or sys.Echo(...), we finally obtain that if
α compromises the consistency of O[α](σ), then α′ compromises the consistency of σ as well.
Adversarial power We can finally show that the adversarial power of α′ is greater than the
adversarial power of α. Let σ be a system.
Let i,j∈N such that σ∈Sij . The probability of α compromising the consistency of σ is
P[α↘σ]=C[α]ij
and, since α′ compromises the consistency of σ if α compromises the consistency of O[α](σ), the
probability of α′ compromising the consistency of σ is
P[α′↘σ]=P[α↘O[α](σ)]=C[α]iC[α]i∗≥C[α]ij =P[α↘σ]
Which proves that the adversarial power of α′ is greater or equal to the adversarial power of α.
D.7 Single-response adversary
Lemma 38. The set of single-response adversaries Asr is optimal.
Proof. We prove again the result using a decorator. Here we show that a decorator ∆sr exists such
that, for every α∈Abc, the adversary α′= ∆sr(α) is a single-response adversary, and as powerful
as α. If this is true, then the lemma is proved: let α∗ be an optimal adversary, then the sequential
α+ =∆sr(α
∗) is optimal as well.
Decorator Algorithm 14 implements Single-response decorator, a decorator that transforms a
Byzantine-counting adversary into a single-response adversary. Provided with a Byzantine-counting
adversary bcadv, Single-response decorator acts as an interface between bcadv and a system sys,
effectively implementing a single-response adversary sradv. Single-response decorator exposes both
the adversary and the system interfaces: the underlying adversary bcadv uses sradv as its system.
Single-response decorator works as follows:
• Procedure sradv.Init() initializes the following variables:
– A cache set, initially empty: cache is used to store the first non-empty set returned from
sys.State().
– A poisoned variable: poisoned is set to True if and only if at least one correct process
in sys is poisoned. This condition is verified by looping over sys.Byzantine(pi) for every
correct process pi.
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Algorithm 14 Single-response decorator
1: Implements:
2: SingleResponseAdversary + CobSystem, instance sradv
3:
4: Uses:
5: ByzantineCountingAdversary, instance bcadv, system sradv
6: CobSystem, instance sys
7:
8: procedure sradv.Init() is
9: cache=∅; poisoned=False; step=0;
10:
11: for all pi∈ΠC do







19: procedure sradv.Step() is
20: step←step+1;
21:
22: if poisoned=False or step≤(N−C)C2 then
23: bcadv.Step();










34: procedure sradv.State() is
35: return cache;
36:
37: procedure sradv.Sample(process,message) is
38: raise error;
39:
– A step variable, initially set to 0: at any time, step counts how many times sradv.Step()
has been invoked.
• Procedure sradv.Step() increments step, then implements two different behaviors depending on
the value of poisoned:
– If poisoned= True, it forwards the call to bcadv.Step() for the first (N −C)C2 times.
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40: procedure sradv.Deliver(process,message) is
41: sys.Deliver(process,message);
42:




47: procedure sradv.Echo(process,sample,source,message) is
48: sys.Echo(process,sample,source,message);
49:
50: procedure sradv.End() is
51: sys.End();
52:
For the next C steps, it sequentially invokes sys.Deliver(ζ(1),1), ..., sys.Deliver(ζ(C),1).
Finally, it calls sys.End().
– If poisoned=False, it forwards the call to bcadv.Step().
• Procedure sradv.Byzantine(process) returns an array of count elements, count being the
number of elements returned from sys.Byzantine(process). The array is filled with ⊥ values:
since bcadv is Byzantine-counting, the content of the array is irrelevant.
• Procedure sradv.State() simply returns cache.
• Procedure sradv.Sample(process,message) is never called. This is due to the fact that bcadv
is sample-blind.
• Procedure sradv.Deliver(process,message) forwards the call to
sys.Deliver(process,message). Then, if cache is empty, it updates cache with sys.State().
• Procedure sradv.Echo(process,sample,source,message) simply forwards the call to sys.Echo(process,sample,source,message).
• Procedure sradv.End() simply forwards the call to sys.End().
Correctness Here we prove that every adversary, coupled with Single-response adversary:
• Has a well-defined behavior. An adversary has undefined behavior if, at any point, the sequence
of invocations and responses it exchanges with sradv is incompatible with every system.
• Is process-sequential, sequential, and Byzantine-counting.
We start by noting that poisoned= True if and only if sys is poisoned. Indeed, sradv.Init()
explicitly checks if any correct process has at least Eˆ Byzantine processes in its first echo sample.
We distinguish two cases, based on the value of poisoned. Let us assume poisoned = True.
When sradv.Step() is invoked, the call is forwarded to bcadv.Step() only for the first (N−C)C2
times. Noting that bcadv is an auto-echo adversary, every call to bcadv.Step() results in a call to
sradv.Echo(...). For the next C steps, sradv.Step() sequentially causes ζ(1),ζ(2),... to pb.Deliver
message 1. Finally, sradv.Step() invokes sys.End(). Therefore, sradv has a well defined behavior
and implements a process-sequential adversary. Since it causes only message 1 to be pb.Delivered,
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sradv is also trivially sequential.
Let us assume poisoned=False. As we proved in Appendix B.9.3, since sys is not poisoned, a
correct process in sys will only deliver a message m as a result of an invocation to sys.Deliver(pi,m)
for some pi∈ΠC . Until cache 6=∅, cache is updated to sys.State() after every call to sys.Deliver(...).
Therefore, throughout the first phase, sradv.State() is always identical to sys.State(). The trace
exchanged between bcadv and sradv is, therefore, trivially compatible with sys.
Throughout the second phase, we have cache 6= ⊥. Since, throughout the first phase, cache
is updated after every call to sys.Deliver(...), only one message m∗ exists such that, for some
pi∗ ∈ ΠC , (pi∗,m∗) ∈ cache. Noting that bcadv is a non-redundant adversary, it will never invoke
sradv.Deliver(...) on m∗: indeed, the value returned from sradv.State() never changes throughout





The trace exchanged between bcadv and sradv is compatible with sys′. Indeed, for every pi∈ΠC ,
pi’s sample for m∗ in sys is identical to pi’s echo sample for m∗ in sys′: at any moment, pi delivered
m∗ in sys if and only if pi delivered m∗ in sys′. For every pi∈ΠC and m 6=m∗∈M, pi’s every correct
process in pi’s sample for m is pi∗. However, pi∗ pb.Delivered m∗ 6=m. Therefore, since sys′ is not
poisoned, no correct process in sys′ ever delivers a message other than m∗.
Every call to sradv.Deliver(...) and sradv.Echo(...) is respectively forwarded to sys.Deliver(...)
and sys.Echo(...). Moreover, bcadv is process-sequential and sequential. Therefore, if poisoned=True,
sradv is also process-sequential and sequential.
It is immediate to see that Single-response decorator always implements a Byzantine-counting
adversary. Indeed, for any pi∈ΠC , sys.Byzantine(pi) is only invoked from |sys.Byzantine(pi)|.
Single-response It is immediate to see that Single-response decorator always implements a single-
response adversary. Indeed, when sys.State() returns a non-empty set for the first time, cache is set
to a non-empty set, and sys.State() is never invoked again.
Roadmap Let α∈Abc, let α′=∆sr(α). Let σ be a system such that α compromises the consistency
of σ. Let σ′ be an identical copy of σ. In order to prove that α′ is as powerful as α, we prove that α′
compromises the consistency of σ′.
Poisoned case Noting that α′ is an auto-echo adversary, if σ is poisoned we immediately have that
α′ compromises the consistency of σ′.
Trace Let us assume that σ is not poisoned. We start by noting that, if we couple Single-response
decorator with σ′, we effectively obtain a system instance δ with which α directly exchanges invocations
and responses.
We start by defining a boolean sequence W by setting Wn=True if and only if, after the n-th
invocation, two correct processes pi,pi′ and two distinct messages m,m′ 6=m exist such that pi delivered




Here we show that, for every n≤w, the trace τ (α,σ)n is identical to the trace τ (α,δ)n. Intuitively,
this means that, until the consistency of σ is compromised, α has no way of distinguishing whether
it has been coupled directly with σ, or it has been coupled with σ′, with Single-response decorator















and we need to prove that rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Let us assume that in+1 =(Byzantine,pi). Noting that sradv.Byzantine(pi) forwards the call to
sys.Byzantine(pi), bcadv is a Byzantine-counting adversary, and σ′ is an identical copy of σ, with a
minor abuse of notation we effectively have rn+1 =r
′
n+1.
Let us assume that in+1 =(State). We start by noting that, since all calls to sradv.Deliver(...)
and sradv.Echo(...) are respectively forwarded to sys.Deliver(...) and sys.Echo(...), a correct process
pi delivered m∗ in σ if and only if it delivered m∗ in σ′ as well. As we proved, throughout the first
phase, sradv.State() always returns the same value as sys.State(). Let us assume n> |η(α,σ)|. Let
m∗ be the only message that was delivered by at least one correct process in σ. Noting that a correct
process delivers a message only as a result of a call to sys.Deliver(...), we have n<w. Therefore, by
definition, no correct process in σ delivered a message other than m∗. Since α is a non-redundant
adversary, it never causes any correct process to pb.Deliver m∗ throughout the second phase. As a
result, no correct process delivers m∗ in σ throughout the second phase. Therefore, all the processes




Noting that procedures Deliver(...) and Echo(...) never return a value, we trivially have that if
in+1 =(Deliver,pi,m) or in+1 =(Echo,pi,s,ξ,m) then rn+1 =⊥=r′n+1. By induction, we have that, for
every n≤w, τ(α,σ)n=τ(α,δ)n.
Consistency of σ′ We proved that, for all n≤w, τ (α,σ)n=τ (α,δ)n. Moreover, we proved that if a
correct process pi eventually delivers a message m in σ before the w-th invocation, then pi also delivers
m in σ′ before the w-th invocation.
Since α compromises the consistency of σ after the w-th invocation, two correct processes pi, pi′
and two distinct messages m, m′ 6=m exist such that, in σ, pi delivered m and pi′ delivered m′ before
the w-th invocation. Therefore, in σ′, pi delivered m and pi′ delivered m′ before the w-th invocation.
Therefore α′ compromises the consistency of σ′.
Consequently, the adversarial power of α is equal to the adversarial power of α′=∆sr(a), and the
lemma is proved.
D.8 Two-phase adversary
Lemma 39. The set of two-phase adversaries Atp is optimal.
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Algorithm 15 Two-phase decorator
1: Implements:
2: TwoPhaseAdversary + CobSystem, instance tpadv
3:
4: Uses:
5: StateMonitoringAdversary, instance smadv, system tpadv
6: CobSystem, instance sys
7:




12: procedure compatible(invocations) is
13: systems=∅;
14:
15: for all σ∈S do
16: match=True;
17: for all pi∈ΠC do












30: procedure tpadv.Step() is
31: smadv.Step();
32:





Proof. We prove again the result using a decorator. Here we show that a decorator ∆tp exists such
that, for every α∈Asm, the adversary α′=∆tp(α) is a two-phase adversary, and more powerful than
α. If this is true, then the lemma is proved: let α∗ be an optimal adversary, then the sequential
α+ =∆tp(α
∗) is optimal as well.
Decorator Algorithm 15 implements Two-phase decorator, a decorator that transforms a state-
monitoring adversary into a two-phase adversary. Provided with a state-monitoring adversary smadv,
Two-phase decorator acts as an interface between smadv and a system sys, effectively implementing a
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38: procedure tpadv.State() is
39: invocations← invocations+1;
40:
41: if sys.State() 6=∅ then
42: outcomes=∅;







50: for all (response,fulltrace)∈outcomes do
51: compromissions=0;
52:
53: for all σ∈compatible(invocations) do
















70: procedure tpadv.Sample(process,message) is
71: raise error;
72:












single-response adversary tpadv. Two-phase decorator exposes both the adversary and the system
interfaces: the underlying adversary smadv uses tpadv as its system.
Two-phase decorator works as follows:
• Procedure tpadv.Init() initializes a invocations variable: at any time, invocations counts the
number of invocations issued by smadv.
• Procedure compatible(invocations) returns a set of systems σ that satisfy the following proper-
ties:
– For every correct process pi, the number of Byzantine processes in pi’s first in first echo
sample is identical in σ and sys.
– The length |η(α,σ)| of the first phase when α is coupled with σ is equal to invocations.
• Procedure tpadv.Step() simply forwards the call to smadv.Step().
• Procedure tpadv.Byzantine(process) increments invocations, then returns an array of count
elements, count being the number of elements returned from sys.Byzantine(process). The
array is filled with ⊥ values: since smadv is Byzantine-counting, the content of the array is
irrelevant.
• Procedure tpadv.State() increments invocations. It then returns an empty set if sys.State() is
empty. If sys.State() is not empty, the procedure returns, among all the possible responses that
are compatible with the trace exchanged between smadv and tpadv, the one that maximizes the
probability of smadv compromising the consistency of sys. This is achieved as follows:
– The procedure loops over every system σ in compatible(invocations). In doing so, the
procedure loops over every system σ such that: σ has the same Byzantine count as sys;
when α is coupled with σ, it concludes the first phase in exactly invocations invocations.
– For every process σ in compatible(invocations), the procedure stores in a set outcome a
(response,fulltrace) pair, response being the State() of σ at the end of the first phase
(response is extracted from τ(α,σ)invocations), and fulltrace being τ(α,σ), the full trace
exchanged between α and σ.
– For every (response,fulltrace) in outcomes, the procedure loops over every system σ
in compatible(invocations), and counts the number of systems whose consistency is
compromised by fulltrace. The procedure returns the value of response that maximizes
the number of systems in compatible(invocations) whose consistency is compromised by
fulltrace.
• Procedure tpadv.Sample(process,message) is never called. This is due to the fact that smadv
is sample-blind.
• Procedure tpadv.Deliver(process,message) increments invocations, then forwards the call to
sys.Deliver(process,message).
• Procedure tpadv.Echo(process,sample,source,message) increments invocations, then forwards
the call to sys.Echo(process,sample,source,message).
• Procedure tpadv.End() simply forwards the call to sys.End().
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Correctness Here we prove that every adversary, coupled with Two-phase decorator:
• Has a well-defined behavior. An adversary has undefined behavior if, at any point, the sequence
of invocations and responses it exchanges with tpadv is incompatible with every system.
• Is Byzantine-counting and single-response.
We start by noting that, since invocations is incremented every time smadv issues an invocation,
when tpadv.State() is invoked and sys.State() 6=∅ we have invocations= |(|η(α,σ)).
Every invocation of a procedure in tpadv is always forwarded to the corresponding procedure in
sys, except for tpadv.State(). Whenever sys.State()=∅, tpadv.State() returns ∅ as well. Therefore,
up to the (η(α,sys)−1)-th invocation, the trace exchanged between smadv and tpadv is trivially
compatible with sys.
Procedure compatible(invocations) returns all systems σ such that |σ.Byzantine(pi)|= |sys.Byzantine(pi)|
for all pi∈ΠC , and |η(α,σ)|= invocations= |η(σ,sys)|. It is immediate to see that compatible(invocations)
is non-empty, as it includes sys. Every system σ∈compatible(invocations) is compatible with the
first n−1 elements of the trace exchanged between smadv and tpadv. Procedure tpadv.State() then
returns a response response, such that
τ(α,σ)invocations=((State),response)
for some σ∈compatible(invocations). Therefore, the first n elements of the trace exchanged between
smadv and tpadv is compatible with σ. Due to Lemma 15, the entire trace exchanged between smadv
and tpadv is compatible with σ.
It is easy to see that tpadv always implements a Byzantine-counting and single-response adversary.
Indeed: whenever tpadv invokes sys.Byzantine(pi), it invokes |sys.Byzantine(pi)|; tpadv.State()
returns a non-empty set if and only if sys.State() returns a non-empty set, and smadv is a single-
response adversary.
Two-phase It is immediate to see that Two-phase decorator always implements a two-phase
adversary. Indeed, whenever tpadv invokes sys.State(), it invokes (sys.State() 6=∅).
System partitioning Let α be a state-monitoring adversary, let σ be a system. Let us denote





It is immediate to see that
α∼ is an equivalence relation, and we can use α∼ to partition S∗:
S[α]1,...,S[α]h= Sα∼
Let i∈1..h. Due to Lemma 14, we have
∀σ,σ′∈S[α]i,∀n< |η(α,σ)|, τ(α,σ)n=τ(α,σ′)n
Moreover, since σ is not poisoned, η(α,σ) includes at least one call to Deliver(...). Therefore, for
every i∈1..h, let σ∈S[α]i, we can define a function δ[α]i :M×1..(|η(α,σ|) by
pi∈δ[α]i(m,n) def⇐⇒∃j<n |τ(α,σ)j =((Deliver,pi),⊥)
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Intuitively, δ[α]i(m,n) represents the set of correct processes that α causes to pb.Deliver m before the
n-th invocation, when α is coupled with any σ∈S[α]i.
We additionally define pi[α]i :M→P(ΠC), pi−[α]i :M→P(ΠC) by, let σ∈S[α]i,
pi[α]i(m) = δ[α]i(m,|(|η(α,σ)))
pi−[α]i(m) = δ[α]i(m,|(|η(α,σ)−1))
Intuitively, pi[α]i(m) represents the set of correct processes that α causes to pb.Deliver m throughout
the first phase, when α is coupled with any σ∈S[α]i. Noting that α is a state-monitoring adversary,
and σ is not poisoned, then pi−[α]i(m) represents the set of correct processes that α causes to pb.Deliver
m throughout the first phase when α is coupled with any σ∈S[α]i, excluding the last invocation to
Deliver(...) in η(α,σ).
Finally, we define m(α)i by, let σ∈S[α]i
τ(α,σ)|η(α,σ)|=((Deliver,pi∈ΠC ,m),⊥)
Intuitively, m(α)i is the last message that α causes a correct process to pb.Deliver throughout the first
phase, when α is coupled with any σ∈S[α]i. Noting that α is a state-monitoring adversary, and that
σ is not poisoned, m is the only message delivered by at least one correct process at the end η(α,σ).






∃pi∈ΠC | |{n∈1..E |σ[pi][m(α)i][n]∈(pi[α]i(m(α)i)∪(Π\ΠC)))}|≥ Eˆ
@m 6=m(α)i,pi∈ΠC | |{n∈1..E |σ[pi][m][n]∈(pi[α]i(m)∪(Π\ΠC))}|≥E
Indeed, we are restating the condition |η(α,σ)|= |η(α,σ′)| with the following conditions:
• No correct process has, in its echo sample for m(α)i, at least Eˆ processes that are either
Byzantine, or pb.Deliver m(α)i as a result of any invocation of Deliver(...) in η(α,σ) except the
last. This encodes the condition that no correct process delivers m(α)i before the last invocation
of Deliver(...) in η(α,σ).
• At least one correct process has, in its echo sample for m(α)i, at least Eˆ processes that are
either Byzantine, or pb.Deliver m(α)i throughout the first phase when α is coupled with σ. This
encodes the condition that at least one correct process delivers m(α) after the last invocation of
Deliver(...) in η(α,σ).
• No correct process has, in its echo sample for m 6=m(α)i, at least Eˆ processes that are either
Byzantine, or pb.Deliver m throughout the first phase when α is coupled with σ. This encodes
the condition that no message is delivered before m(α)i.









Let σ¯∈S[α]i, let τ=τ (α,σ¯). For any σ∈S[α]i, τ compromises the consistency of σ if τ causes at
least one correct process to deliver a message m′ 6=m(α)i throughout the second phase. Since this
condition is independent from the echo sample for m(α)i of any correct process, we finally have that,
for every j∈1..l,
P[τ↘(σ∈S[α]ij)]=P[τ↘(σ∈S[α]i)]
Adversarial power Here we prove that α′ = ∆tp(α) is more powerful than α. Let σ¯ denote a
random system in S.
Let us assume that σ¯ is poisoned. Since both α and α′ are auto-echo adversaries, both compromise
σ¯.
Let us assume that σ¯ is not poisoned. For some i,j, we therefore have σ∈S[α]ij . When tpadv.State()
is invoked and sys.State() 6=∅, the procedure returns a response best.response such that the trace τ∗








which proves that, if σ is not poisoned, then the probability of α′ compromising σ is greater or equal
to the probability of α compromising σ.




In this appendix we discuss epidemic processes, mimicking the spread of a disease in a population,
and the Threshold Contagion game, which gives a player the possibility to actively infect parts of a
population.
As we discuss in Appendix C.2, in Contagion, when a correct process receives enough Ready
messages from its ready sample for the same message m, it issues itself a Ready message for m. This
produces a feedback mechanism that, in Appendix C, we show to be isomorphic to an epidemic process
as we define it below.
Threshold Contagion is a game where a player iteratively applies the epidemic process to inputs of
her choice. We use Threshold Contagion for modeling and analyzing our Contagion algorithm.
E.1 Epidemic processes
An epidemic process models the spreading of a disease in a population.
E.1.1 Preliminary definitions
Definition 34 (Directed multigraph). A directed multigraph is a pair g=(v,e), where v is a set
and e :v2→N is a multiset whose elements are pairs of elements of v. We call the elements of v the
vertices (or nodes) of g. We call the elements of e the edges of g.
Following from Definition 34, a directed multigraph allows self-loops (let a∈v, (a,a) can be an
element of e) and multiple edges (let a,b∈v, the multiplicity of (a,b) in e can be greater than one).
E.1.2 Contagion state
The spreading of a disease is represented by a contagion state.
Definition 35 (Contagion state). A contagion state is a pair s = (g,w), where g = (v,e) is a
multigraph and w∈P(v). We call the elements of w the infected nodes of s.
Let s=((v,e),w) be a contagion state. In an epidemic process:
• Each node in v corresponds to one individual member of the population.
• A node is always in one of two possible states: healthy or infected. We do not consider any
cure—once a node becomes infected, it stays infected forever. The set w represents the nodes
that are infected.
• Edges model interactions between the members of the population. The multiset of edges e
represents the ”can infect” relation. Note that this relation is not symmetric. A directed edge
(a→b) between nodes a and b means that a can infect b, but not that b can infect a.
Definition 36 (Predecessors). Let g=(v,e) be a multigraph, let a∈v. Then the predecessors of a
in g form the multiset p[a] :v→N defined by
p[a](x∈v)=e(x,a)
Following from Definition 36, the predecessors of a node a in a multigraph g form the multiset of




In an epidemic process, the infection of healthy nodes follows a single rule.
• Contagion rule: A healthy node becomes infected if the number of its infected predecessors
reaches a critical threshold.
The input to an epidemic process is a contagion state s. The epidemic process repeatedly applies
the contagion rule to s until either all nodes are infected or no healthy node has enough infected
predecessors to become infected itself. The epidemic process outputs the resulting contagion state.
E.2 Threshold Contagion
Threshold Contagion is a game played on the nodes of a random directed multigraph g. Threshold
Contagion consists of one or more rounds. Each round inputs a contagion state s and outputs a
contagion state s′. The input to the first round is the contagion state (g,∅), i.e., the contagion state
with no infected nodes whose multigraph is g. The input to any other round is the output of the
previous round.
A round with input s is played as follows:
• The player infects a fixed-size subset of the healthy nodes of the contagion state s. This results
in a contagion state s′.
• The contagion state s′ is provided as input to an epidemic process. The output s′′ of the epidemic
process is returned.
E.3 Rules
In this section, we formally define the rules of Threshold Contagion and introduce its parameters.
Threshold Contagion is played on the nodes of a random, directed multigraph g= (v,e). The
in-degree of each node n in v is independently binomially distributed; each predecessor of n is uniformly
picked with replacement from v.
E.3.1 Parameters
A game of Threshold Contagion depends on the following numerical parameters:
• Node count (N ∈N): Represents the number of nodes in the multigraph (N= |v|).
• Sample size (R∈N): Represents the maximum in-degree of a node in the multigraph.
• Link probability (l∈ [0,1]): Represents the probability of a predecessor link being successfully
established. The in-degree of a node follows the distribution Bin[R,l].
• Round count (K∈N>0): Represents the number of rounds in the game.
• Infection batch ((S<N)∈N>0): Represents the number of healthy nodes the player infects
at the beginning of each round.
• Contagion threshold ((Rˆ≤R)∈N): Represents the number of infected predecessors that will
cause an healthy node to become infected (see Contagion rule).
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E.3.2 Game
A game of Threshold Contagion is played as follows:
• A random, directed multigraph g=(v,e) with N nodes is built. For every node n in v:
– R times:
∗ A Bernoulli random variable B¯←Bern[l] is sampled.
∗ If B¯=1, then a random node m is selected with uniform probability from v, and the
edge m→n is added to e (i.e., m is added to the predecessors of n).
• Let s=(g,w=∅) be a contagion state. For K rounds:
– If at least S nodes in v are healthy (i.e., they are not in the set of infected nodes w), the
player selects S distinct nodes and infects them. The player cannot inform this choice
with knowledge of the topology of g.
– An epidemic process is run on s: until either every node in v is infected (i.e., v=w), or no
healthy node in v has at least Rˆ infected predecessors, the following contagion step is
iterated:
∗ Every node in v with at least Rˆ infected predecessors is infected, i.e., it is added to w.
Figure 2 shows an example game of Threshold Contagion with small parameters.
E.4 Random variables
We introduce the following random variables, which we discuss in more formal detail in the next
sections:
• Infection size N ri : represents the number of infected nodes at round r and step i.
• Frontier size U ri : represents the number of nodes that are infected at round r and step i, but
are not infected at round r and step i−1.
• Infection status W ri [j]: represents whether or not the j-th node is infected at round r and
step i. We use W ri [j] to signify that the node is infected, and 
W ri [j] to signify that the node is
not infected.
• Infected predecessors count V ri [j]: represents the number of predecessors of the j-th node
that are infected at round r and step i.
Remark: for the sake of readability, the round number and/or the node index (for W and V )
will be omitted whenever it can be unequivocally inferred from the context.
E.5 Goal
The goal of this appendix is to compute the probability distribution underlying the number of infected
nodes at the end of a game of Threshold Contagion.
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Figure 2: An example game of Threshold Contagion. Here N=11, l=1, R=3, Rˆ=2, K=1 and
S=3. Notice how nodes can be linked to themselves, form loops, or be linked more than once. An
initial set of S nodes (1) is infected by the player (2). The game then unfolds in contagion steps (3 to
6): whenever a node has at least Rˆ infected predecessors, it becomes infected. This example shows
how easily a game of Threshold Contagion can converge to a fully-infected configuration.
• U ri>0 =N ri −N ri−1.
• For any j, W ri [j] =⇒W ri+1[j].
• V ri is a non-decreasing function of i and V ri ≤R.
From the above follows that all random variables converge for i→∞.
The codomains of N , U , W and V are all finite. Therefore, all random variables converge in a
finite number of steps.
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Corollary 2. All rounds terminate in a finite number of contagion steps.
Notation 10 (End of round). We use N r∞, U r∞, W r∞[j], V r∞ to denote the values of N , U , W , V at
the end of round r.
The goal of this appendix is to compute the probability distribution underlying the random variable
γ(N,R,l,K,S,Rˆ)=NK∞ (16)
i.e., the probability of a game of Threshold Contagion resulting in N¯K∞ nodes ultimately being infected.
Lemma 40 proves that Γ is a well defined variable (i.e., the limit exists) and, since K is finite, can be
computed in a finite total number of steps.
E.6 Sample space
In this section, we define a sample space for Threshold Contagion, i.e., the set of all possible outcomes
of a Threshold Contagion game. As we described in Appendix E.2, the outcome of a game of Threshold
Contagion is completely determined by two factors:
1. The topology of the random multigraph g on which Threshold Contagion is played. The
probability distribution underlying g is known, and we compute it in this section.
2. The player’s infection strategy, i.e., the nodes the player chooses to infect at the beginning
of each round. The probability distribution underlying the player’s choices is unknown and
arbitrary. In this section, we only formalize their sample space.
Thus, an element of the sample space is a pair consisting of a multigraph (1.) and an infection
strategy (2.).
E.6.1 Multigraph
As discussed in Appendix E.3.2, a game of Threshold Contagion is played on the nodes of a multigraph
g=(v,e) allowing multi-edges and loops. Every node in v has at most R predecessors. Therefore, g
can be represented by a predecessor matrix as we define it below.
We start by explicitly labeling the elements of v.
Notation 11 (Vertices). Let g=(v,e) be a multigraph, with |v|=N . Without loss of generality, we
label the elements of v using natural numbers:
v=1..N
Since every node in g has at most R predecessors, for every j∈v we can represent the elements of
p(j) as the components of a predecessor vector.
Definition 37 (Predecessor vector). A predecessor vector is an element of the set
R=({⊥}∪v)R
In a multigraph g=(v,e), whose in-degree is bound by R, we use a predecessor vector to represent
the predecessors of a node. Let r∈R be the predecessor vector of a node j∈v. If rk=⊥, we say that
the k-th predecessor of j is missing.
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As discussed in Appendix E.3.2, the predecessors of each node in v are generated by independently
sampling R times a value B¯ from a Bernoulli variable; whenever B¯=1, an additional predecessor is
uniformly picked with replacement from the elements of v. We call a vector of predecessors selected
this way a random predecessor vector, as formally defined in Definition 38.
Definition 38 (Random predecessor vector). A random predecessor vector is a predecessor
vector generated by the procedure described in Appendix E.3.2.
Let r be a random predecessor vector. For every k ∈ {1,...,R}, B¯← Bern[l] is independently
sampled; if B¯=0, rk is set to ⊥, otherwise rk is set to an element of v, picked independently with
uniform probability.








Proof. Following from Definition 38, each component of r is independently sampled. Each component
has a probability (1−l) of being missing. Each non-missing component of r has an equal probability
of being equal to any element of v.
As we discussed in Appendix E.3.2, the multigraph g= (v,e) is constructed by independently
generating the predecessors for each node in v. Therefore, the topology of g is completely determined
by N predecessor vectors, that can be organized in a predecessor matrix.
Definition 39 (Predecessor matrix). A predecessor matrix is an element of the set
G=RN
Notation 12 (Predecessor matrix). Since a predecessor matrix uniquely identifies a multigraph, we
interchangebly use g to denote a predecessor matrix and its corresponding multigraph. Let g be a
predecessor matrix defining a multigraph (v,e), then gj is the predecessor vector of node j∈v.
Definition 40 (Random predecessor matrix). A random predecessor matrix is a predecessor
matrix representing the outcome of the multigraph generation process described in Appendix E.3.2.
More formally, a random predecessor matrix consists of N independent random predecessor vectors.















Figure 3: An example multigraph g=(v,e) with 7 nodes. A subset X⊆v is highlighted. Numbered
dots represent the elements of v, and the edges to nodes 1, 2 and 3 are displayed. With R=3 and
Rˆ= 2, we have g1 /∈ R˜X , g2 ∈ R˜X , and g3 ∈ R˜X . Note how the predecessor vector of node 2 is in
the sub-threshold predecessor set of X even if node 2 is in X. Note how node 3 has one missing
predecessor (i.e., one of the elements in g3 is ⊥). The nodes whose predecessor vectors are in R˜X are
highlighted.
E.6.2 Sub-threshold predecessor set
As discussed in Appendix E.3, a epidemic process consists of a sequence of contagion steps. Let
s=((v,e),w) be a contagion state. In a contagion step, a healthy node j∈v (j∈w) becomes infected if
at least Rˆ of its predecessors are infected, i.e., if
|p(j)∩w|≥Rˆ
Given the set w, the set of predecessor vectors that do not satisfy the condition in Appendix E.6.2
is uniquely defined. We define sub-threshold predecessor sets to capture this notion.
Definition 41 (Sub-threshold predecessor set). Let g be a predecessor matrix defining a multigraph





R˜X contains all the predecessor vectors in R that have less than Rˆ components in X.
Figure 3 shows an example multigraph where the predecessors of three nodes are displayed, two of
which are in the sub-threshold predecessor set of a given set X.
E.6.3 Player’s strategy
As discussed in Appendix E.3, at the beginning of each round of Threshold Contagion the player
selects, if possible, S distinct healthy nodes and infects them. These are the only K choices the player
makes throughout Threshold Contagion. Moreover, the player has no knowledge of the topology of the
multigraph g on which Threshold Contagion is played.
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The player’s choices can be expressed in an infection strategy, as we formally define it in this
section. Together with the topology of the multigraph on which the game is played, an infection
strategy uniquely determines the outcome of an instance of Threshold Contagion.
Let g= (v,e) be the multigraph on which Threshold Contagion is played. At the beginning of
round r, the player knows the value of W r
′
i [j] for every r
′<r, every i∈N and every j∈v, which we
encode in an infection history. The player chooses a set of S of the nodes that are healthy at the
beginning of round r. We model this choice with an infection function. We call infection strategy the
sequence of choices the player makes throughout the game.





An infection history is a table with three indices. The first represents the round, the second
represents the step, the third represents the node. Let h∈Hr, then hr′i′ [j]=> signifies that node j is
infected at round r′ and step i′.
Notation 13 (Round and step order). Let r,r′ be round numbers, let i,i′ be step numbers. We say
that (r,i)<(r′,i′) if (r,i) temporally precedes (r′,i′). More formally
(r,i)<(r′,i′)⇐⇒(r′>r)∨(r′=r∧i′>i)








A valid infection history is an infection history where a node is never healed. If a node is infected
at round r′ and step i′, then it also infected at any subsequent round r′′ and step i′′.
Definition 44 (Incomplete infection history). An incomplete infection history for round r>0





An incomplete infection history is a valid infection history with at least S healthy nodes at the
end of round r−1.
Definition 45 (Infection function). An infection function for round r is an element of the set
Fr=
{
f :H+r →P{1..N}(S) |∀x∈f(h),hr−1∞ [x]=⊥
}
An infection function is a function that inputs an incomplete infection history and outputs a set of
S nodes, all of which are healthy at the end of round r−1.





The first element of an infection strategy is a set of S nodes to infect at the beginning of round 0.
Let r>0, the r-th element of an infection strategy is an infection function for round r.
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An infection strategy encodes all the choices a player makes during a game of Threshold Contagion:
• At the beginning of round 0, the player has no information available. All nodes are healthy, and
its choice reduces to selecting S of them to infect.
• At the beginning of round r≥1, the information available to the player is the propagation of
the infection throughout all previous rounds. Such information is input to the r-th infection
function, which returns a set of S healthy nodes to infect.
E.6.4 Sample space
In Appendix E.6, we noticed how the outcome of a game of Threshold Contagion is completely
determined once both the topology of the multigraph and the strategy of the player are known.
In Appendix E.6.1, we showed how a multigraph can be expressed with a predecessor matrix,
defined the space of predecessor matrices and derived the probability distribution underlying random
predecessor matrices.
In Appendix E.6.3, we showed how the choices that a player makes at the beginning of each round
in response to the infection history can be encoded in infection strategies. We then defined the space
of infection strategies. Unlike random multigraphs, infection strategies are under the control of the
player. Therefore, a probability distribution over the space of infection strategies is not available.
As we discussed in Appendix E.6, an element of the sample space is a pair of a multigraph and an
infection strategy.
Definition 47 (Sample space). The sample space for Threshold Contagion is the set Ω=G×F .
Lemma 43. Let ω=(g,f) be a random element of Ω. Then P[g¯,f¯]=P[g¯]P[f¯], i.e., g and f are
independent.
Proof. It immediately follows from the fact that the player has no knowledge of the topology of the
multigraph g.
E.7 Random variables as sample functions
In Appendix E.4 we intuitively defined a set of random variables to capture useful properties of a
game of Threshold Contagion. In the next sections, we use those random variables to compute the
probability distribution underlying the number of infected nodes at the end of a game.
In Appendix E.6 we formally defined the sample space of a game of Threshold Contagion. We
started by showing that an instance of the game is completely determined once the topology of the
multigraph and the strategy of the player are known. We also computed the probability of any specific
multigraph topology occurring.
In this section, we rigorously re-define the random variables we defined in Appendix E.4 by
expressing them as functions on the sample space as defined in Appendix E.6.
E.7.1 Infection history
As discussed in Appendix E.6.3, an infection function for round r inputs an incomplete infection
history for round r and outputs a set of S nodes to infect out of those that are healthy at the end of
round r−1.
We introduce two useful functions to manipulate infection histories.
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Definition 48 (Sample history function). The sample history function for round r is the function






The sample history function for round r inputs a sample ω and outputs the valid infection history
for round r produced by ω.
Note how the definition of sample history function relies on the definition of the infection status
W . We introduced W in Appendix E.4, and we formally define it in the next section.
Definition 49 (Sample completion function). The sample completion function for round r is





The sample completion function for round r inputs a sample and outputs > if the infection history
of the sample is complete at round r, and ⊥ otherwise.
E.7.2 Infection status
As stated in Appendix E.3.2, the infection status is defined as follows:
• At the beginning of the game, all the nodes are healthy.
• During the first step of each round, the player selects a set of S healthy nodes and infects them.
• During every subsequent step, every healthy node that has at least Rˆ infected predecessors is
infected.
• The infection state at the end of a round is carried without change to the beginning of the next
round.
In order to formalize the above in the definition of infection status, we preliminarly define infection
sets.
Definition 50 (Infection set). The infection set at round r and step i is the random variable
Wˆ ri :Ω→P(1..N) defined by
Wˆ ri (ω)={j∈1..N |W ri [j](ω)=>}
The infection set Wˆ ri (ω) represents the set of nodes that are infected in ω at round r and step i.
Like the sample history function, the definition of infection set relies on the definition of infection
status W , which we can now define by cases.
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Definition 51 (Infection status). Let ω=(g,f)∈Ω. The infection status for round r, step i and
node j is the random variable W ri [j] :Ω→{>,⊥} defined by
W 00 [j](ω) =⊥ (18)
W r>00 [j](ω) =W
r−1
∞ [j](ω) (19)
W 01 [j](ω) =
{
> iffj∈f0
W 00 [j](ω) otherwise
(20)
W r>01 [j](ω) =
{
> iffcr(ω)=⊥∧ j∈fr(hr(ω))








The above equations encode the following properties:
• At the beginning of the game (Equation (18)), all nodes are healthy.
• The infection status at the beginning of round r>0 (Equation (19)) is equal to the infection
status at the end of round r−1.
• During step 1 of round 0 (Equation (20)), all the nodes in f0 are infected. Intuitively, the player
selects S nodes and infects them. Note how this choice is not informed by any history (following
from Definition 46, f0 is a set and not a function).
• During step 1 of round r> 0 (Equation (21)), if ω is not complete (i.e., there are at least S
healthy nodes at the beginning of round r), all the nodes in fr(hr(ω)) are infected. Intuitively,
the player selects S healthy nodes and infects them. This choice is informed by the infection
history for round r (see Definition 48).
• During step i > 0 of any round r (Equation (22)), all the nodes whose predecessor vector is
not in the sub-threshold predecessor set (see Definition 41) of the infection set at step i−1 are
infected. In other words, the contagion rule (see Appendix E.1.3) is applied, and all the nodes
that have at least Rˆ infected predecessors are infected.
Following from Definition 51, we prove that nodes are never healed in a game of Threshold
Contagion.
Lemma 44. Let j∈1..N , r,r′∈1..K, i,i′∈N, let ω∈Ω. If (r′,i′)≥(r,i), then
W ri [j](ω)=>=⇒W r
′
i′ [j](ω)





i′′ [j](ω) =⇒W r
′′
i′′+1[j](ω)=> (23)
The lemma is proved by induction on Equations (19) and (23).
Corollary 3. The infection set Wˆ ri (ω) is non-decreasing in (r,i).
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E.7.3 Infection size, frontier size and infected predecessors count
In Appendix E.7.2, we defined the infection status W ri [j] as a function on the sample space (see




As stated in Appendix E.4, the infection size N ri represents the number of infected nodes at round
r and step i, and the frontier size U ri>0 represents the number of nodes that are infected at round r
and step i, but not at step i−1. We can formalize the above in the following definitions.
Definition 52 (Infection size). The infection size for round r and step i is the random variable
N ri :Ω→0..N defined by
N ri (ω)=
∣∣∣Wˆ ri (ω)∣∣∣
The infection size counts the infected nodes at step (r,i).
Definition 53 (Frontier size). The frontier size for round r and step i is the random variable




The infection size counts the nodes that are infected at step (r,i), but not at step (r,i−1).
As stated in Appendix E.4, the infected predecessors count of node j for round r and step i
represents the number of predecessors of node j that are infected at round r and step i. We can
formalize this definition in the following.
Definition 54 (Infected predecessors count). Let ω=(g,f)∈Ω. The infected predecessors count
of node j for round r and step i is the random variable V ri [j] :Ω→0..R defined by
V ri [j](ω)=
∣∣∣{k |(gj,k)∈Wˆ ri (ω)}∣∣∣
The infected predecessors count counts the number of predecessors of node j that are infected at
step (r,i).
Lemma 45. Let ω=(g,f)∈Ω, let j∈1..N , r∈1..K, i∈N. Then
g∈R˜Wˆ ri [j]⇐⇒V ri [j](ω)≤Rˆ
Proof. It follows immediately from Definitions 41 and 54.
E.8 Contagion step
In Appendix E.7, we expressed the random variables we introduced in Appendix E.4 as functions over
the elements of the sample space we defined in Appendix E.6. As we established in Appendix E.5, the
goal of this appendix is to compute the distribution underlying NK∞ (see Equation (16)).
Here we focus on the contagion steps of a round of Threshold Contagion. As per Equation (22),
at every step (r,i) such that i>1, all the healthy nodes that have at least Rˆ infected predecessors
become infected.
In this section, we show that a contagion step defines a Markov chain with states (N¯ ri ,U¯
r
i ). More




=P[N ri+1 =N¯ ′,U ri+1 = U¯ ′ |N ri =N¯ ,U ri = U¯] (24)
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Intuitively, this means that, once the infection size and the frontier size at step (r,i) are determined,
no other knowledge is needed to compute the probability distribution underlying the frontier size at
step (r,i+1). This means, in particular, that the payer’s infection strategy does not affect the end
result of the game. This result is somewhat unsurprising: since the player has no knowledge of the
multigraph on which Threshold Contagion is played, she has no way to meaningfully distinguish two
nodes by the effect that their infection will have on the system. Since the number of infected nodes
per round is determined, every choice of the player can be shown to be effectively equivalent to the
infection of S random healthy nodes.
E.8.1 Roadmap






to denote the subset of the sample space Ω that







−1(N¯ ri )∩(U ri )−1(U¯ ri )
In order to show that a pebbling step defines a Markov chain with states (N¯ ri ,U¯
r
i ), we:
• Define a set of partition functions Sri :Ω→P(Ω) that map elements of Ω into well-structured
subsets of Ω. Intuitively, Sri maps a sample ω=(g,f) to a set of samples that are similar to it
(by a notion of similarity that we define later).
• Let ω′∈Sri (ω). We show that ω and ω′ result in the same infection history up to step (r,i).
• We show that Sri can be used to define an equivalence relation on the sample space Ω.
• Let ω be equivalent to ω′ through Sri . We show that, since N ri (ω)=N ri (ω′) and U ri (ω)=U ri (ω′),




















given that ω is in sh is analitically computable and independent of h.
• We use the independence across partitions to compute the terms of MN¯ ′,U¯ ′
N¯,U¯
E.8.2 Partition functions
We start by defining a set of partition functions Sri :Ω→P(Ω) that map elements of Ω into subsets of
Ω. Intuitively, a partition function maps a sample to a set of samples that are similar to it.
Let ω=(g,f)∈Ω, let ω′=(g′,f ′)∈Sri (ω). We define Sri such that the following hold:
• f ′=f , i.e., the player’s strategy is left unchanged by Sri .
• Let j ∈ 1..N be a node. If j is infected in ω at step (r,i), then g′j = gj . In other words, the
predecessors of a node that is infected at step (r,i) in ω are left unchanged by Sri .
• Let j ∈ 1..N be a node. If j is not infected in ω at step (r,i), then g′j is an element of the
sub-threshold predecessor set of Wˆ ri−1(ω). In other words, the predecessors of a node that is not
infected at step (r,i) in ω can be changed by Sri , as long as no more than Rˆ of them are infected
in ω′ at step (r,i−1). Intuitively, we allow the predecessors of j to change in a way that does
not make it infected in ω at step (r,i).
We formalize the above in the following definition.
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Definition 55 (Partition function). Let r∈1..K, i≥1, let ω=(g,f)∈Ω. The partition function














In Appendix E.8.2 we defined a set of partitions functions that map a sample ω∈Ω to a set of samples
that are similar to ω.
Let ω=(g,f)∈Ω. We designed Sri to leave unchanged the player’s strategy and the predecessors of
every node that is infected in ω at step (r,i). The predecessors of the nodes that are not infected in ω
at step (r,i) can change, as long as less than Rˆ of them are among the nodes that are infected in ω at
step (r,i−1).
Intuitively, Sri is designed to alter the topology of g in a way that does not affect its infection
history: since the predecessors of the nodes that are not infected in ω at step (r,i) are not changed,
they will still be infected in ω′. Similarly, if a node is not infected in ω at step (r,i), its predecessors
are not changed in a way that makes it infected in ω′ at step (r,i).
In this section, we formally prove this intuitive result.











Now, assume that (r′,i′)<(r,i) and, for all j∈1..N , Wˆ r′i′ (ω′)=Wˆ r
′
i′ (ω).




































































If W ri [j](ω)=⊥, then g′j∈R˜Wˆ
r
i−1(ω). Noting that (r′,i′)≤(r,i−1), from Lemma 44 it follows that
Wˆ r
′













































In Appendix E.8.2, we introduced a set of functions Sri :Ω→P(Ω) that map a sample into a set of
similar samples. In Appendix E.8.3, we proved that, if ω∈Ω and ω′∈Sri (ω), then ω and ω′ produce
the same infection history (i.e., the same values for Wˆ ri ) up to round r and step i.
In this section, we show that Sri can be used to define a equivalence relation on Ω.
Lemma 47. Let ω,ω′∈Ω. If ω′∈Sri (ω), then Sri (ω′)=Sri (ω).

























Definition 56 (Partition relation). Let ω,ω′∈Ω. If ω′∈Sri (ω), then ω′ has a partition relation




(r,i)∼ is an equivalence relation.
Proof. Let j ∈ 1..N , let ω∈Ω. Following from Equation (22), if W ri [j](ω) =⊥, then gj ∈R˜Wˆ
r
i−1(ω).
Consequently, following from Definition 55, if W ri [j](ω)=>, then
gj∈{gj}=Sri [j](ω)
and if W ri [j](ω)=⊥, then
gj∈R˜Wˆ ri−1[j](ω) =Sri [j](ω)









(r,i)∼ ω =⇒ ω (r,i)∼ ω′
therefore
(r,i)∼ is reflexive.








In Appendix E.8.4 we showed that the partition function we introduced in Appendix E.8.2 can be
used to induce an equivalence relation on the sample space Ω.
In this section, we use this result to show that a contagion step defines a Markov chain with states
(N¯ ri ,U¯
r
i ), and compute the values of its associated transition matrix M.
More formally, let r∈1..K, i≥1. In this section, we compute
P[N¯ ri+1,U¯ ri+1 |N¯ ri ,U¯ ri ]
and we show that its value is independent of the player’s strategy.
As we established in Lemma 48,
(r,i)∼ is an equivalence relation on Ω. Moreover, let ω ∈Ω, by







We can therefore use









By the law of total probability,




P[N¯ ri+1,U¯ ri+1 |sl]P[sl |〈N¯ ri ,U¯ ri 〉]
Note how P[sl |〈N¯ ri ,U¯ ri 〉] is unknown, as it depends on the probability distribution underlying the
player’s strategy. For a given h, we instead focus on computing P[N¯ ri+1,U¯ ri+1 |sh].
Roadmap In order to compute P[N¯ ri+1,U¯ ri+1 |sh], we compute the probability for a node that is not
infected in sh at step (r,i) to become infected at time (r,i+1). Let j be a node that is not infected in sh
at step (r,i). We compute the probability of it becoming infected at step (r,i+1) by first computing the
probability distribution underlying V ri−1[j]. Given V¯
r
i−1[j], we then compute the probability distribution
underlying V ri [j], and threshold it with Rˆ to compute the probability of j becoming infected at step i+1.
Notation 15 (Kronecker delta). We use δ to denote the Kronecker delta. Let i,j∈N, then
δi,j =I(i=j)
Let ω¯=(g¯,f¯)∈sh be an example of sh. Let W , W denote the set of nodes that are infected and
not infected in ω¯ at step (r,i), respectively:
W ={w1,...,wn} = Wˆ ir(ω¯)
W ={w1,...,wm} = 1..N \Wˆ ir(ω¯)
with n=N ri (ω¯) and m=N−n. Let ω=(g,f), following from Lemma 45 we have
(ω∈sh)⇐⇒
(




Let j∈W , i.e., W ri [j]=⊥. Using the independence of the distribution of each predecessor vector
in sh (see Equation (17) and Definition 55), we can compute the probability distribution underlying
V ri−1[j] in sh:
P[V¯ ri−1[j] |W ri [j],sh]=
= P
[










V¯ ri−1[j] |V ri−1[j]<Rˆ
]
Using Bayes’ theorem we get
P
[













Following from Lemma 41, each predecessor of j is independently selected with uniform probability.




of being in Wˆ ri−1. The unconditioned
number of infected predecessors of j is therefore binomially distributed:





Plugging Equation (28) in Equation (27) and noting that N ri−1 =N
r
i −U ri we get
P
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Following from Equation (17), each predecessor of j that is not in Wˆ ri−1 has an independent chance
of being in Wˆ ri . Therefore, the number of newly infected predecessors for j at step i is binomially
distributed:






V¯ ri −V¯ ri−1
)
(29)
Using the law of total probability, we can now use Equations (27) and (29) to compute the
probability distribution underlying V ri [j], given 
W ri and sh:
P[V¯ ri |W ri ,sh]= Rˆ−1∑
V¯ ri−1=0
P[V¯ ri | V¯ ri−1,W ri ,sh]P[V¯ ri−1 |W ri ,sh]
Finally, following from Lemma 45, we get the probability of W ri [j], given 
W ri and sh:
P[W ri |W ri ,sh]= R∑
V¯ ri =Rˆ
P[V¯ ri |W ri ,sh]
Since each of the N−N¯i nodes in W has an independent probability of becoming infected at round
i+1, the frontier size at step i+1, given sh is binomially distributed:
P[N¯ ri+1,U¯ ri+1 |sh]=Bin[N−N¯i,P[W ri+1 |W ri ,sh]](U¯ ri+1)δN¯ri+1−N¯ri ,U¯ri+1
We can now note how, when computing P[N¯ ri+1,U¯ ri+1 |sh], the condition on sh reduces only to a
condition on the values of N¯ ri and U¯
r




i ), the transition
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probability for the Markov chain underlying a contagion step reduces to
P[N¯ ri+1,U¯ ri+1 |N¯ ri ,U¯ ri ]= q∑
l=1
P[N¯ ri+1,U¯ ri+1 |sl]P[sl |〈N¯ ri ,U¯ ri 〉]= (30)
=P[N¯ ri+1,U¯ ri+1 |sh] q∑
l=1
P[sl |〈N¯ ri ,U¯ ri 〉]=
=P[N¯ ri+1,U¯ ri+1 |sh]
E.9 Final infection size
In Appendix E.8, we showed that a contagion steps defines a Markov chain with states (N¯ ri ,U¯
r
i ), and
we computed the values of its associated transition matrix M. In this section, we use this result to
achieve our goal to compute the probability distribution underlying the infection size at the end of a
game of Threshold Contagion.
As we established in Appendix E.8, provided with P[N¯ ri ,U¯ ri ], we can compute P[N¯ ri+1,U¯ ri+1].
Moreover, following from Corollary 2, every configuration P[N¯ r1 ,U¯ r1 ] converges in a finite number of
steps i∗ to satisfy
P[N¯ ri ,U¯ ri ]=P[N¯ ri+1,U¯ ri+1] ∀i≥ i∗
P[U ri >0]=0 ∀i≥ i∗
It is easy to see that the first step of each round (where the player selects S healthy node and
infects them) also defines a Markov chain that deterministically increases, if possible, the infection size
by S.
Specifically, the transition probabilities from step 0 to step 1 in each round are defined by:
P[N¯ r1 ,U¯ r1 ]=

P[N r0 =N¯ r1−S] iffN¯ r1 ≥S,U¯ r1 =S
P[N r0 =N¯ r1 ] iffN¯ r1 >(N−S),U¯ r1 =0
0 otherwise
(31)
The distribution underlying the final infection size can be computed as follows:
• The distribution underlying the first step of the game is known:
P[N¯00 ,U¯00 ]=δN¯00 ,0δU¯00 ,0
• For K rounds:
– If r>0, then P[N¯ r0 ,U¯ r0 ]=P[N¯ r−1∞ ,U¯ r−1∞ ].
– Apply Equation (31) to compute P[N¯ r1 ,U¯ r1 ].
– Until convergence:
∗ Apply Equation (30) to compute P[N¯ ri ,U¯ ri ].
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